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Abstract 
 
Constructing Alternatives to Western Modernity:  
CONAMAQ’s Struggle for Indigenous Autonomy in the Bolivian 
Altiplano 
 
Bridget Kelsey Footit, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Charles R. Hale 
 
How are indigenous peoples negotiating their cultural, political, and economic 
autonomy in twenty-first century Bolivia? This thesis explores one iteration of that 
struggle, through a case study of the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu 
(Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu, CONAMAQ). I provide a 
historical overview of how highland indigenous peoples have resisted centuries of 
exclusion and forced assimilation through state and non-state avenues in order to create 
spaces for their autonomy to flourish. In particular, I emphasize CONAMAQ’s efforts to 
revalorize traditional political, juridical, economic, agricultural, and spiritual practices. I 
frame these efforts within a larger epistemological challenge to hegemonic notions of 
Western modernity and liberal citizenship.  
 
 vii 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia under president Evo Morales has accomplished 
profound institutional shifts in an effort to respect indigenous rights. However, I argue 
that the (neo)liberal understanding of a homogenous indigenous subject continues to 
drive this Proceso de Cambio (Process of Change). In order to realize the goals of a 
plurinational state (in practice, not just in title), the Bolivian government, and non-state 
actors, will need to acknowledge and respect the distinct identities and goals of different 
subjectivities throughout the country (indigenous/non-indigenous, urban/rural etc.). I 
demonstrate complex relationships amongst members of CONAMAQ, the Morales 
government, and transnational companies, through a series of land and mining conflicts 
that ultimately led to CONAMAQ’s decision to break away from a historical Unity Pact 
of civil society organizations in 2012. This discussion helps us understand the complex 
struggle for indigenous rights in Bolivia, why an indigenous movement has retracted their 
support of a supposedly pro-indigenous government, and how these struggles are tied to a 
larger effort to harvest alternatives to Western modernity.  
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Figure One: Map of Bolivia
 1 
Introduction 
“Without territory we cannot live, we are no one. Therefore, we will always 
defend Mother Earth” (Peralta 2014). These are the words of Mama Nilda Rojas, an 
indigenous Aymara woman, and current co-leader of the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y 
Markas del Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu, 
CONAMAQ) in Bolivia. She invokes a battle cry that her compatriots and their ancestors 
have asserted for hundreds of years in the struggle to reclaim indigenous land rights. How 
has this resistance to systemic discrimination developed in Bolivia? And how does 
CONAMAQ weave in and out of the larger movement?  
This thesis explores how distinct peoples with unique customs, traditions, and 
political and juridical systems collaborate, cooperate, and clash. I consider efforts that 
have emerged to harvest social change as well as the obstacles that impede profound 
transformation. While much has been written about the revival of indigenous identity and 
mobilization in Latin America and specifically Bolivia, very little has been written about 
CONAMAQ and their struggle to re-valorize traditional political, juridical, economic, 
agricultural, educational, and spiritual practices. By focusing on the rise of this Andean 
movement in the 1990s, and their efforts to gain greater autonomy throughout neoliberal 
and ‘post-neoliberal’ governments, this thesis provides a nuanced perspective on the 
ways that certain indigenous peoples are challenging hegemonic notions of Western 
modernity and liberal citizenship.  
A historical exploration developed throughout the first two chapters of this thesis 
will provide necessary context in order to ultimately understand why CONAMAQ 
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recently decided to break away from a decade-long Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact). Why 
has this indigenous movement distanced itself from an alliance with four other civil 
society organizations and a left-wing political party that have been main proponents of 
pro-indigenous social change in twenty-first century Bolivia? I propose that scholars and 
journalists alike have simplified the motivations behind CONAMAQ’s decision to leave 
the Unity Pact. While most sources attribute this rupture to the 2011 TIPNIS land conflict 
(in which the government supported building a highway through indigenous protected 
territories), there is much more lying beneath the surface. By looking at a longer 
historical period and engaging with heterogeneous perspectives from within the 
movement, we see that CONAMAQ’s decision to break away from the Unity Pact is 
deeply rooted in epistemological discrepancies over land use and development.  
 
THEORETICAL LENSES 
I situate CONAMAQ’s movement in the broader theoretical context of 
coloniality, indigenous rights, decolonization, and alternatives to Western modernity. 
While these themes will become clear at different points throughout the body of this text, 
two theoretical lenses are worth pointing out from the start. The first refers to 
heterogeneity amongst indigenous peoples, and the second recognizes the importance of 
social emancipation outside of state domination.  
Early scholars of indigenous studies searched for similarities amongst diverse 
groups, pinpointing a spiritual connection to the land and common liberating struggles 
against conquest, genocide, and political marginalization. This scholarly approach is 
supported by neoliberal-multicultural systems of governance that tend to homogenize 
indigenous peoples in order to create a limited space for certain permitted types of others 
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to exist. However, with the onset of the twenty-first century, scholars such as John 
Bowen (2000), Charles Hale (2005), Karen Engle (2010), and Joanne Rappaport (2013) 
brought attention to the profound heterogeneity amongst and within indigenous peoples 
as well as the immobilizing effects of lumping them together.  
The following analysis contributes to this strain of thought, recognizing that there 
are many different ways of being indigenous in contemporary Bolivia. Throughout the 
entirety of this essay I am careful not to homogenize indigenous peoples under one 
othered category. In particular, chapter one and two will elaborate on the similarities and 
differences between highland and lowland indigenous peoples, and chapter three will 
engage with the diversity of beliefs within CONAMAQ. Recognizing this heterogeneity, 
I propose that the newly founded Plurinational State of Bolivia must move beyond 
dichotomies of highland/lowland and urban/rural, to recognize that being indigenous in 
the twenty-first century encompasses a plurality of histories, identities, and lived 
experiences.  
In order for multiple ways of being indigenous to coexist, many scholars, 
politicians, activists, and grassroots movements strive to create a pluriverse (Blaser 2010, 
de la Cadena 2010, Escobar 2011, Mignolo 2011). This is a global system in which a 
plurality of ways of knowing and being are recognized as equally legitimate. It de-centers 
the Eurocentric mode of thought that assumes universal notions of Truth, objectivity and 
a linear notion of progress. Recognizing that the majority of the world is not supported by 
this system, it emphasizes racialized and gendered Western influence on non-Western 
culture, psychology, linguistics, and bureaucracy. By analyzing CONAMAQ’s 
recuperation of traditional knowledges, technologies, and political and legal structures, I 
consider whether Bolivian soil is fertile ground for the emergence of a pluriverse. 
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This effort to recognize many ways of being and thinking is dependent on the 
social emancipation of historically subjugated subjects. Raquel Gutierrez states that this 
process is most dignified and possible when enacted independently from the state. 
Drawing on John Holloway, she suggests that, “Taking power is a condition neither 
necessary nor sufficient to change the world” (2012, 55-57). On the contrary, she argues 
that emancipation is reliant on the “recurrent upheaval and escape from what is imposed 
on us as actuality and as destiny… it lies in the persistence of the capacity to subvert the 
dominant order” (2012, 57-58). In other words, social change is a politics of disruption 
enacted by thinking critically and challenging hegemony.  
Members of CONAMAQ agree with this perspective that the radical change 
necessary to overcome colonial and postcolonial racism and sexism will not come merely 
through state reform. While President Morales has accomplished significant social and 
economic changes (including the establishment of a Vice Ministry of Decolonization), his 
Proceso de Cambio (Process of Change) is not the Pachacuti—the complete overturning 
of societal hierarchies—that many indigenous peoples hoped for. CONAMAQ recognizes 
that the state is an inherently colonial organism. Therefore, their goals do not rely on 
creating a political party to generate institutional change, but rather pushing state policies 
from an outsider’s stance. This is deeply rooted in a desire to revive and legitimize pre-
Columbian organizational structures that precede colonial conquest and the Bolivian 
nation state. CONAMAQ has learned how to act creatively within and without the 
geographic and ideological boundaries of the state in order to push for profound social 
change. This thesis will explore numerous ways in which the state’s bureaucratic 
processes have pacified and even demobilized social movements through 
institutionalization and appropriation—a trap that CONAMAQ strives to evade. 
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While Gutierrez recognizes the need to create social change outside of state 
governance, there are many different tiers of association and distance. Charles Hale 
(2011) explores different strategies of grassroots movements that have either completely 
refused to engage with the state or maintained their separation while working within the 
ideological boundaries of political frameworks. He recognizes the risks of the former 
stance that focuses on utopian dreams without recognizing the here and now, often 
resulting in the inability to meet immediate needs. In the latter case, by working within 
the system, movements risk appropriation and entrapment (2011, 203). Using this lens 
will be particularly helpful in chapter three of this thesis as a way to theorize the internal 
dynamics of CONAMAQ. We will see how “impossible subjects” utilize radical refusal 
while others accept funding and support from the government at the risk of complying 
with a profoundly capitalist system.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is informed by two months of ethnographic research conducted in the 
departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, and Potosí in June and July of 2014.1 During this 
time I interviewed current and former leaders and members of CONAMAQ, Bolivian 
intellectuals, and allies of the movement. I also attended government and non-
government sponsored events. My fieldwork is supplemented by archival research in the 
Benson Latin American Collection, newspaper articles collected at CEDIB (Bolivian 
                                                 
1 The origins of this project run much deeper than this master’s thesis. In 2010, I began researching the 
intersections between spirituality and the environment in the Inca Empire, which inspired me to learn about 
more contemporary Bolivian history and the rise of President Evo Morales. In 2011, I spent five months 
living in La Paz, studying at the Universidad Privada de Bolivia and traveling throughout the country with 
the School for International Training. As a final research project, I interviewed functionaries of the Vice-
Ministry of Decolonization and the Unit of Depatriarchalization as a way to understand how the state was 
spearheading efforts to put decolonization theory into practice. This background has greatly informed this 
thesis in direct and indirect ways. 
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Documentation and Information Center), and public resolutions, declarations, 
photographs and film clips provided by members of CONAMAQ.  
Compiling the details of certain events has been difficult from afar due to 
temporal and spatial restrictions. Particularly in chapters two and three, I utilize blog 
posts that are explicit about their political bias. I use these sources recognizing that they 
may not provide a complete picture, but because they serve to illuminate a side of the 
story that is not generally reported in traditional media or formal accounts. I recognize 
that no primary or secondary source is ever complete, but rather one piece of an utterly 
complicated picture. 
Throughout this thesis I favor detailed description, and then critical reflection. My 
goal is primarily to present a reality to a broader audience and secondarily to analyze the 
larger implications of these actions in a global and historical context. I hope that this 
technique will promote a philosophy of listening as modeled by Audra Simpson (2000). 
Given my positionality as a white woman trained in a western institution of higher 
learning, perhaps the most productive thing I can do is to step into the background and 
act as a platform for other people to speak. I therefore include the voices of members of 
CONAMAQ without imposing my perspectives and opinions as a way to listen in silence, 
and encourage the reader to follow suit.  
I do not aim to tell the story of CONAMAQ, but rather the way that I have come 
to view CONAMAQ through my research. I do not claim to be representative of the 
entire movement that includes people from 16 indigenous nations across seven different 
departments. This would be irresponsible and impossible given the amount of time that I 
have spent in the highlands of Bolivia. Nonetheless, I hope that the story I have compiled 
will serve to spark transnational dialogue about the strategies and struggles of defending 
social justice 
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My own methodology is inspired by activist anthropologists and decolonial 
scholars such as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Florencia Mallon, 
Joanne Rapaport, Mario Blaser, Charles Hale, and Donna Haraway. I view the effort to 
minimize hierarchical relationships between scholar and community as a crucial 
development in academia. I do not claim to be a neutral, objective observer. My personal 
dedication to imagining alternatives to Western hegemony, capitalism, neoliberalism, and 
neo-extractivism align with those of the indigenous people I work with in Bolivia.  
I hope that telling the following story will contribute to a movement that aims to 
awaken the masses that have become placated by the seeming inevitability of capitalism. 
David Graeber refers to the current political moment as one in which, “we are left in the 
bizarre situation of watching the capitalist system crumbling before our very eyes, at just 
the moment everyone had finally concluded no other system would be possible” (2013). 
While this is true in many contexts, Graeber has overlooked the many indigenous 
movements throughout the world that strive to create and maintain a space outside of 
exploitative capitalist structures. By making CONAMAQ’s struggle visible to a Western 
audience, I hope to demonstrate the existence, potential, and possibility of alternatives 
grounded in lived experience. I do not see these alternatives as utopian, but rather 
inspiration for reflection, reevaluation, and continued resistance. I am dedicated to 
fostering communication through transnational networks so that the struggles of 
CONAMAQ might influence other indigenous and non-indigenous movements 
throughout the world, and so that CONAMAQ may also learn from the strategies of 
international movements. 
Furthermore, I believe that indigenous struggles are human struggles. We are all 
interconnected in a human ecological system, so that changing the way that people live 
and relate to the earth is necessary for all of human survival. In this vein, my positionality 
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as a scholar and activist in the United States is intimately connected to histories and 
contemporary iterations of invasion and exploitation. I hope to use my voice in the 
United States to change a culture of heedless exportation of imperialist Truths, and 
thoughtless consumption of material goods, in order to confront climate change and 
environmental racism that disproportionately affects the global South and marginalized 
populations within the global North. 
This thesis aims to engage with the complexities of being indigenous in a country 
ruled by an indigenous man, but in a predominantly Western liberal world burdened by 
the legacies of colonialism and imperialism. I hope to present contradictions in an active 
manner, not as a way to paralyze us from creating change but as a way to inspire us to 
think critically and take action. I do not aim to pose dichotomies between predatory state 
and defenders of indigenous rights, but rather blur these lines so as to recognize the deep 
embeddedness of racialized and gendered structures in everyday interactions. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
Three major historical periods guide the following investigation. In chapter one, I 
focus on exclusion and forced assimilation of indigenous peoples in Bolivia during 
Spanish colonial occupation and internal colonialism within the national Republic. 
Tracing this history, in combination with ongoing indigenous resistance situates the 
founding of CONAMAQ in 1997. This section is contextualized within scholarship on 
liberal citizenship, and the rise of identity politics and indigenous rights on an 
international, regional (Andean), and national scale. In chapter two, I investigate the role 
of CONAMAQ in the formation of the Unity Pact (2005), an alliance amongst five 
different Bolivian social movements that supported President Evo Morales in his ascent 
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to power. I analyze CONAMAQ’s role in the Constituent Assembly (2006-2007) to 
better understand how they utilize the language of the state to preserve their right to live 
and think autonomously according to their own traditions. Finally, chapter three describes 
a series of land and mining conflicts amongst members of CONAMAQ, the Morales 
government, and transnational companies that ultimately led to CONAMAQ’s decision to 
break away from the Unity Pact in 2012. Each of these events helps us understand the 
complex struggle for indigenous rights in Bolivia, why an indigenous movement has 
retracted their support of a supposedly pro-indigenous government, and how these 
struggles are tied to a larger effort to harvest alternatives to Western modernity.
 10 
Chapter One: Indigenous Determination in the Wake of Colonial and 
Liberal Exclusion 
In June 2014 I met two young men at an international anti-imperialist conference 
outside of Cochabamba, Bolivia. They were dressed in colorful ponchos, and knitted 
chullo hats with the indigenous whipala flag draped around their shoulders. Their 
communities had sent them to this meeting as representatives of their highland 
indigenous organization, the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ). After explaining my research to these men, I asked if they could tell me 
about the history of their organization. With great excitement, the younger man 
immediately responded, Well it begins with the Spanish colonization of indigenous 
peoples. He deferred to his friend who was a bit older, a local leader, or Mallku, of his 
community. Tell her about how our people were colonized. Tell her about how they 
enslaved our ancestors. We postponed this conversation so that we could attend the 
scheduled conference discussions, but not before coordinating a time to meet the next day 
and a trip for me to visit their community in Northern Potosí.  
Upon asking these young men about the history of their indigenous organization, I 
expected them to begin with the inauguration in 1997, or perhaps a few years earlier to 
establish context. To my surprise, they began at the moment of indigenous contact with 
Spanish Colonizers nearly five hundred years ago. They shared the collective memory 
that their parents and grandparents have passed down to them, recounting how foreigners 
invaded their land, enslaved their ancestors, and exploited their resources. They shared a 
flame of resistance against the oppressive legacy of colonialism, and for the revitalization 
and revalorization of indigenous customs and traditions. For this reason, it seems only 
right to begin the following story in a similar manner.  
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The ensuing chapter situates the rise of CONAMAQ, a contemporary Bolivian 
highland indigenous organization, within the context of a five hundred year legacy of 
colonialism, the imposition of Western modernity’s liberal citizenship, and the 
emergence of the global indigenous rights movement. The history presented here is 
general and sweeping at times, but serves to frame short and long term systemic 
discrimination of indigenous peoples as well as determined resistance. Ultimately, it 
helps to contextualize CONAMAQ’s contemporary clashes with the Bolivian 
government and other civil society organizations. 
Chapter one explores how indigenous peoples have fought for greater autonomy 
from colonial and liberal governments. In this sense, they exist in a space neither 
completely inside nor outside the colony or nation state, never truly autonomous nor 
conquered, but negotiating a unique third space. A particular emphasis on laws excluding 
indigenous peoples from land and voting rights situates CONAMAQ’s struggle for 
political and cultural autonomy, collective land rights, and preservation of natural 
resources. The final section of this chapter will describe the founding mission of 
CONAMAQ to recuperate pride and dignity for highland indigenous knowledges, 
technologies, and traditions through cultural, political, and legal systems. 
In the scope of this thesis’ larger argument, the following chapter contextualizes 
the emergence of CONAMAQ on a vast historical and geographic scale. It establishes 
CONAMAQ as one of many organizations in the global movement for indigenous rights, 
as well as the current day iteration of a long trajectory of resistance in Bolivia. 
Subsequent chapters will emphasize CONAMAQ’s struggles for autonomy through 
negotiations with the Bolivian government, other civil society organizations, and 
transnational companies (from formal written proposals to street level protests). 
However, to begin with, we must respect the will of my friends from Northern Potosí and 
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engage in a discussion about the Spanish colonization of Bolivia and the legacies of 
oppression that have haunted indigenous peoples for centuries.  
 
SPANISH COLONIALISM  
The Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire in 1532 persists in the collective 
memory of many Bolivians today. With firearms, horses, and infectious diseases, 
colonizers thrived on mechanisms of physical domination, accumulation of territory, and 
exploitation of labor. Whether through the spread of disease, overworking slaves to 
death, or outright murder, the Spanish enacted genocide on indigenous peoples. Estimates 
show that the Andean indigenous population decreased by over fifty percent in the mid-
sixteenth century. However, a logic of conquest was coupled with economic exploitation 
that depended on enslaved labor. That is, genocide does not imply complete elimination 
as portrayed by the disappearing native trope, but rather a violent and xenophobic 
practice that has continued to shape native and non-native relations. 
Colonizers manipulated Inca systems of collective, reciprocal labor to earn 
excessive riches for the crown creating an interdependent market relationship between 
center and periphery. They enslaved indigenous and African peoples to extract gold and 
silver, and cultivate large agricultural haciendas. This practice ignored native practices of 
subsistence farming and techniques of irrigation, terracing, and crop rotation and 
diversification. These traditional methods, long-perfected in the region, were seen as un-
scientific and amateur in the age of European Enlightenment and scientific exploration. 
Europe’s modernizing project of industrialization was not only dependent on colonial 
natural resources and labor, but simultaneously excluded peripheral peoples from 
modernizing. That is, indigenous peoples became the antithesis of modernity in the 
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colonizer’s social imaginary. Spaniards justified this forceful implementation of 
European systems with the rationale of spreading mercantilism as a superior system to 
reign over indigenous reciprocal archipelagic trade. Differential ways of understanding 
the relationship between labor, production, consumption, and dignity has marked a 
persistent clash between descendants of pre-Columbian empires and Spanish and mestizo 
lineages. These epistemological discrepancies over practices of land use and development 
guide this thesis as a lens to understand continued resistance to Western logics of 
modernity. 
Colonial missionaries imposed Catholic ideological values in an effort to save and 
civilize those they deemed ‘savage pagans’. They destroyed huacas (spiritual sites) and 
forbid local peoples from conducting ceremonies for their numerous deities that helped 
assure abundant crops and control harsh weather (McEwan 2006). Spanish colonizers 
imposed the patriarchal values of Catholicism, teaching women that they were born from 
the rib of Adam and are therefore inferior to men. They used the logic of elimination 
(through religious conversion and cultural assimilation) to augment self-proclaimed 
moral superiority and eliminate other modes of being and thinking. 
Spanish colonization began to restructure indigenous ontological and 
epistemological subjectivities throughout the long colonial period in Bolivia (1532-1825). 
Western values of individualism, accumulation, patriarchy, and profit began to 
overshadow indigenous Andean values of collectivity, reciprocity, and subsistence. In an 
interview with a government functionary of the Bolivian Viceministry of Decolonization, 
he explained the effects of colonialism to me by saying that,  
 
The most fundamental change is that they began to restructure schemes of 
thinking… It was an imposition that is difficult to break… The 
[indigenous] philosophy was ama llulla: do not lie. So there was no 
sentiment of deception. Ama súa: do not steal. Therefore, there was no 
 14 
necessity to have doors on homes because there were no thieves. Ama 
q’ella, do not be lazy. Everyone worked [interview conducted by author, 
November 22, 2011; Translated by author].   
The ideology of ama llulla, ama súa, and ama q’ella guided pre-Columbian Andean 
society, and continues to motivate contemporary indigenous Bolivians as they strive to 
replace Western capitalist logics of accumulation with collective moral guiding 
principles. As with all ideologies, the absence of deceit, thievery, and laziness is not an 
exact reflection of society, but rather a goal to strive for. Therefore, most indigenous 
peoples I spoke with recognize the faults of many ancestors, but also the guiding 
principles that re-connected them to their society.  
The process of imposing Western values and ways of thinking was forceful at 
times, but also became an act of strategic self- driven assimilation. For example, 
anthropologist Edgar Esquit has written extensively about processes of education and 
professionalization as a way to enhance the position of indigenous Guatemalans 
throughout the twentieth century (2010). He writes about how indigenous peoples opted 
for education or military service to learn the tools of elite institutions in order to combat 
and confront racism and push for social mobility. We can imagine that many indigenous 
peoples within the Spanish colony and the Bolivian Republic may have used catholic 
conversion, or learning the colonial language as a way to gain the trust of colonizers, to 
augment dialogue, negotiation, and minimize brutal treatment. 
Physical, psychological, epistemological, and spiritual violence spawned centuries 
of subjugation, but also creative resistance. Perhaps the most notable colonial indigenous 
rebellion occurred in the late eighteenth century. Aymara leader Tupac Katari fought for 
the expulsion of Spanish colonial officials in an effort to restore equilibrium to the 
Andean region. For six months, between March and October of 1781, Katari and his 
40,000 supporters (including infamous Peruvian indigenous leader Tupac Amaru) 
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maintained a siege over the city of La Paz. However, after nearly two hundred years of 
colonial domination, Spanish loyalists to the Crown quelled the uprising. They brutally 
executed Katari and many members of the rebellion, decapitating and burning them 
alive.1  This ruthless oppression has haunted the collective memory of Bolivians to this 
day, at once discouraging and motivating them to break the colonial legacy of coercion. 
The Creole and mestizo elite strengthened their political, economic, and racial 
superiority through exclusive judicial, educational, and religious systems.  The upper 
class monopolized intellectual property distributing Eurocentric logics and delegitimizing 
indigenous modes of thought. Institutionalization of individual private property 
ownership took precedence over ancestral collective territorial claims and validated land-
grabbing practices. Arbitrary nation-state borders persist in which goods, but not people, 
are able to cross. This undermines indigenous community networks that cross 
departmental and national borders like an archipelago of diverse islands. All of these 
factors contributed to a racialization process, forming indigenous and European 
subjectivities in contrast to one another. 
Colonial mechanisms that justified and maintained elite power encumbered 
Bolivia and most colonies throughout the Americas, Asia, and Africa. The following 
section engages with several theoretical interventions regarding academic understandings 
of the legacies of colonialism and Eurocentrism. This discussion will give way to an 
overview of the post-independence Bolivian Republic and the effects of liberal 
citizenship on indigenous peoples. 
 
                                                 
1 Tupac Katari’s rebellion was not the only of his time, but rather the one that has been best documented in 
written and oral histories. Nonetheless, it is worth acknowledging that Katari and his supporters stood on 
the shoulders of many indigenous leaders who fought against the initial Spanish invasion and the 
persistence of slavery.  
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THE LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM 
“They have filled our heads with the history of our colonizers.” 
- Fausto Reinaga, La Revolución India (1969) 
The colonial relationship explained above initiated a legacy of power, race and 
gender relations systematizing the exploitation of indigenous peoples. Edward Said, 
Anibal Quijano, J.M. Blaut, Walter Mignolo and Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui provide 
nuanced analyses of how European exceptionalism influenced power hierarchies in 
colonial and post-colonial contexts. They dispel myths of inherent superiority in an effort 
to respect and revive subaltern modes of thought and governance. 
Many scholars of decolonization stand on the shoulders of Edward Said. In the 
mid 1970s, he wrote extensively on the West’s patronizing perceptions and depictions of 
the other. He emphasized the subtle yet persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arab-
Islamic peoples in the Middle East, Asia, and North Africa and the role of academics in 
legitimizing superiority. The west portrayed the east as an irrational, weak, feminized 
other to bolster the West as a rational, strong, masculine subject. This xenophobia served 
to justify colonial and imperial projects throughout the world but also resulted in an 
internalization of inferiority on the part of the colonized (Said 1978). Said’s 
understanding of the East/West divide provides important tools to understand 
North/South subordination and its effects on self-making and being-made. 
In an American context, Anibal Quijano acknowledges the creation of racial 
hierarchies through his notion of the “coloniality of power” (2000). According to 
Quijano, the confrontation of three distinct “races”—African, indigenous and 
European—during the colonial encounter gave way to the formation of elaborate 
racialized power relationships that persist to this day. The hierarchy of power and race is 
based upon a colonial misunderstanding of human biology, that people of different races 
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are fundamentally different from each other, some being inferior, and others superior. 
Explorers, settlers, and anthropologists used scientific racism to connect race with control 
of paid and unpaid labor and natural resources to assure European dominance. This 
relationship has remained linked in spite of the fact that race and class are not inherently 
dependent on each other. The following thesis engages with the intersections of race, 
ethnicity, and class, to challenge stereotypes of the poor, under-developed native. It 
recognizes complex indigenous economic and political systems in an effort to question 
the centrality of a Western dominated world. 
Colonization, internal colonialism, and imperialism have strengthened the myth 
that Europe is the center of the world, the producer of knowledge, and the leader of 
progress. In The Colonizer’s Model of the World (1993), J.M. Blaut describes the 
pervasiveness of Eurocentrism in the creation and dissemination of knowledge through 
“European diffusionism”. This is the understanding that Europeans are inherently 
creative, inventive, and innovative, while non-Europeans remain stagnant because they 
inherently lack intellect and are meant to imitate instead of lead. Blaut demonstrates how 
the myth of European superiority has been perpetuated through “universal” notions of 
space and time, through the Cartesian map that places Europe at the top-center, and at the 
zero-point of time in which all other time zones are measured in relation to Greenwich, 
London.  
Blaut attacks the notion of European superiority by claiming that the “European 
miracle” is simply a myth that has been strengthened over centuries through the work of 
academics, scientists, and anthropologists. He argues that Europe did not rise to power 
autonomously, but on the backs of those they colonized. European conquest was not a 
result of inherent, natural superiority or internal characteristics, but rather, a phenomenon 
based strictly on geographic location (Blaut 1993, 183). Furthermore, non-European 
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countries are not behind in time, or peripheral in space, but have their own unique 
histories, traditions, and beliefs. This is crucial to the Bolivian context in which complex 
indigenous political, judicial, agricultural, medicinal, and spiritual practices preceded 
Spanish-imposed systems. A major goal of CONAMAQ, as we will see at the end of this 
chapter, is to revive traditional practices, in turn disproving notions of European 
exceptionalism. 
Walter Mignolo (2010) understands the basis of Eurocentrism through the theo- 
and ego- politics of knowledge. He argues that the humanitas inhabited the “epistemic 
zero point” (the center in which everything else is based), and from there, orchestrated a 
global, linear understanding of the world. Mignolo’s proposed decolonial option aims to 
displace this zero point epistemology by recognizing that multiple ways of knowing and 
being have persisted relative to where an individual is located within the epistemic and 
ontological racial coordinates of imperial knowledge. His proposed decolonial option 
aims to unveil the pretentious sense of superiority of Eurocentrism to show how illogical 
and violent their self-centered logic is (Mignolo 2010). Eurocentrism does not recognize 
that its project of Truth emanates from a specific positionality. Instead, Western 
modernity disperses certain Truths as universal and all other experiences as behind in 
time and in the order of myth, legend, or folklore. This logic serves to delegitimize 
certain political, juridical, and territorial claims, assuring the inferiority of non-
Europeans. By rejecting Eurocentrism, decolonial thinkers do not reject all European 
models, but instead recognize that there is no such thing as a universal trajectory or Truth 
that is Right, unless that Truth is that there is no Truth.  
Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui has written extensively about the long-term effects of 
European influence on indigenous and mestizo subjectivities and social stratification in 
modern Bolivia. She traces the ways in which the liberal and populist Republic of Bolivia 
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recreated colonial racial, class and gender hierarchies (2010, 45). She critiques the 
nation-state project of mestizaje as a hegemonic colonial-patriarchal ideology meant to 
subjugate and homogenize non-European peoples, particularly women. The following 
section will engage more deeply with Rivera Cusicanqui’s analysis of the effects of 
Eurocentrism in a specifically Bolivian historical and social context. 
Understanding the myth of Western superiority and its long-term effects on 
subaltern peoples is crucial to understand why the rise of indigenous rights, and the 
process of decolonization is such an important yet difficult task. It requires analyzing 
everyday thoughts and actions in an effort to delink from dominant, exploitative systems. 
Recognizing the global hierarchy of center and periphery and the internalization of 
inferiority urges and inspires scholars and activists to confront the roots of racial and 
geographic inequality. A mere critique of Western modernity however is insufficient. The 
next step is to acknowledge and respect multiple histories, traditions, and beliefs as 
equally legitimate to the story that one is a part of. Beyond simply acknowledging a 
plethora of lived experiences, we must also allow ourselves to imagine future possibilities 
that break with this long history of subordination and exploitation. Finally, we must take 
steps to live intentionally: to slow down the engine of mindless subjection to the capitalist 
machine that exploits and commodifies humans and nature, and to actively challenge the 
norm and embrace the discomfort of not knowing what will come next.  
An underlying motive of this chapter’s emphasis on colonialism, Eurocentrism 
and coloniality is to consider the long and painful history of racial and ethnic 
discrimination and the responsibility of Western institutions. This context helps to 
contextualize the long struggle for indigenous rights in Bolivia and throughout the world. 
It will help situate the difficulties of changing laws and systemic biases as well as 
personal interactions. The Western-centric world has suppressed indigenous ways of 
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thinking and being for long enough, it is time that we listen to the voices that have been 
silenced for centuries and respect their desire for self-determination. 
 
INDEPENDENCE AND NATION MAKING IN BOLIVIA 
Bolivian independence in 1825 did little to change the hierarchical relationship 
between indigenous peoples and the mestizo elite that took power. While it did guarantee 
the abolishment of slavery (1826), policies and mechanisms of elimination and 
assimilation continued to strip indigenous peoples of their identity and livelihood in order 
to integrate them into the nation state as ‘civilized’ producers and consumers within a 
Western-centric scheme of progress. The following section elaborates on the process of 
nation making in Bolivia through the imposition of Western liberal citizenship. It 
specifically focuses on land grabbing processes that sustained the subjugation of 
indigenous peoples. This serves to reinforce the distinct epistemological discrepancies 
over indigenous and non-indigenous land use and development. By drawing on theorists 
who have pinpointed exclusion as a fundamental basis of liberal citizenship, this segment 
moves beyond Bolivia’s history to interrogate the roots of social inequality inherent in 
liberal theory.  
The South American wars of independence, led by Creole elite Simón Bolívar and 
his militias, fought for a homogenous, unified region encompassing Bolivia, Peru, 
Colombia, and Venezuela. Largely influenced by European enlightenment and Lockean 
liberal theory, they strived for the creation of modern states that would integrate all 
citizens under one language and one culture. This model proved to liberate the Bolivian 
Republic from Spain’s direct control, but failed to free indigenous peoples from the 
subjugation of the creole and mestizo internal power elite.  
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Fausto Reinaga, an indigenous Bolivian intellectual, describes the exclusion of 
indigenous peoples by referring to two different Bolivian nations within the Republic’s 
territorial boundaries: one Europeanized mestizo nation, and another indigenous nation. 
He stated that,  
 
since August 1825 [the year of Bolivian independence]… the Indian fell 
victim to the revenge of both the Creole traitors of the king, and the 
national mestizos. They were subjected to the cruelest slavery they had 
ever known. There has never been a Bolivian president that did not 
massacre Indians (Reinaga 1969, 407).   
This parallels Chaterjee’s notion of “modernity in two languages”, “our modernity”, and 
“their modernity” (1998). Reinaga refers to the widespread feeling of not belonging in a 
nation that tries to include indigenous peoples by stripping them of their identity, their 
humanity, and even their lives. Like Chaterjee, Reinaga also recognizes the distinct 
visions of what progress and development, or modernity might look like for an 
indigenous nation and a mestizo Republic. 
Pablo González Casanova, a Mexican sociologist, described the transition from a 
colonial international elite to a small national elite as ‘internal colonialism’ (1965). He 
proposed the idea that indigenous communities throughout the Americas were merely 
colonies within the boundaries of nation states. The indigenous population therefore 
continued to confront exclusion, subjugation, and exploitation with resistance. In Bolivia, 
early policies within the Republic allowed the national elite to exploit indigenous labor 
through tributary taxes and usurp their land. These laws were seemingly identical to 
colonial orders in practice, if not in discourse.  
The first national leaders of Bolivia believed that indigenous peoples should be 
integrated into society little by little as a way to civilize them. This, they recognized, 
needed to be a slow and cautious practice, for the elite feared the power of strong masses 
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of indigenous peoples. This paranoia grew out of memories of Tupac Katari’s revolts, 
news of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804), and the organizational strength of 
indigenous communities or ayllus.2 The Bolivian Republic limited full liberal citizenship 
to literate, salaried, male landowners. These standards contributed to the formation of a 
mestizo, elite oligarchy that excluded nearly three quarters of the population (Larson 
2004, 204). Independence never promised to fulfill Tupac Katari’s rebellion with the goal 
of returning to an indigenous system of governance, but rather aimed to incorporate 
Bolivia into the industrial world of Western modernity. 
According to the first national census in 1846, over half of the Bolivian 
population lived in semi-autonomous ayllus with communal landholdings (Larson 2004, 
204). The rest of the population lived on private estates. Up until this point, there was 
relative leniency and tolerance for indigenous self-governance. Since indigenous peoples 
continued to pay significant tributary taxes, the republic had no option but to appease the 
masses by allowing them to live in their traditional communities and govern according to 
their local justice systems.  
However, the slow post-independence transition period ended abruptly with the 
onset of the 1870s and 1880s. This period is marked by aggressive economic liberalism 
due to the recovery of silver and tin mining in the highlands and therefore an increase in 
export economy. This spike in trade brought the “Indian problem” to the forefront of the 
political stage, as indigenous peoples were tired of paying taxes to a government that did 
not recognize their full citizenship within Bolivia nor their complete sovereignty outside 
of the Republic. Furthermore, the elite class wanted to eradicate communal indigenous 
                                                 
2 The ayllu is a complex concept that will be explained in more detail towards the end of this chapter. In the 
mean time, it is best to understand the ayllu as the total fabric of indigenous Andean communities including 
geographic location, traditions, and customs. 
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land holdings by fragmenting plots into private property to be incorporated into a free 
market economy to fund the industrialization of the modern world. 
By 1866 President Melgarejo passed a series of confiscation decrees in which the 
state became the owner of all communal property rights throughout the country. 
Indigenous peoples living on those lands therefore were forced to buy individual titles 
from the state for their ancestral land, disregarding complex indigenous ontological 
relationships with their territory. Any indigenous community unable to prove land 
possession through a formal colonial title, or too poor to pay the fee, could be stripped of 
their fields and pastures. An 1868 edict allowed wealthy landholders to hold bidding wars 
over an entire community’s territory (Larson 2004, 218). The elite class claimed that the 
state should grant them land so that they could protect Indians, and rid the state of this 
responsibility. This infantilizing whitening solution became a legitimate justification for 
re-feudalization (Larson 2004, 213-217).  
Liberalization of Bolivian policies sparked a three-year period (1869-1871) of the 
intensified indigenous resistance and rebellion. The necessity to fight for communal land 
ownership in the face of increasing privatized individualization led to a revival of 
collective indigenous identity, strengthened by a trans-regional archipelagic network of 
indigenous ayllus. However, it is crucial to recognize the differences amongst diverse 
indigenous peoples of this time. Some continued to live in their traditional ayllus, while 
others worked on haciendas or in the mines, and some who fled enslavement became 
landless foresteros. Furthermore, indigenous peoples had different levels of interaction 
with official bureaucratic structures depending on their proximity to the capital city of La 
Paz. Resistance therefore took many different strategic forms. Should communities 
search for a way to legitimize their territorial claims through formal land titles? Or should 
they reject the Spaniard-imposed written system that devalued indigenous people and 
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their traditions? Major debates ensued in regards to working either within, or without the 
dominant Bolivian Republic. 
In 1874, the Ley de Ex-vinculación granted indigenous peoples the right to 
individual landownership (under limited terms), but simultaneously stripped them of their 
right to communal landownership and absolved the ayllu as a juridical entity. The law 
dismantled Bolivia’s tributary system in which communities could collectively pay 
tribute to the state, and implemented a universal, individual property tax, expanding 
capitalism to rural areas. Indigenous peoples were integrated into liberal citizenship 
through the right to own land, but only within the mestizo elite’s jurisdictions. It assumed 
that indigenous peoples would be motivated by market incentives to buy and sell private 
property as a way to incorporate them as good citizens and their presumably “unused” 
land as productive agricultural plots. This law was based in premises of Western 
modernity that substantially differed from traditional indigenous systems of governance 
and relationships with territory. 
Zarate Willka led one of the most documented rebellions of this time period in 
1899. He gained mestizo trust by organizing an indigenous army to defend and protect 
the nation-state. At the last minute, Willka’s army used their weapons to rebel against the 
Republic demonstrating that while he was capable of using the nation-state’s institutions, 
they were not the institutions of his people and could not be used to dominate them 
(Condarco Morales 1965). Out of this conflict, an enhanced effort to ‘domesticate’ the 
Indian race once and for all emerged. Extermination campaigns materialized in the 
eastern lowland frontiers, but were not as feasible in the highlands where community 
networks thrived as a result of the Inca Empire’s systematization.  
With no state-recognized political representation and the legal disintegration of 
communal property, the 1910s-1930s saw the growth of a national indigenous movement 
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in an effort to defend communities from liberal assimilatory processes. A current member 
(and previous leader) of CONAMAQ told me how her father escaped from an hacienda 
during this time in search for paid labor. He, like many others, sought work in the mines, 
which offered a bit more freedom, and when necessary, a hiding place from hacendados 
(interview conducted by author, July 4, 2014). Taking refuge in the mines created a space 
for indigenous peoples to organize politically while enduring harsh working conditions. 
On a larger scale, an activist network of Alcaldes Mayores Particulares emerged in the 
1920s, supporting traditional pachamámico spirituality to challenge the white minority’s 
violation of mother earth, to end segregation policies, and to establish autonomous 
education for indigenous peoples. This ayllu-based movement offered alternative 
conceptualizations of citizenship and nation making in modern Bolivia, proposing an 
Aymara republic of Qullasuyu, separate from the Bolivian nation state (Ari 2014).  
The 1920s-1960s marked a long process of assimilation, particularly through the 
use of total institutions such as public schools and military service. Throughout the Chaco 
War (1932-1935), the military sent indigenous men to the southeastern lowlands to 
confront Paraguayan troops. This was a transitional moment of integration for many 
indigenous peoples who began to feel a sense of nationalism in their military training. It 
also sparked an acute awareness of the Bolivian citizenship rights that were being 
withheld from them (Morales 2010). In 1937, Coronel Gérman Busch declared August 2 
el Día del Indio (National Indigenous Day) in an effort to include indigenous peoples 
within the social imaginary. By 1945, a left-leaning government led by Villarroel 
permitted the first national indigenous organized congress in La Paz. This monumental 
encounter brought over one thousand ayllu leaders from the highland areas and valleys to 
the capital city as a symbol of alliance and integration (Gotkowitz 2008, ch 7). Here we 
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see how processes of assimilation simultaneously served to give indigenous peoples 
platforms to express themselves, but only within the parameters of the state. 
The second wave of liberalization swept over Bolivia in the lead up to the 1952 
populist Bolivian revolution. Led by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), 
the insurgency emerged as a means to break down the historical oligarchy of silver 
barons, latifundistas, and the creole elite. Overthrowing a military junta that had 
controlled Bolivia off and on for nearly two decades, the revolution achieved universal 
suffrage by banning prior literacy and property requirements. In this moment, the number 
of Bolivian voters multiplied by five times. The MNR government nationalized all of the 
mines owned by the nation’s three great tin barons and established the Mining 
Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL) as a semi-autonomous enterprise to run state-owned 
mines. One year after the ’52 revolution, the government implemented an agrarian 
reform. This abolished the remnants of forced labor and established a program of 
expropriation and redistribution of rural property from traditional landlords to rural 
peoples.  
While indigenous peoples were finally granted full citizenship, they were 
nonetheless explicitly excluded from the agrarian reform. It is crucial to differentiate 
between peasants and indigenous peoples (campesinos and indios) within the underlying 
ideology of mestizaje. In an effort to integrate indigenous peoples into Bolivian society as 
peasants (emphasizing their class distinction rather than their ethnicity), labor unions 
controlled land distribution to individuals (not communal holdings). The word indio was 
eliminated from public discourse practically overnight. The Día del Indio, established 15 
years earlier, was changed to the Día del Campesino, a nominal change symbolic of 
deeply rooted racialized policies. However, many indigenous peoples did not identify as 
peasants. They claimed that they belonged to indigenous nations, separate from the nation 
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state of Bolivia. They had their own governing structures, originary authorities, separate 
territorial jurisdiction, and administration.  
While the revolution accomplished three fundamental goals (universal suffrage, 
nationalization of mines, and land reform), it is largely seen as unfinished. This is 
particularly because the MNR focused more on economic reform than social reform. The 
position of indigenous peoples and women did not change as much as the lives of poor 
peasants and miners. In the words of indigenous intellectual Fausto Reinaga, 
 
What did the agrarian reform grant us? Lies! The agrarian reform of 1953 
was another conquest of the Indian. By liquidating the latifundio, we 
wanted the restoration of the Inca community, the collectivization of land. 
We have been cheated. The white mestizo, instead of collectivize, turned 
the land into private smallholdings (Reinaga 1969, 423).  
Older men and women in contemporary Bolivia echo Reinaga’s opinion after watching 
their dreams of the 1952 revolution whither away throughout their lifetime. Speaking 
with several retired miners at an anti-imperialist conference in Cochabamba (July 2014) 
opened my eyes to the promise they see in President Morales’ Proceso de Cambio as a 
revival of what they hoped would be achieved in the mid-twentieth century. Many see the 
recent re-nationalization of the mines (after neoliberal privatization) as an opportunity for 
the government to implement social programs that did not emerge after the 1952 
revolution. Furthermore, they hope that a more complete land reform will occur with the 
increase of legal avenues for indigenous communities to receive and defend collective 
land holdings.  
After only a decade, the MNR revolutionary party gave way to US-funded 
military regimes that controlled Bolivia off and on from 1964-1982. This period of 
dictatorship marks the strongest effort to integrate indigenous peoples into a mixed 
homogenous nation. The word indio was largely eliminated from language (only used as 
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a derogatory slur), and speaking indigenous languages became socially unacceptable. The 
mestizo class took pride in certain indigenous history, but simultaneously degraded 
indigenous peoples and their traditions. In this moment, many indigenous peoples tried to 
assimilate their children into mestizo society, so as to protect them from discrimination. 
They truly believed that by stripping their children of indigenous identity, they could 
liberate them from the violent subjugation they and their ancestors had endured.  
This recapitulation of Bolivian history follows the dominant trends of nation 
making in Bolivia driven by liberal notions of citizenship. We see how some indigenous 
peoples resisted assimilation while others reveled at the opportunity to benefit from 
upwards social mobility, acclimating to the goals of Western modernity. This section 
served to demonstrate the overarching trend of simultaneous exclusion and assimilation 
of indigenous peoples through a discussion of land access and ownership. The next 
segment will build off of these Bolivia-specific trends to look at deep-rooted exclusionary 
practices embedded within liberal citizenship. 
 
INHERENT EXCLUSION IN LIBERAL THEORY 
Liberalism, in which individual citizens are universally granted the right to life, 
liberty, private property, to elect and be elected, is not necessarily the foundation of a 
healthy and happy society. As we have seen in the case of Bolivia, this notion tends to 
protect the elite while disproportionately disenfranchising traditionally subjugated sectors 
or more broadly, those who prescribe to non-dominant epistemologies. Uday Mehta 
argues that the exclusion and marginalization of certain peoples in the British Empire is 
central to liberal theory, not simply an anomaly when put into practice (1999). He 
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demonstrates how a theory so fundamentally rooted in inclusion is based in practices that 
are predicated on marginalization.   
Liberal theories that have guided Western modernity and spread through political 
and cultural imperialism inherently exclude all identities that do not fit within the 
universal, imagined permitted subject. Despite a discourse on equality, liberal theory fails 
to acknowledge the prevalence of multiple ontologies and epistemologies so that when 
colonizers encounter foreign peoples they are struck by what they find. Instead of 
accepting difference, colonizers felt that all peoples and nations that deviated from 
Western notions of progress and modernity were backward and in need of ‘more 
developed’ countries to guide them in their journey towards progress (Mehta 1999). This 
has done much damage historically in assuring that subaltern peoples remain subjugated. 
The presumption of liberal equality as a baseline for societal interactions 
disregards the very legacies of colonialism and subjugation as explained earlier in this 
chapter. While pre-modern moral orders acknowledged hierarchy due to privilege, liberal 
theory assumes sameness without taking genuine action to assure that everyone has 
access to the same resources. Nonetheless, legal recognition often becomes an instrument 
of regulation and subordination instead of self-determination (Brown 1995, 99).  
In The Politics of the Governed, Partha Chaterjee points to the space between 
utopian dreams and harsh realities of discrimination. He recognizes the intrigue of an 
imagined space in which all individuals are seen as equally important members of a 
homogenous, unbounded nation state. However, he questions whether these types of 
relationships and ways of identifying with other humans can exist anywhere except in 
utopian (imaginary) spaces. He recognizes that the “slogan of universality is often a mask 
to cover the perpetuation of real inequalities” (Chaterjee 2004, 22). That is, until we 
reach this utopian dream state (which may be an unrealistic objective), we first must 
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acknowledge the fact that historically, individuals and groups of people have been 
marginalized, systemically oppressed, and socially condemned by the elite. The liberal 
nation state is not a level playing field, nor is it homogenous. Therefore, direct 
representation is necessary to create spaces in which the voices of disenfranchised 
communities can be listed to on their own terms. 
The moral orders of society under Western modernity have spread to entire 
societies and blinded the masses to other ways of thinking and being. Liberal modernity 
has infiltrated the market economy, the public sphere, and self-governance to an extent 
that a collective social imaginary has become incredibly difficult to penetrate. Canadian 
philosopher Charles Taylor elaborates stating that, “Non-Western cultures have 
modernized in their own ways and cannot be properly understood if we try to grasp them 
in a general theory that was originally designed with the Western case in mind” (2002, 
91). This is an argument that indigenous intellectuals such as Fausto Reinaga have 
declared throughout the twentieth century. It implies that indigenous peoples have the 
right to be autonomous and do not need to be understood under western-centric 
epistemologies. 
One of Taylor’s greatest contributions is reminding his readers that the social 
fabric of Western modernity has not, and will not always be the norm. He writes about 
the long march of transitioning from a pre-modern to a modern society. It is not only a 
matter of changing laws and political mechanisms, but changing the social imaginary of 
all citizens. This history of transitioning is “easy to forget, because once we are well 
installed in the modern social imaginary, it seems the only possible one, the only one that 
makes sense. After all, are we not all individuals? Do we not associate in society for our 
mutual benefit? How else to measure social life?” (Taylor 2002, 99). Indigenous peoples 
in Bolivia who have fought for centuries to destabilize liberal Western social imaginary 
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would beg to differ. They have not forgotten the ways of their ancestors and have fought 
both peacefully and violently for the right to live according to their own social imaginary, 
according to their own political philosophies. 
 
THE RISE OF GLOBAL INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
While indigenous peoples have resisted physical and psychological colonial 
domination and Eurocentric liberal assimilation for centuries, a new wave of formally 
recognized international indigenous rights movements have gained momentum within the 
past fifty years. After a century of widespread national efforts to assimilate all people into 
one homogenous national identity, politicians, scholars, and activists have largely 
recognized that respecting difference and multiplicity is as important as breeding 
similarities. Subaltern and decolonial scholars shed light on the inherent discrimination of 
assimilationist policies, Eurocentric notions of Western modernity, and linear progress. 
They in turn push for local, national, and international policies that tolerate and accept 
heterogeneity guided by identity politics. The following section presents a brief 
description of the international indigenous rights movement, with an emphasis on Latin 
America. It ultimately provides context for a more specific exploration of the rise of 
indigenous rights in Bolivia in which we can finally place the emergence of CONAMAQ.  
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, indigenous rights movements achieved more 
momentum on an international scale. One of the most important functioning international 
laws that guarantees the rights of indigenous peoples is the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Convention169 adopted in 1989. The document is based on 
principles developed in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1949) and revises the 
outdated ILO Tribal Populations Convention and Recommendation (1957). First and 
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foremost, the document recognizes, “the aspirations of these [indigenous] peoples to 
exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and 
to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework of 
the States in which they live” (ILO 169). This statement recognizes the right to live 
according to traditional sovereign principles within state parameters. Twenty different 
countries have ratified the document (predominantly within the Americas), pledging to 
respect indigenous peoples within their borders. Upon ratifying ILO 169, nations have 
one year to align policies and legislation before it becomes legally binding. 
The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 2005-2014 to be the second 
International decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. After more than twenty years of 
negotiations by indigenous peoples around the world, on September 13, 2007, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
This document guarantees life and security, language, cultural and spiritual identity, 
education, resources and knowledge, employment, participation, development, economic 
and social rights, and self-governance without coercion. According to the UN declaration, 
indigenous peoples have the right to participate in all decision-making that affects them. 
This particularly refers to contemporary struggles against extractive industries for water 
rights and access to national parks and forests. Together, ILO 169 and the UN declaration 
mark a crucial turn in legitimizing indigenous struggles within a Western legal 
framework. 
Greater accountability for human rights on an international scale brought limited 
protection for previously marginalized peoples including women, indigenous peoples, 
and children. However, it did so within a profoundly liberal system. A rights-based legal 
framework inherently leads to questions of whose responsibility it is to guarantee rights, 
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as well as when, and how? Furthermore, formal recognition of cultural rights can lead to 
unwanted entanglement with the state. 
The rise of indigenous rights on an international scale occurred at the same time 
as the rise of neoliberalism. Many scholars have observed increased recognition of 
cultural rights and endorsement of intercultural equality in tandem with the conservative 
economic reforms that neoliberalism is known for (privatization, decentralization, 
deregulation, free market etc). This may seem contradictory given the last section of this 
chapter emphasizing the detriment of liberal policies on indigenous peoples. However, 
the neoliberal regime simultaneously produces and contests state recognition and 
inclusion of indigenous peoples. Neoliberalism relies on a strong civil society to care for 
itself in lieu of large government. Policies of decentralization redistribute power and 
resources from the hands of few politicians to local leaders. This transition from 
centralized homogenous power to a more diverse system is mirrored by a transition from 
policies of unification and mestizaje through assimilation and integration to policies of 
multiculturalism that recognize cultural diversity and difference.  
Shifting our focus to Latin America, we see large indigenous populations who 
have gained substantial indigenous rights, particularly in Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. While these countries have sizeable indigenous populations 
and well-documented histories of ancient pre-Columbian traditions, native rights have 
persevered in nearly every single Latin American nation. Major progress has been made 
in respect to cultural and territorial rights. For example, in 2001, the people of Awas 
Tingni won a landmark case in the Inter-American Human Rights Court, ruling that the 
Nicaraguan state had violated their right to collective land. This case marks the first time 
that a court favored a group of indigenous peoples over the State on a collective lands 
claim. Despite this legal victory, the Nicaraguan government negotiated with the 
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community and its lawyers for almost two years before taking any action. Four years 
after the Awas Tingni case ruling, no progress had been made (Hale 2005).   
Charles Hale (2005), Jose Antonio Lucero (2009), and Karen Engle (2010) 
remind scholars that the recent rise of indigenous mobilization, recognition of cultural 
and territorial rights, and endorsement of intercultural equality throughout Latin America 
exists within the matrix of neoliberal multiculturalism. While state actors and 
international organizations have seemingly supported indigenous rights, this support is 
accompanied by an ‘invisible asterisk’ that greatly restricts self-determination (Povinelli 
in Engle 2010). Neoliberal multicultural governing mechanisms constrain indigenous 
mobilization through webs of administrative and bureaucratic negotiations. Despite 
support from international governing bodies, the cultural, political, economic 
superstructure continues to restrict the evolution of indigenous rights. That is, even 
though subaltern voices are heard in the government, deeply rooted racialized and 
gendered power hierarchies persist.  
Engle explores the “unintended consequences” that indigenous peoples endure 
when working within the neoliberal state matrix that views indigenous peoples as a 
homogenous entity (Engle 2010, 168). Governments and corporations place restrictions 
on rights, an asterisk if you will. For example, if indigenous peoples cease to treat the 
land in the way that the nation believes a ‘noble savage’ should, they are stripped of their 
identity, and their label, as a ‘real’ indigenous group. Therefore, if a community is 
forcibly relocated, they may not have the cultural knowledge of the land and can in turn 
be stripped of their rights. The formal rights framework does not account for the diversity 
of experiences, traditions, and movements of indigenous peoples. Conversations of 
authenticity (defined by non-indigenous powers) limit access to rights and resources. For 
example, indigenous peoples who use slash and burn techniques or chemicals have been 
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accused of not being authentic. Furthermore, those that have been forced to move from 
their ancestral land and are living in exile are seen to have lost what makes them 
indigenous, creating complex hierarchies and limited access to benefits. 
Charles Hale explains this hierarchy of indigenous peoples through his notion of 
the “indio permitido” (2004). He acknowledges that certain types of indigenous peoples 
are permitted by society and therefore supported by the government, while others remain 
too far beyond the realm of what is acceptable or normative. The “permitted Indian” is 
generally one that is willing to cooperate and be coopted. They produce, consume, and 
participate in the global economy.  
Lucero problematizes the unilineal neoliberal view of indigenous identity, arguing 
that social organization does not always emerge from an indigenous formula (Lucero 
2009, 64). There are many ways of being indigenous with different goals and methods 
that should not be lumped together. He argues that we must recognize the role of war and 
authoritarianism, the unequal reach of state benefits, as well as differing levels of 
willingness to be incorporated into the nation state. Lucero attributes the rise of 
indigenous rights to the pressures of neoliberal state reforms as well as the existence of 
rural networks and the collective memory and tradition of indigenous resistance. One 
might push back on this statement, asking how this is different from previous pressures as 
described throughout this chapter. Scholars and activists must continue to ask, “under 
what conditions can indigenous movements occupy the limited spaces opened by 
neoliberal multiculturalism, redirecting them toward their own radical, even utopian 
political alternatives” (Hale 2005, 11)? 
While indigenous rights did in fact emerge at the same time as neoliberal 
economic and cultural policies, macro structural decisions are only one factor in a long 
struggle of indigenous rights. While neoliberalism may have been a final spark to light 
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the fire, it is crucial to recognize the long term oppression that native peoples were 
fighting against, as well as the legacy of struggle and organization that have inspired 
contemporary indigenous peoples. The following section will take a closer look at the 
struggle for indigenous rights in Bolivia.  
 
THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN BOLIVIA 
“You kill me now, but I will return as millions” 
- Tupac Katari’s last words before decapitation- 1781 
The rise of indigenous rights in Bolivia emphasizes a transition from class-based 
identity imposed as a mechanism of mestizaje, to a recuperation of indigenous identity 
through the revalorization of traditional customs. Despite formal recognition of 
indigenous peoples as full citizens after the 1952 Revolution, many were still largely 
excluded and marginalized. In the wake of state efforts to homogenize the nation, many 
indigenous peoples declared that their ayllu communities fostered an authentically 
indigenous form of communism that suited them better than the Euro-centric Marxism 
that Bolivian labor parties supported. The rise of Katarismo (a reincarnation of Tupac 
Katari’s eighteenth century resistance) in the 1970s laid the groundwork for 
contemporary indigenous movements, such as CONAMAQ. 
In 1969, Fausto Reinaga engaged with tensions between class and ethnicity in his 
indigenous manifesto titled La Revolución India.  Until the 1960s, Reinaga had been an 
ardent supporter of Communism. He was a member of the Communist Part of Bolivia, 
attended labor union congresses in East Germany and spent time in the Soviet Union. 
However, upon returning to Bolivia after traveling throughout Europe, he had an 
overwhelming realization that his indigenous brothers and sisters were continuing to 
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follow the white European, mestizo dream, in turn abandoning the indigenous revolution 
their ancestors had been fighting for centuries. In his manifesto he declares,  
 
We have resisted all of this infernal torture; we have carried all of this 
suffering for four long centuries, and we have not disappeared. And it’s 
not only that we haven’t disappeared, but also that—and this is most 
important—we have persisted in our liberatory struggle. The West has not 
conquered us (Reinaga 1969, 429). 
After heavy communist influence, Reinaga rejected the impositions of Western 
modernity in an effort to revive the traditions of his ancestors. 
La Revolución India is an effort to bring indigenous thought to the forefront of 
society, demonstrating that Marxism, while useful for some, would only weaken their 
struggle for an autonomous indigenous state. He resisted efforts to turn indigenous 
peoples into peasants, claiming that their spirituality and epistemology differentiated 
them in many ways. “Inti and Pachamama- unlike the terrifying Jehova, breathe and 
exude love, and make man a cheerful being, lover of good and peace. Inca philosophy has 
the mission of ennobling life” (1969, 397). Reinaga claimed that indigenous peoples have 
their own socialist essence that is unique from European communism, yet serves similar 
purposes. David Choquehuanca (the Minister of Exterior Relations) has echoed this 
sentiment in relation to the concept of vivir bien. He claims that while capitalism 
privileges money, and socialism privileges men, that vivir bien privileges life of both 
humans and non-humans (Colque Condori et al 2013). 
The international movement towards decolonization motivated local Bolivian 
indigenous communities to denounce the legacies of colonialism, genocide, and white 
supremacy. Reinaga cites scholars of the negritude movement such as Frantz Fanon and 
Aimee Cesaire as inspiration. Like Reinaga, these Martinican scholars proposed a radical 
revolution of consciousness and a complete destruction of racial hierarchy.  
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By the 1970s, discontent with an incomplete agrarian reform, assimilationist 
policies that aimed to silence indigenous identity, and a wave of oppressive military 
dictatorships, inspired action from a new generation of young indigenous rural and urban 
peoples. Since the mid 1950s, indigenous parents had sent their children to urban 
universities so that they would mix with the mestizo class, with the dream of cleansing 
them and their families from centuries of subjugation. However, racism persisted in urban 
centers as teachers and peers discriminated against indigenous students, their native 
languages, and modes of thinking (Rivera 1984). One member of CONAMAQ that I 
spoke with recounted that she felt safe in her ayllu, but once she moved to the city of 
Sucre to attend university, both students and teachers made fun of her braids, her name, 
her accent when she spoke Spanish, and her traditional pollera skirt (Interview conducted 
by author, July 4, 2014). Continued discrimination led to internalization of inferiority but 
also to a renewed sense of resistance. 
Perhaps the final factor that radicalized the katarista movement was the Tolata 
massacre in 1973 in which dictator Hugo Banzer approved the murder of thirteen 
Quechua peoples. Recognizing that indigenous peoples constituted the majority of the 
population and that they need not stand for the subordination of their people under the 
mestizo elite, Aymara leaders organized in a radical political movement. With the 
wisdom of elders who had fought for centuries, Reinaga’s inspiration, the international 
human rights movement, and young peoples energy, the indigenous Katarista movement 
emerged in La Paz reviving the name and legacy of Tupac Katari. 
The founding document of Katarismo, the Tiwanaku Manifesto (1973), declared 
that Bolivia’s historical economic and social instability was a result of oppressing and 
silencing the positive contributions of indigenous peoples. The document denounced 
inequality of wealth, insufficient rural education and the intentional destruction of 
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indigenous culture. They proposed that the state support the development of indigenous 
communities according to their own identity as a move that would ultimately benefit the 
country as a whole. They argued that despite discourses of mestizaje, the state had 
brushed aside many of the indigenous systems that would truly benefit the country. That 
is, they did not want to be assimilated into the liberal norm, but wanted to bring uniquely 
indigenous political and judicial systems to the nation-state. They argued that the 
Western driven international economy continued to exploit Bolivia’s natural wealth. The 
manifesto stated, “the greatest good that governments and political parties can do for the 
indigenous peoples is to let us… design our own socioeconomic policies taken from our 
cultural roots” (Tiwanaku Manifesto 1973).  They did not favor complete autonomy, but 
rather a new state that would draw on the best of both worlds—a new Bolivian-specific 
type of modernity. 
By the 1980s, the Katarista movement fractured into two different factions based 
on heterogeneous indigenous groups and needs. Until then, highland Aymara and 
Quechua activists who lived in close proximity to the capital of La Paz had largely 
dominated the indigenous movement. In the 1980s, lowland indigenous peoples began to 
speak up on a national scale, claiming that highland indigenous peoples did not speak for 
their particular needs. This split between lowland and highland indigenous movements 
will be explored further in chapter two. 
Similar to other Latin American countries, the onset of the 1980s debt crisis and 
neoliberal structural adjustment programs acted as an impetus for indigenous resistance 
and multicultural policies creating a space for indigenous voices to be heard on a national 
platform. The 1985 privatization of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) 
reversed the 1952 nationalization of mines, resulting in massive layoffs of over 20,000 
miners. With no work, many miners and their families were forced to return to their 
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native communities where they found the support of kinship networks. The same member 
of CONAMAQ who attended university in Sucre and described the discrimination she 
felt there, explained how it was upon moving back to her community as a teenager that 
she realized the strength of her indigenous culture and heritage. 
Her family escaped from an hacienda and found refuge in the mine of Huanuni in 
Oruro. When her father passed away in 1985, just prior to the relocalization of miners, 
she moved back to her mother’s community with her eleven brothers and sisters. Her 
family was able to recuperate fifty percent of their ancestral land. At the age of fourteen, 
she left the miners town and learned how to live in the rural area of her mother’s ayllu in 
the province in southern Oruro. She told me how she had to learn the norms of her 
community, the culture, and the ceremonies, how to work the land, and how to participate 
in the ayllu. She remembered that her community welcomed them, as they were family, 
and taught them how to live in a system that was not communism nor socialism, but 
something unique to indigenous Bolivians. She recounted how living in her ayllu and 
returning to her roots felt right. This taught her the importance of fighting for indigenous 
rights, a motivation that ultimately encouraged her to become a local leader of 
CONAMAQ (Interview conducted by author, July 4, 2014). 
A series of neoliberal reforms called the Plan de Todos created space for 
indigenous peoples to participate in local politics at an unprecedented level. The Law for 
Popular Participation (1993) decentralized governments and created almost 400 different 
municipalities with local offices. This reorganization of political society redistributed 
power and resources away from the centralized state, putting it in the hands of local 
leaders. This transitioned rural areas into political forces as any peasant or indigenous 
person could run for mayor. While this decentralization meant more responsibility, it also 
meant wider participation (Medeiros 2001). The Plan de Todos also implemented 
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bilingual education and set the groundwork for the formal recognition of communal 
territory through an agrarian reform in 1996. This recognition of communal territory 
marks a historical landmark finally reversing the law of ex-vinculación in 1874 after over 
one hundred years of private landownership.  
A long history of indigenous struggles against subjugation brings my analysis to 
the present day. According to the 2001 national census, sixty-two percent of Bolivian 
citizens self-identified with one of thirty-six recognized indigenous nations. The majority 
of indigenous Bolivians identifies as either Quechua or Aymara and inhabits the western 
highland region. Thirty-four of the indigenous nations inhabit the Eastern lowlands, most 
notably the Chiquitano, Guaraní, and Mojeño peoples. Indigenous peoples have 
reclaimed approximately twenty percent of Bolivia’s land through collective land titles to 
Native Community Lands (TCOs). Bolivia is the first country in South America to elect 
an indigenous president, and was also the first country to sign the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples into law (International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs). Chapter three will elaborate on the many achievements of the Morales 
administration. 
Indigenous peoples in Bolivia live in both rural and urban areas. Urban centers 
have attracted young indigenous peoples to universities and the formal and popular 
markets. Loss of land and job opportunities has begun to change the rural ayllu, but many 
indigenous peoples continue to strive for equilibrium between humans and the natural 
world, animals, gods, and authorities. The following section will elaborate on 
contemporary life in the ayllu and the alternative platform CONAMAQ provides 
indigenous highland Bolivians in a world dominated by Western modernity. 
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THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AYLLUS AND MARKAS OF QULLASUYU 
The Bolivian indigenous movement CONAMAQ (El Consejo Nacional de Ayllus 
y Markas del Qullasuyu) has brought national and international attention to the ayllu 
system since their inauguration in March 1997. This movement composed of 
predominantly Aymara, Quechua, and Uru peoples aims to reclaim the ayllu as a central 
economic, social and political community structure in place of the dominant Eurocentric 
labor union. CONAMAQ values a model of horizontal solidarity with humans and non-
humans rather than a vertical chain of command characteristic of Western modernity.  In 
reviving the ayllu, they aim to reconstitute legitimacy for local indigenous leaders, gain 
respect for the historical role of originary peoples, and protect the environment that they 
depend on for survival (CONAMAQ 2008). 
One member of CONAMAQ remembers that before its formation, ayllu leaders 
were active but hadn’t formed a cohesive movement yet. She reminded me that 
CONAMAQ is the contemporary iteration of a pre-colonial lifestyle that has never truly 
died. She told me about the many nests of indigenous resurgence throughout the country 
that had not yet revived networks of communication. For example, the Federation of 
Ayllus of Southern Oruro and the Central Ayllus of Northern Potosí (los Jacha 
Karanagas) in the late 1980s marked the beginning of organizing across ayllus at the 
regional level. Furthermore, there were a series of regional meetings throughout the early 
1990s in La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí (Interview conducted by author, July 4, 2014). 
She said that when she returned from university during her vacations, members of 
her community told her that there was a movement rising with force. Little by little the 
state government began creating indigenous institutions, including the viceministry of 
indigenous affairs. Communities gained support from international NGOs that focused on 
cultural heritage and revitalization in the wave of neoliberal multiculturalism (Interview 
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conducted by author, July 4, 2014). Ultimately, CONAMAQ was founded on March 22, 
1997 in the Challapata Marka of Oruro at a gathering of representatives from eight 
different suyus (CONAMAQ 2008). The first initiatives of CONAMAQ struggled to 
have the ayllu system recognized as a legitimate collectivity given the dominance of 
labor unions. Early projects involved requesting government-subsidized seeds, but in the 
past nearly twenty years, the organization has grown into one with much greater political 
influence as we will see in chapters two and three.  
Before engaging in a discussion of the ideological principles that guide 
CONAMAQ as an organization, it is important to recognize the internal diversity within 
the group. The national organization represents sixteen different indigenous nations (or 
suyus) across five different departments in Bolivia, including the voices of both rural and 
urban peoples, with differing cultural traditions and contemporary needs. In Sucre, Oruro, 
and Northern Potosi, the role of the ayllu is much stronger than in places like La Paz and 
Cochabamba. This is because the traditional indigenous community structures of 
governance have been better preserved in departments further away from the capital, 
where assimilation processes were not as strong. Many indigenous communities in La 
Paz prefer to align themselves with labor unions, because these organizations continue to 
offer better services as a result of the 1952 revolution. In contemporary Bolivia, if you 
are affiliated with a labor union, you are siding with President Evo Morales and will 
therefore receive greater benefits from the government. Nonetheless, CONAMAQ has 
been the predominant body to represent the needs of highland indigenous peoples for 
nearly twenty years and have negotiated indigenous autonomy in crucial ways. 
While CONAMAQ has brought attention to the ayllu throughout the past two 
decades, this ancient Andean community structure has existed for thousands of years. 
Even after Spanish conquest, internal colonialism, Western imperialism, liberal 
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democracy, and neoliberal governance the ayllu has resisted appropriation and persisted 
as a locus of indigenous ideology (Fernandez Osco 2010). Many indigenous peoples have 
resisted efforts to create a homogenous Bolivian republic by maintaining their own 
epistemologies despite facing extraordinary racism and discrimination under Bolivian 
law. The declaration of Bolivia as a plurinational state and the re-writing of the 
constitution (2009) has nominally reopened a space in which indigenous traditions and 
customs are seen as legitimate options, but in practice are still subordinate to the laws and 
economy of the nation-state. For this reason, many indigenous communities have rejected 
state governance and embraced local indigenous ayllu-based traditions. 
But what exactly is an ayllu? Does the ayllu really represent an alternative to 
capitalism and Western modernity? We can begin to think of the ayllu as a geographic 
space, although we will soon learn the importance of the values and ideology that bind 
the ayllu as a cohesive community structure. Tawantinsuyu, the region that the Spaniards 
called the Inca Empire, is made up of four suyus, or regions. Qullasuyu is the southern 
most region that is now home to the nation-state of Bolivia. Each suyu is composed of a 
group of smaller regions called markas, which are further broken down into kin-based 
neighborhoods. These kin-based neighborhoods are called ayllus. The ayllu, however, is 
much more than a territorial claim of a community, or a socio-economic unit of Aymara 
and Quechua culture. It is a space of strong epistemological values that bind the 
community, recognizing the interconnectedness of all humans and non-humans. 
Marcelo Fernández Osco, a Bolivian sociologist, anthropologist, and author of La 
ley del ayllu (The Law of the Ayllu), reflects on the role of the ayllu as one that keeps 
order by maintaining an understanding of the sacred character of everything human and 
non-human (2010). Justo Oxa, a self-identifying Aymara elementary school teacher 
describes the ayllu as a, 
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dynamic space where the whole community of beings that exist in the 
world lives; this includes humans, plants, animals, the mountains, the 
rivers, the rain, etc. All are related like a family. It is important to 
remember that this place [the ayllu] is not where we are from, it is who we 
are (de la Cadena 2010, 354). 
Each ayllu is part of a larger agricultural network of markas and suyus so that goods and 
peoples traverse across great distances in a reciprocal system of economic trade. John 
Murra describes this interaction as a “vertical archipelago” based on ecological 
complementarity (McEwan 2006). Given the diverse microclimates throughout the Andes 
Mountains, the valleys, and the lowland Amazonian region, ayllus have traditionally 
depended on a shared labor system (minga) to cultivate or create goods (food, ceramics, 
textiles etc) to trade in a non-monetary arrangement of ayni (reciprocity). 
The ayllu represents a space governed by principles of duality, complementarity, 
reciprocity, solidarity, collectivity, horizontality, ancestrality, and self-sufficiency 
(Fernandez Osco 2010). These values are in stark contrast to capitalist values of 
individualism, hierarchy, linear progress, productivity, efficiency, and accumulation. I 
elaborate on a few of these values as a way to demonstrate how the ayllu ideology of 
vivir bien diverges from Western capitalist values but might resonate with Westerners 
nonetheless. 
Within the ayllu, duality is demonstrated by the belief that everything comes in 
pairs. This means that the individualistic “other” does not exist as it does in Western 
society, but is rather the flip side of a coin. An enemy is one in the same as the individual 
and must be treated with dignity and respect. Leadership within the indigenous 
movement CONAMAQ reflects this duality as all leaders come in pairs of male tata 
mallkus and female mama tallas. Furthermore, individuals are parts of collectivities and 
can never be seen as separate from the larger human and non-human collectivity. Unlike 
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Western rationality, which is ego-centric, Aymara and Quechua rationality is based in 
collective memory which integrates the past, present and future of both humans and 
nonhumans. 
Indigenous epistemologies within the ayllu represent a non-Western 
understanding of space and time. In contrast to Western linear progress, indigenous 
ancestrality implies that the past is always brought with us to the present so that the 
unveiling of events is spiral. The past is not rigid, dead, nostalgic, nor fantasized, but 
alive and continuously acting on the present. On the contrary, Western modernity 
assumes that time proceeds in a linear fashion, implying that ‘tradition’ is in the past and 
can no longer be relevant to present progress. Western chronopolitics (in contrast to 
Foucault’s biopolitics and Mbembe’s necropolitics) has become one of the main tools to 
promote competition and capitalism, linking speed to success so that going faster means 
getting ahead (Mignolo 2011). This capitalist notion of success destroys collectivities and 
ultimately quells political activity by overworking individuals. 
Instead of accumulation, over-production and over-consumption, the ayllu values 
self-sufficiency, which brings us back to the ideology of vivir bien, living well instead of 
living better. This means living harmoniously with other humans and non-humans and 
finding dignity in work without exploiting others or the land. It means appreciating care-
giving roles such as mothers, teachers, and healers.  
Within CONAMAQ, constant communication and consensus across regional 
levels is accomplished through a series of meetings (cabildos) and councils of rotating 
leaders. Apu Mallkus and Asesores (local leaders) coordinate six different commissions 
for the Markas in their jurisdiction. One such commission serves to facilitate 
communication and coordination throughout the ayllus, markas, and suyus. A Territorial 
Commission works towards the sanitation and titling of communal land holdings. The 
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Juridical Human Rights Commission has representatives in the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and the United Nations to further the international protection of indigenous 
rights and hold these bodies accountable. They also help to implement community justice 
at the local level. One Mallku in this commission told me that a major part of his job is 
dealing with issues of violence or robbery within the community so that they do not need 
to deal with the overburdened, bureaucratic police system. Furthermore, he works to 
implement traditional justice practices that are often different from the State’s 
punishments. The Commission for International and National Relations links 
CONAMAQ with other indigenous organizations to share strategies of resistance in an 
act of solidarity. A Health Commission focuses on traditional medicine, and finally, the 
Commission on development and the environment emphasizes sustainable growth of the 
ayllu (CONAMAQ 2008). 
CONAMAQ’s goal as an organization is neither to create a political party nor to 
take state power, but rather to use a politics of protest, refusal, and disruption in order to 
challenge the state government and defend their indigenous autonomy. CONAMAQ is an 
indigenous, originary government that represents peoples whose ancestors pre-date the 
nation-state. Garcia Linera et al. (2004) critique this stance, claiming that it preserves the 
colonial structure of the state. Simultaneously, these authors hold another Bolivian civil 
society organization, the CSUTCB, up on a pedestal for their efforts to take power and 
radically decolonize the state through the Movimiento a Socialismo (Movement Towards 
Socialism, MAS) political party (Garcia Linera et al. 2004, 337). Given Raquel 
Gutierrez’s emphasis on changing the world without taking power, one might question 
the narrowness of this critique, recognizing the value of grassroots alternatives and 
indigenous demands for recognized autonomy (2012). 
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CONAMAQ exerts change on the national government from the outside, calling 
for direct representation in decisions that affect their communities and a higher level of 
self-determination, particularly in regards to land and natural resources. Furthermore, 
they challenge the state to leave behind their colonial hierarchical model and create a 
more horizontal structure based on the ayllu model. In the early years of CONAMAQs 
development, they pushed for and participated in a major constitutional reform 
(CONAMAQ 2008). The next chapter will engage with the details of the demands and 
outcomes of the constituent assembly. 
CONAMAQ views the Western subordination of non-Western knowledge as 
temporary and cyclical. Fernandez Osco compares the reign of Western modernity to a 
period of suffering, of llaki pacha, or of hunger, awti pacha. This is a time to withstand 
political injustice in the same way that one might withstand hunger during barren months 
of the year. You persevere until times of abundance return (Fernandez Osco 2010). From 
this Aymara perspective, the current reign of the West is neither irreversible nor without 
alternatives. However, it will require a radical turn of events.  
Nicole Fabricant provides a pertinent criticism of CONAMAQ, noting that, 
“when it comes to urban or periurban areas, this ethno-territorial model can leave many 
indigenous peoples out of the conversation, legitimizing certain indigenous identities, 
while deligitimizing others” (2013, 165). This is a fundamental critique that must be 
recognized in a country with such profound diversity as a result of such a complex 
history as described throughout this chapter. Urban indigeneity is a major component of 
Bolivian society with increasing migration to cities like El Alto. Fabricant’s critique 
forces us to consider the heterogeneity of indigenous peoples within Bolivia and the risk 
of marginalizing certain communities based on standards of authenticity. 
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CONCLUSION 
By understanding the long history of CONAMAQ in a vast geographical context, 
we can better understand why the movement is focused on reclaiming communal land 
rights and asserting their indigenous identity after centuries of subjugation. While the 
council formally materialized in 1997, we see that its mission is largely based in the 
oppressive legacy of race relations within Bolivia. By looking at the effects of 
colonialism in the form of control over intellectual property, land grabbing practices, and 
the imposition of psychologically and socially destructive assimilation policies we see 
how indigenous peoples have been consistently stripped of their right to self-identify 
according to their own traditions. Nonetheless, indigenous peoples have resisted in an 
effort to restore self-determination. Furthermore, they have resisted in different ways, 
asserting that not all indigenous peoples fit neatly into one homogenous category. 
Subsequent chapters will explore CONAMAQ’s negotiation of indigenous autonomy 
within the national constituent assembly, with the Bolivian government and in the face of 
encroachment by transnational corporations.
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Chapter Two: Envisioning a Plurinational State: CONAMAQ’s 
demands during the Bolivian Constituent Assembly 
Traveling across Bolivia by bus, watching how the landscapes, animals, plants, 
and people change demonstrates extreme diversity and interdependence. Some 
indigenous descendants of the Inca Empire harvest potatoes and herd alpacas and llamas 
in the highland Andes Mountains. They engage in a unique ancestral spiritual relationship 
with the land that sustains them. Some design new forms of architecture and clothing in 
the city of El Alto, where others are perfecting the art form of Aymara hip-hop. All have 
inherited the economic legacy of colonial natural resource extraction and a select few 
continue to profit off mineral wealth, while others risk their lives to protect their land. To 
the east, lowland indigenous nations live the legacy of the Spanish rubber industry and 
elite owned latifundios. New crops of soybeans and palm oil have brought a new wave of 
capital to the region. Somewhere in the middle of these two extremes, driving down the 
winding roads from the mountains to the jungle, the traveler journeys through the 
Chapare valleys that provide lush earth for coca harvests. Bolivians use this crop not only 
for ritual practices and for lessening the effects of extreme altitude, but many have also 
manipulated it into a dangerous drug, trafficked throughout the region and the world. 
Understanding the rich diversity of this land and its indigenous and mestizo people 
reveals the difficulty of the liberal nation-state project that strives for one singular 
imagined national identity.  
The Republic of Bolivia has never been a cohesive homogenous imagined 
community in the way that Benedict Anderson describes, or in the way that Western 
influenced liberal politicians envisioned. While nationalist state sponsored policies 
attempted to condition citizens to identify according to their class (as opposed to their 
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ethnicity) throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this only worked to a certain 
extent. Projects of assimilating indigenous peoples into a mestizo, urban, Western 
educated society altered the lives of many Bolivians. Yet, countless fought against this 
process in diverse ways, struggling to revive respect for their ancestral lifestyles, and 
modify the forced national identity to encompass a plethora of identities that are equally 
legitimate. The recent constitutional reformation of Bolivia as a plurinational state 
(2009) is, at the very least, a nominal step towards acknowledging and supporting the 
many ways of thinking and being that have existed in the region for centuries. The epoch 
of striving for a homogenous national identity is over. The Republic of Bolivia, tied to 
liberal theory, is no longer a realistic goal. But will a plurinational state allow for the 
level of autonomy that many indigenous Bolivians are striving for? Does it continue to be 
wrapped up in the liberal matrix of power? 
The following chapter delves into the diverse demands made by a number of 
different political parties and grassroots indigenous and campesino organizations in the 
process of writing a new Bolivian constitution. Active civil society organizations 
struggled to define the future of Bolivia from the first march in 2002, to the many 
meetings with hundreds of representatives throughout 2006, to the consolidation of a 
historical Unity Pact (2004), to the final ratification of the constitution in 2009. Protests 
and numerous resolutions influenced the creation of a final document that defines Bolivia 
as a secular, unitary, plurinational state that recognizes indigenous autonomies, 
communal land rights, and restricts private land ownership.  
This chapter is not an all-encompassing analysis of the constituent assembly. 
Salvador Schavelzon has already accomplished that in El nacimiento del Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia: Etnografía de una Asamblea Constituyente (2012).  On the 
contrary, this chapter focuses on the specific role of civil society organizations in re-
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defining the state, with an emphasis on CONAMAQ’s proposals for indigenous 
autonomy and territorial and resource rights. Reviewing the organization’s propositions 
demonstrates the utopian Bolivia that this highland indigenous movement is struggling to 
realize and the legal base that they are constructing to present the possibility of real self-
determination. Furthermore, analyzing why the constituent body as a whole rejected 
certain proposals helps to demonstrate CONAMAQ’s contentious relationship with the 
state and other sectors of Bolivian society. By understanding these two aspects of 
CONAMAQ in light of the historic discrimination described in chapter one, their recent 
denunciation of the Morales administration and decision to break away from the Unity 
Pact (as described in chapter three) is recognizable as grounded in a long-term struggle 
for cultural recognition and rights to land and natural resources. 
Kevin Bruyneel’s “third space of sovereignty” provides a useful theoretical 
framework to understand the cracks in which indigenous resistance flourishes throughout 
the Americas. He suggests that in spaces of colonial ambivalence, indigenous political 
actors can effectively contest the imposition of dominant politics, economic systems, and 
ideology. Through refusal, negotiation, and straddling of two systems, indigenous 
peoples create alternative spaces within the liberal democratic state to assure that their 
autonomous rights are respected (Bruyneel 2007). This third space of sovereignty rejects 
the imperial binary of understanding indigenous peoples as either inside or outside of the 
nation-state, and instead demonstrates how indigenous peoples transcend these borders 
through creative articulations of agency.  
This chapter engages with CONAMAQ’s role in the Bolivian constituent 
assembly (2005-2007) to show how an autonomous indigenous movement used the 
language of the state to push monumental constitutional change. They demand rights and 
resources from the state, while simultaneously recognizing and rejecting its inherently 
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colonial nature, situating themselves both inside and outside of the imagined state. Did 
CONAMAQ avoid the entrapments of working within dominant legal frameworks? Were 
they able to use the national judicial system to ultimately create a space for community 
justice systems to prevail?  
This discussion of resistance is a continuation of the previous chapter that 
explored the longue durée of indigenous struggles for self-determination since Spanish 
colonization in 1532. An in depth exploration of the constituent assembly will lead to an 
analysis of the risks associated with the incorporation, cooptation and appropriation of 
indigenous systems into state governance. But first, this chapter puts body and form to 
the third space of sovereignty by recalling who initiated the constitutional reform, how 
they did so, and why they felt it was necessary. 
 
THE MARCH FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY  
From May 13 to June 19, 2002, members from over 50 different Bolivian social 
organizations marched in solidarity from the lowlands of Santa Cruz to the highlands of 
La Paz. While a network of lowland indigenous peoples led by CIDOB (Confederation of 
Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia) initiated the movement, highland members of 
CONAMAQ joined them in a historical act of solidarity foreshadowing a Unity Pact. 
Participants and the press referred to this event as “The Indigenous People’s March for 
Popular Sovereignty, Territory, and Natural Resources,” but it would ultimately become 
known as “The March for the Constituent Assembly”. 
This march was by no means the first time that Bolivians had called for a process 
to rewrite the constitution. The ultimate realization is a result of a number of protests, 
marches, and assemblies throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. First, a 1994 reform 
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recognized the country as multiethnic and pluricultural, setting the precedent that all 
citizens have the right to participate in decision-making (but only when done through 
formal, recognized means). These policies established a system for collective land titles, 
recognizing the economic, social, and cultural (but rarely political) rights of indigenous 
peoples. In 1996, the March for the Right to Land and Natural Resources successfully 
brought about a national land reform (INRA). The Water War in Cochabamba (2000) and 
the larger struggle to nationalize hydrocarbons demonstrated profound discontent with a 
neoliberal system that had restricted the right to water. Finally, the Gas War of October 
2003 fought for the nationalization of natural resources as well as the realization of a 
constituent assembly.  In each of these earlier battles, indigenous and campesino peoples 
pushed the neoliberal Republic to open the possibility for constitutional change. They 
used grassroots methods of marching, protesting, and holding demonstrations to voice the 
needs of the masses. 
The March for the Constituent Assembly was a monumental display of 
organization, solidarity, and transformation. Upon arriving in La Paz, after walking and 
meeting with leaders in local communities for thirty-seven days, representatives 
presented two main points to President Jorge Quiroga’s administration. First, they 
demanded “popular sovereignty”, including control of and respect for communal land 
holdings (Garcés 2011). This point was a continuation of several demonstrations led by 
indigenous peoples in the 1990s, but also the impetus of hundreds of years of struggle as 
described in chapter one. Thousands of people marched to remind government officials 
that the people create and sustain government by consent, that the majority of the 
population is indigenous, and that they demand control over their own territory and the 
natural resources according to their own traditions.  
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Second, leaders called for an assembly to rewrite the antiquated Bolivian national 
constitution. They specified that the committee must be composed of representatives 
from all sectors of society (Garcés 2011). With this proposal, they denounced the 
monopoly held by political parties, declaring that civil society organizations and 
communities should have the right to participate freely and directly in decision-making 
processes. Indigenous organizations (CIDOB and CONAMAQ) declared that the elitist 
parliament should not have the power to dominate constitutional reform, because they 
only represented a small sector of people, had controlled the country for centuries, and 
steered Bolivia into a neoliberal economic crisis.  
Up to seven thousand indigenous and non-indigenous men, women, and children 
participated in the March for the Constituent Assembly. Supporters included rural 
farmers, labor union members, university students, neighborhood organizations, informal 
workers federations, and women’s confederations, all of which united to fight for the 
rights of the Bolivian people. Upon crossing the border from the department of Santa 
Cruz to Cochabamba, indigenous brothers and sisters from Peru, Ecuador, and the 
Brazilian Rural Workers’ Movement joined the march in solidarity. As the mass of 
Bolivians and their allies pushed forward, they held meetings with local organizations 
and government representatives, particularly from the ministry of peasant and indigenous 
affairs, gaining a wide base of support and explaining their specific proposals (Centro de 
Medios Independientes 2002).  
Representatives of CONAMAQ left their highland communities to march with the 
lowland organizations. On the tenth day of the thirty-seven day march, indigenous 
peoples from the Ayllus of Chuquisaca left the city of Sucre and met the rest of the group 
one day later. Meanwhile, supporters from the Ayllus of Potosi and the Ayllus of Oruro 
began journeying through the Andes and joined the march on June 16 in the town of 
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Calamarca in the department of La Paz (Centro de Medios Independientes 2002). This 
demonstration of lowland and highland solidarity marked one of the early moments of the 
consolidation of the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact), a conglomeration of Bolivian civil 
society organizations that supported President Morales in his ascent to power. However, 
this did not mean that CONAMAQ and eastern lowland organizations agreed on all of the 
constitutional proposals. A later section of this chapter will interrogate the basis of the 
Unity Pact’s alliance and their different visions of how a plurinational state should 
function. 
Lack of oxygen due to high altitudes, drastic change in temperature from 
afternoon to evening, and unexpected storms haunted the marchers along their five-week 
journey. One marcher described their exhaustion and excitement on the sixth day: 
 
Despite being tired from yesterday’s journey…today we awoke again with 
the sunrise to continue our march. We began our journey, as long as 
yesterday’s, to Yapacaní. It would be 30 more kilometers of walking, and 
walking quickly because despite our blistered feet everyone wants to be at 
the front of the march. At first, it was harder because of the pain, but later 
with the energy of the movement walking became easier. We marched for 
eight hours, half of which were under the hot sun. Peasants and small land 
owners along the way gave us water and oranges. They greeted us and 
gave us strength (Equipo Nizkor 2002, Translated by author).   
Children, women, and men supported each other as they weaved through the Andes 
Mountains to the city of La Paz calling for radical change in how the state treated its 
citizens. They were met by solidarity and support from their brothers and sisters along 
their journey urging them to continue. 
The March for the Constituent Assembly held particular importance due to its 
timing. The movement attracted national media attention only weeks before general 
elections on June 30, 2002. This inspired a number of different responses from 
presidential candidates. While some used indigenous demands to bolster their political 
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campaign by supporting the call for a constituent assembly, others promised that they 
would protect the country from a process that would destabilize societal norms. While 
some politicians agreed that community voices should direct the assembly, others 
supported a constituent body dominated by political parties that would serve to reassure 
their continued power. To this propaganda, indigenous peoples reiterated that they fought 
not only to realize a constituent assembly, but one in which representatives from all 
sectors of society could be elected as official members (Centro de Medios Independientes 
2002). 
Many who marched for the realization of the constituent assembly recognized the 
need for systemic change, but did not see value in doing so through elections or political 
parties. Indigenous peoples had been largely excluded from these units for centuries and 
preferred a forum where they could speak on behalf of their communities and regional 
organizations on their own terms. The Coordinator of Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz 
(CPESC), a lowland indigenous organization, denounced propaganda that associated the 
march with specific political parties stating that, 
 
Our march is political because we are struggling for a truly democratic 
country where the rights of our peoples, communities and citizens are 
recognized and applied; because we speak of the political constitution, 
where we should define the rights of all and how the state should function. 
This is political. But when they say that our march is based in one 
particular political party, they are confused (Equipo Nizkor 2002, 
Translated by author).   
The march was about more than elections and political leaders, it was about the voices of 
the masses. It was a gathering of communities, outside of formal structures, supporting 
each other in their struggle to create a more just country in which historically subjugated 
peoples would have equal opportunity.  
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On June 10, 2002, when the procession arrived in Vinto (a town just beyond the 
city of Cochabamba) the marchers called for an extraordinary congress before the 
elections on June 30 to approve a law declaring the need for a constitutional reform. The 
draft stated that the constituent assembly would occur in the next presidential term and 
that it would include participants from all sectors of society without the mediation of 
political parties. Finally, on August 8, 2002, Jorge Quiroga passed a slightly altered 
version of this law that stated the necessity of reforming the constitution.   
After the March for the Constituent Assembly, many of the participating social 
organizations began an intense process of drafting a communal proposal for the 
constituent body. They convened in a series of meetings in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and 
La Paz, culminating in the inauguration of the national constituent assembly in Sucre on 
August 6, 2006. The next section will explore CONAMAQ’s specific proposal for the 
constituent assembly published months before the march. This chapter will then engage 
in a discussion of their strategic collaboration with other civil society organizations in the 
Unity Pact. 
 
CONAMAQ’S VISION FOR A NEW BOLIVIA: ARUSKIPASIPXAÑANI 
By tracing CONAMAQ’s proposals during the national constituent assembly, we 
see the ways that they redefine and negotiate the meaning and location of indigenous 
political identity. Is it contradictory that CONAMAQ, an indigenous organization striving 
for greater autonomy, is also calling for participation in the constituent assembly? Do 
they want to be a part of the larger nation-state? Or do they want a separate entity called 
Qullasuyu? Legacies of colonialism and exploitative relationships between indigenous 
nations and the Bolivian nation state complicate this either/or scenario. To become totally 
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self-sufficient, as members of CONAMAQ desire, they must first overcome the power 
hierarchies that have become deeply entrenched after centuries of exclusion, subjugation, 
and forced assimilation.  
In analyzing the relationships between Native Americans and the United States 
government, Kevin Bruyneel suggests that “indigenous tribes and nations claim a form of 
sovereignty that is unclear because it is not easily located inside or outside” of the 
dominant nation state (2007, xiii). The previous chapter of this thesis demonstrated how 
indigenous nations are neither part of the Bolivian nation nor complete sovereign bodies. 
They have been excluded by state policies and segregated in social scenarios, yet 
simultaneously forced to assimilate. This chapter builds on Bruyneel to argue that 
members of CONAMAQ strategically place themselves in the cracks between spatial and 
temporal boundaries imposed by the nation-state. They reject the assumption that 
indigenous peoples are backwards in time and peripheral in space. They claim a form of 
sovereignty that is unclear because it is not easily located in the dominant political system 
or imaginary but rather exists on the edges, pushing the boundaries of normativity 
through strategic ambivalence. It is an evasive, inassimilable space, so as to avoid the 
entrapments of the modern liberal democratic nation state.  
In February 2002, the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ) developed a reformist proposal for the future of Bolivia based on 
grassroots demands and regional consultation. Indigenous leaders presented this 
document to the country as a whole, and to President Jorge Quiroga. Given that the 
previous constitution only acknowledged indigenous peoples in two of the 235 articles, 
CONAMAQ wanted to assure that indigenous peoples would be represented according to 
their own identity (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 5). This analysis draws heavily upon the 
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Aruskipasipxañani proposal to recognize and analyze the specific demands of 
CONAMAQ. 
The document admonishes the “poverty that affects indigenous peoples in rural 
communities and large cities in such a perverse manner” (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 1).  
They recognize that marginalization and exclusion are structural problems reified by the 
elite class, not a natural inferiority or backwardness of indigeneity. As described in 
chapter one, the capitalist system imposed upon Bolivia through colonial and liberal 
governments disproportionately disenfranchised native peoples. Traditional ways of 
subsistence became increasingly difficult as large-scale mining and agriculture relied on 
massive labor-forces and unfair compensation. This poverty breeds financial dependency 
on the state for goods and services. 
Relations between indigenous peoples and q’aras (non-indigenous ‘outsiders’, or 
mestizos) have been laden with insults, aggression, violence, war, and genocide since 
European colonialism. Homogenizing policies have not included indigenous peoples in 
the nation state according to their own identity, but rather the labor-based identity that the 
elite class imposed upon them. CONAMAQ’s proposal declared a desire to move beyond 
this tumultuous relationship through aruskipasipxañani (the Aymara word for 
communication), understanding, and a reevaluation of institutional and local norms. 
These goals require a politics of listening and recognition of indigenous peoples as 
worthy speakers. If only the state would listen instead of unilaterally make decisions, 
then indigenous and non-indigenous peoples could engage in a long overdue conversation 
in regards to what nationhood and sovereignty mean in overlapping, yet distinct, spaces.  
Audra Simpson, a Mohawk scholar, suggests that a philosophy of listening would 
enable open dialogue between colonized and colonizer in a process of “reconfiguring the 
relationships of power that characterize native-state relations” (Simpson 117). By truly 
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listening to indigenous peoples, we could escape the linear trajectory of Western 
modernity, from nationalism to nationhood, and recognize that many indigenous peoples 
have separate systems that shape and are shaped by distinct experiences. To many 
members of CONAMAQ, this means the creation of a state-like body called Qullasuyu 
that resembles pre-colonial systems of reciprocal trade, community justice, and 
traditional land stewardship. For others it means integration into the nation-state but with 
dignity. By listening, observing, and communicating, colonizers and colonized could 
engage with commonly misunderstood experiences. By mixing knowledge with emotion 
and experience, we could escape “static and necessarily reified representations of 
identities and cultures” (Simpson 125). CONAMAQ’s proposal calls upon the Bolivian 
State to listen and think beyond western-centric modes of governance that understands 
indigenous peoples as the distant, inferior other.  
CONAMAQ proposed both specific and ideological reforms to the Bolivian State 
according to five themes: cultural politics, territory and natural resources, legal rights, 
development of the ayllu, and the constituent assembly. Specifically, they demanded an 
immediate de-bureaucratization of the 1996 INRA land reform that legalized collective 
land ownership so that indigenous communities could access official titles for the 
territories they inhabit without the risk of confiscation. A victory won through discourses 
of multiculturalism, finally obtaining formal land titles would prevent further invasion of 
indigenous land, but would also subsume communities into the gaze of state bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, the key to the Aruskipasipxañani proposal was the call for a new 
constitution that recognized Bolivia as a plurinational state so that “our voices in aymara, 
qhichwa, chipaya, guaraní, moxeño… and Spanish will be written in stone and bronze for 
eternal memory” (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 2). This discourse of inclusion into the 
Bolivian national constitution seems like a step towards total enclosure, however, their 
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subsequent proposals demonstrate how legal recognition was a tool to gain greater 
autonomy, acting as a shield to protect indigenous peoples from state encroachment. 
Furthermore, their propositions do not rely on inclusion into a static state, but rather 
suggests fundamental changes to the governing body so as to create a less exploitative 
relationship. 
First, in regards to cultural politics, CONAMAQ’s proposal called for the 
reconstitution and strengthening of indigenous systems of governance, language, and 
spirituality. They advocated for a transformation of the exclusive, inherently colonial 
Bolivian political system to a more just governing body based on the horizontal model of 
the ayllu. That is, CONAMAQ did not want to be integrated into the liberal state, but 
rather wanted the state to transition to a style of governance inspired by traditional 
indigenous systems. They proposed a political system that would respect autonomy and 
disentangle institutionalized racism from law and education. They called for the 
obligatory use of indigenous oral and written languages in educational systems, public 
administration, and private institutions and for government sponsored cultural-linguistic 
research to develop literature in indigenous languages. Furthermore, CONAMAQ 
declared that respect for nature and Pachamama should guide development policies and 
protect indigenous sacred land (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 2-3).  
Each of these changes would serve to transform the Bolivian nation state into an 
institution that would recognize the value of traditional indigenous institutions. In the 
short-term, there is nothing separatist about these proposals. However, in the long-term, 
they would serve to create a space in which respect for indigenous customs may lead to 
less exploitative relations amongst indigenous and non-indigenous peoples and in turn, 
further cultural and political autonomy.  
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Second, the proposal critiqued the historical and contemporary elite monopoly 
over territory and natural resources as a system that benefits few and assures continued 
indigenous exclusion and poverty. CONAMAQ demanded the right to autonomous 
administration of indigenous territories and resources, both above and below the earth’s 
surface. They insisted that a new constitution and a modification of the 1953 agrarian 
reform were necessary to systematize and legitimize indigenous land rights. They also 
called for the reconsideration of arbitrary political-territorial departmental boundaries as 
designated by the Republic to recognize the socio-cultural borders of their traditional 
suyus and markas. This challenged the colonial imposition of political spatial zones that 
fail to account for indigenous kinship networks, trade, and relationships with territory. 
While striving for greater autonomy in regards to land use, CONAMAQ supported the 
direct representation of indigenous leaders into state level decision-making processes on 
natural resource management and exportation (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 4-5). 
Third, CONAMAQ denounced the national justice system that disregarded local 
indigenous community norms and strengthened historical systemic discrimination. They 
demanded a new judicial system that would respect a balance of autonomy and 
participation while recognizing cultural, socio-economic, and territorial rights. Members 
of CONAMAQ recognized that written state law does not always result in tangible 
change and they therefore pushed for mechanisms such as local and national seminars 
and workshops to educate the masses about indigenous rights. They acknowledged that 
despite international human rights agreements such as ILO 169 (ratified by Bolivia in 
1991), indigenous peoples continue to suffer from oppressive racism and inhuman 
exploitation. Part of respecting ILO 169 means greater democratization through the 
participation of ayllus and markas as viable platforms to express community positions 
without relying on political parties that have traditionally prioritized self-gain over the 
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common good (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 5-7). Formally recognizing traditional justice 
systems as legitimate on a national scale would allow for greater autonomy at the 
community level. It also denounces the Western understanding of indigenous peoples as 
lawless and backwards in time, by recognizing complex community justice systems. 
Nonetheless, we must consider the limitations of formal recognition given the plenary 
power of the state. 
Fourth, CONAMAQ called for the development of the ayllu. Six million Aymara, 
Quechua, and Uru people continue to live in ayllus but remain excluded from national 
development programs and funding that tend to emphasize urban areas and labor 
syndicates. While critics have written-off CONAMAQ as an organization that aims to 
‘return to the past’ and is inherently against development, they prefer to bring the past to 
the present, striving for a different type of development that recognizes their identities 
and involves direct representation. The Aruskipasipxañani proposal declared that 
municipal governments should be required to communicate with ayllu leaders in 
transparent ways and collaborate in financial decisions regarding the allocation of 
multilateral funding to indigenous communities. It called for poverty reduction and 
redistribution of resources through improved infrastructure and communication services, 
safe drinking water and electrification for indigenous communities, promotion of local 
modes of production and participation in international markets, multilingual educational 
reform, support for traditional technologies and intellectual property, indigenous nutrition 
programs and support for traditional crops and medicine, as well as culturally sensitive 
state-funded health services (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 7-11). Each of these services as 
determined by communities but subsidized by the state demonstrate the need for support 
after hundreds of years of subjugation, but the desire for local decision-making in 
allocating that funding. 
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CONAMAQ’s willingness to request state sponsored services and the fulfillment 
of social, cultural, and economic rights is not contradictory to their desire for greater 
autonomy. The goal of complete self-sufficiency is stifled by restrictive spatial, and 
temporal assumptions based on colonial imposition, so that assistance is necessary in the 
short term while searching for total self-determination in the long term. Indigenous 
peoples need not choose between assimilation and separation, they can engage with a 
third space of sovereignty, a space of maneuver and navigation. 
CONAMAQ’s proposal concluded by stating that recognition of cultural rights, 
redistribution of land, a legal reform, and support for developing the ayllu can only be 
fulfilled by the reconstruction of a new political constitution that reflects a heterogeneous 
plurinational country (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 11). For hundreds of years, the mestizo 
elite had silenced indigenous peoples, attempting to assimilate them into a homogenous 
nation state. After being excluded from decision making for centuries, CONAMAQ 
declared that a new constitution should recognize a more horizontal state structure with a 
different composition that is representative of the country’s cultural and linguistic 
diversity (Aruskipasipxañani 2002, 11-12).  
Indigenous highland leaders proposed that their driving principles were based in 
listening, conversing, and offering creative alternatives and solutions, and that these 
actions should be met by the national government. In an effort to overcome nearly 500 
years of hate and lack of communication, the proposed dialogue invited a discussion in 
order to search for collective compromise. The following section investigates the alliance 
that CONAMAQ made with other Bolivian civil society organizations in an effort to 
assure that their demands were heard. While this pact assured power in numbers, forcing 
the government to listen, it also became clear that CONAMAQ would have to modify 
many of its propositions to adhere to the needs of the larger group. For example, 
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CONAMAQ wanted to change the name of Bolivia to “Qullasuyu Bolivia” or “Republic 
of Qullasuyu”. The issue with this change is that the peoples of lowland Bolivia were 
never part of the Qullasuyu identity within the Inca Empire. This change would have 
been Andes-centric and exclusionist given the profound diversity of the country. The 
following analysis will provide a deeper understanding of CONAMAQ as an 
organization by comparing its vision for a more just Bolivia in relation to an array of 
Bolivian civil society organizations.  
 
ESTABLISHING THE UNITY PACT 
In September 2004, representatives from many of the social organizations that 
participated in the March for the Constituent Assembly (including CONAMAQ) gathered 
for a National Encounter of Peasant, Indigenous, and Originary Organizations in the 
department of Santa Cruz. They gathered to draft a proposal of the law calling for the 
constituent assembly. With over 300 representatives in attendance, this meeting marked 
the first encounter of a historical Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact).1 Marking a monumental 
alliance, highland originary peoples, lowland indigenous peoples, and peasant labor 
union organizations strategically put aside their many differences in an effort to confront 
the elite class that politically and economically dominated the country. Principal players 
in the Unity Pact included five major national organizations: CONAMAQ, CIDOB 
(Confederation of indigenous Peoples of Bolivia), CSUTCB (Confederation of Peasant 
                                                 
1 The Unity Pact initially included the CSUTCB (Central Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de 
Bolivia), CIDOB (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia), CONAMAQ (Consejo Nacional de 
Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu), CSCB (Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia), CPESC 
(Coordinadora de Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz), FNMCB’BS’ (Confederación de Mujeres Campesinas 
Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia Bartolina Sisa), CPEMB (Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni), 
APG (Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani), MST-B (Movimiento sin Tierra- Bolivia), BOCNAB (Bloque de 
Organizaciones Campesinas e Indígenas del Norte Amazónico), and CDTAC (Central Departamental de 
Trabajadores Asalariados del Campo). 
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Workers of Bolivia), FNMCB-BS (Bartolina Sisa National Federation of Women Peasant 
Workers of Bolivia), and CSCB (Confederation of Unionized Colonists of Bolivia). 
Other regional indigenous and peasant organizations also participated in this encounter, 
including representatives of the Guaraní and Moxeño peoples, and the landless peasant 
movement, but they are not considered key long-term actors within the Unity Pact 
(García Linera et al. 2004).  
The Unity Pact’s proposal for the constituent assembly (2006) identified their 
members as naciones y pueblos indígenas, originarios y campesinos (indigenous, 
originary, and peasant nations and peoples). This terminology was a compromise after 
much discussion and debate and ultimately included nomadic ethnic groups, subsistence 
land based populations, and peasants who owned individual private property (Schavelzon 
2013, 97). Grouping these three categories of Bolivian peoples together recognizes 
overlapping identities as a result of homogenization processes that encouraged 
indigenous peoples to identify as peasants. Nonetheless, by using three different terms, 
they accounted for the distinct identities that have remained separate despite assimilation 
processes (Schavelzon, 2013 93-94).  
The Unity Pact included Aymara, Quechua, and Guaraní originary nations, as 
represented by CONAMAQ, as well as smaller-scale lowland indigenous peoples, 
represented by CIDOB. Both of these social groups distinguish themselves as native to 
the land. While they have had historical differences (predominantly because highland 
land struggles often overshadowed the needs of lowland peoples) they have built strong 
networks of solidarity over the past several decades. The most distinct category is that of 
the campesino (peasant), represented by the CSUTCB, Bartolinas Sisas, and 
Colonizadores. These peoples claim that they have maintained many originary cultural 
forms and territorial organizations despite being subjected to a process of liberal 
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peasantization through practices of mestizaje and land reform. As such, peasant 
organizations claim indigeneity despite reterritorialization and a strong identification with 
their class identity. For example, many members of the CSUTCB emerged from the 
katarista indigenous movement as described in chapter one and may identify with their 
local ayllu as well as their labor union.  
By lumping “indigenous, originary, and peasant nations and peoples” together 
within the Unity Pact, CONAMAQ risked simplifying and even homogenizing their 
demands, yet they also recognized the profound diversity of subjects who had been 
discriminated against for centuries. While the Unity Pact acknowledged many ways of 
being indigenous, those who remained distanced from the modern state, preserving their 
communal lifestyles, disapproved of the inclusion of mestizo, modernized, peasants 
within their definition of indigeneity (Schavelzon 2013, 97). Nonetheless, they acted 
strategically to assure that their demands be heard in front of the constituent assembly. 
They were able to form alliances with other subjugated peoples throughout the country to 
create a collectivity outside of traditional nation-state politics dominated by political 
parties.  
The Unity Pact established in this moment would become a strong political 
mechanism within the constituent assembly. Different organizations came together to 
confront a common oppressor that had played these three distinct identities against each 
other in recent history as a mechanism of divide and conquer. Despite a common 
adversary, the organizations did not have a strong tradition of communication or 
collective demands. Given this level of heterogeneity within the Unity Pact, their most 
powerful collective demand was for a plurinational state that recognized and respected 
local autonomy. The alliance remained unified until 2011 when CIDOB and CONAMAQ 
(in 2012) decided to break away from the three peasant organizations due to ideological 
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differences and waning allegiance to President Morales. The fragmentation of the Unity 
Pact will be discussed in further detail in chapter three. However, the moment of creating 
a plurinational Bolivia and the collaboration of indigenous, originary, and peasant 
peoples created an unprecedented and powerful political force. 
 
REALIZING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
In March of 2006, the Bolivian congress under the leadership of newly elected 
President Evo Morales approved the law to convene the constituent assembly. This 
motion summoned members from different civil society organizations to gather in a 
national meeting to re-write the constitution. On July 2, 2006, Bolivian citizens voted for 
255 representatives to form the constituent assembly. The law declared that all members 
of the assembly would be “equal in hierarchy, rights and obligations”. Of these elected 
members, 137 representatives (54%) identified with the MAS (Movement towards 
Socialism) political party while 60 members (24%) represented the right wing pro-
business PODEMOS political party (Albó 2008). This turnout is telling of the political 
fervor and desire for change, sparking great resentment from the rightwing elite who had 
the most to lose from the rewriting of a constitution that clearly favored their interests. 
Out of the 255 representatives who participated in the constituent assembly, members of 
CONAMAQ acquired eight seats. According to Xavier Albó, a remarkable 56% of the 
constituents self-identified as indigenous (2008). This is monumental considering that 
indigenous peoples had never been included in writing previous Bolivian constitutions. 
Furthermore, the president of the constituent assembly, Silvia Lazarte, self-identified as 
an indigenous Quechua woman.  
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The inauguration of the constituent assembly occurred in Sucre on August 6, 
2006. In this moment, different factions submitted the proposals they had developed in 
the months leading up to the congregation. The Unity Pact’s proposal will be discussed in 
further detail in the next section. CONAMAQ’s leadership met in Sucre two months after 
the inauguration to assure that their voices were being heard and incorporated into the 
new text of the constitution. This effort intended to assure that the eight representatives 
were being taken seriously within the assembly. On November 30, 2006, leaders of 
CONAMAQ (as well as CSUTCB, and the Confederation of Colonizers) announced that 
150 of their members from the Unity Pact would monitor the constituent assembly to 
assure full transparency (Carrasco and Albó 2008). 
The right wing media luna2 presented numerous roadblocks to the reconstitution 
of Bolivia and formulated a major opposition to the Unity Pact. They had benefitted from 
exclusionary policies for centuries and were not willing to give up their elite privilege. In 
particular, the agenda to nationalize natural resources fell in stark contrast with the elite 
agenda. Leading up to the assembly, the media luna initiated an autonomous secessionist 
movement claiming that eastern departments should be sovereign from the rest of 
Bolivia. This movement is a fascinating counterpoint to indigenous proposals for greater 
autonomy. However, the proposition met much resistance from the rest of the country 
due to the eastern region’s richness in natural resources. On the brink of civil war, voters 
rejected the referendum for eastern lowland autonomy on a national level, although all 
four media luna departments voted yes to eastern secession (July 2006). The conflicts 
between the media luna and the Unity Pact continued throughout the constituent 
assembly. The MAS party proposed that a majority vote (128 votes) would pass any 
                                                 
2 The media luna is the elite political base residing in Santa Cruz, Pando, Beni and Tarija, a geographical 
region that resembles a “half moon”. 
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given decision, and that a 2/3 vote (170 votes) would approve the final constitutional text. 
However, representatives of the right-wing PODEMOS party fought for a 2/3 vote for all 
decision making (Garcés 2010). This strategic move aimed to stall the assembly’s 
progress. Overall, in the discussion of CONAMAQ’s vision of a new Bolivia, it is 
important to recognize the extent to which elite sectors disagreed with the Unity Pact’s 
proposals.  
Elite opposition is crucial to understand the deeply rooted conflict between 
indigenous peoples, peasants, and mestizos. The land reform and redistribution of wealth 
that the Unity Pact strived for was in direct opposition to elite ownership of large-scale 
agricultural businesses and mining companies. While indigenous and peasant peoples 
aimed to gain respect, dignity, and control over their own development and resource 
management, they could not risk completely alienating the elite class that lived on the 
most fertile and mineral rich lands. This underlying fear is a key barrier to both sectors as 
they drafted a new constitution with disparate interests. The following chapter will 
explore this tension in further detail in an effort to understand the clashing objectives of 
development through mineral extraction wealth, and protection of mother earth. Before 
looking at these wealth and power disparities between the elite and the civil masses, the 
subsequent section engages in yet another level of conflict and compromise amongst the 
distinct social organizations within the Unity Pact. 
 
THE UNITY PACT’S VISION FOR A NEW BOLIVIA 
This section delves into the official proposal that the indigenous, originary, and 
peasant organizations presented to the board of directors of the constituent assembly on 
behalf of the Unity Pact on August 5, 2006. It serves to demonstrate what the Unity Pact 
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proposed, in order to later recognize what ultimately became the final constitution. They 
strived for a complete reconstruction of the state model as opposed to mere reform that 
they believed would fail to fundamentally change both systemic discrimination and 
micro-level forms of everyday oppression. They began the document by stating that,  
 
Today, originary nations, indigenous peoples, and peasants have the 
challenge of participating in the refoundation of Bolivia, constructing a 
new country based in peoples as a collective subject, towards the 
construction of a plurinational state that transcends the Liberal state model 
cemented in individual citizenship (Pacto de Unidad 2006, Translated by 
Author).   
The Unity Pact addressed both short-term and long-term injustices. They fought 
to reverse neoliberal policies, for the nationalization of hydrocarbons, and for explicit 
rights to land and water. However, embedded in this immediate goal was a deeper 
recognition that the neoliberal system is a perpetuation of the liberal system consolidated 
in 1825. The Unity Pact agreed that the Bolivian Republic should be transformed into a 
plurinational state. This, they declared, would recognize internal heterogeneity, finally 
distinguishing indigenous peoples as legitimate collective contributors to the nation as a 
whole (Pacto de Unidad 2006). Reviving indigeneity as a source of pride and dignity, 
they hoped, would begin to reverse hundreds of years of liberal policies and the 
imposition of Western modernity as explained in chapter one. A plurinational state would 
legally recognize diverse nations, peoples, and cultures that have a right to peaceful and 
respectful coexistence.  
The Unity Pact’s 2006 proposition reaffirmed many of the key ideas that 
CONAMAQ delineated in their 2002 Aruskipasipxañani document described above, but 
provided further elaboration and specificity. The collaborative proposal drew particular 
political strength from the fact that it represented nine different civil society 
organizations, but this also required compromises for each of the included parties. As 
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such, the language contrasted starkly between the group document and the one that 
CONAMAQ had proposed years earlier. Perhaps the most notable difference is the 
complete omission of the word ayllu in the Unity Pact’s proposal. They instead refer to 
autonomy and direct representation through “communal cabildos and assemblies” as well 
as “territorial autonomies” distinguished by “language, history, culture, geography, and 
organizations”. This definition includes the ayllu as a community structure, but broadens 
the conversation to include peasants and indigenous peoples who do not live in originary 
ayllus. While CONAMAQ broke up their proposal into five main points (ie. cultural 
politics, territory and natural resources, legal rights, development of the ayllu, and a call 
for the constituent assembly), I have broken the Unity Pact’s proposal into eight different, 
yet overlapping themes. 
First, the Unity Pact criticized Bolivia’s monoethnic hegemony that supported 
white supremacy and the subjugation of indigenous peoples. Instead, they proposed a 
Pluricultural state that would respect coexistence and interrelation amongst indigenous 
and mestizo peoples. This would include reaffirmation and recuperation of indigenous, 
originary and peasant culture and systems. Each of these sectors of society, they agreed, 
should have the right to preserve and develop material and spiritual culture including 
music, film, archaeological sites, technologies, dress, food, crafts, cosmovision, myths, 
legends, languages, cultural identity, customs, traditional medicine, science and 
technology, intellectual property, and self esteem (Pacto de Unidad 2006). 
The Unity Pact denounced Bolivia’s liberal democracy that adhered to private 
property and legitimized haciendas, latifundios and oligarchy. On the contrary, they 
prioritized human and collective rights and respect for life and dignity as well as 
transparency and social responsibility. They encouraged the recognition of two different 
types of land: first, collective, community lands, and second, individual land. Members of 
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CONAMAQ promoted this first type of relationship with the land, and did not agree that 
the country should allow for private ownership. However, members of the CSUTCB 
insisted that private property was necessary. The joint proposal compromised, stating that 
a plurinational state would privilege the first as inalienable, irreversible, indivisible, and 
exempt from taxation, while establishing certain conditions for the second. More 
specifically, they asserted that the state should recognize private property only if the 
owner personally works the land and meets environmental and social economic functions. 
While they did not specify a maximum permissible limit for individual property, they 
stated that it should be discussed and stated in the constitution (Pacto de Unidad 2006). 
This would prevent excessive accumulation of land. 
The Unity Pact reprimanded monolithic political power that restricted 
representation to official political parties, and advocated for direct representation and 
participation of communities, and recognition of local authorities elected according to 
local customs and traditions. They specified that national representatives should not only 
be ethnically diverse but also 50% male and 50% female. Furthermore, all elected 
representatives should be able to speak the predominant languages of the region that they 
serve. Indigenous, originary, and peasant peoples, they contended, have the responsibility 
of the administration, use, and management of renewable natural resources according to 
their customs and traditions in accordance with the norms of the plurinational state. They 
would also aid in the administration of goods and local services including culturally 
appropriate education and healing practices (Pacto de Unidad 2006). A major 
discrepancy, however, came when discussing what bodies should represent local 
communities. This clash emerged between members of CONAMAQ who relied on the 
ayllu as a form of social organization and Mallku’s as representative leaders, who 
disagreed with peasant peoples who depended on labor unions. 
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Similar to CONAMAQ’s proposal, the Unity Pact condemned the colonial 
geographic political and administrative structure of the country that fragmented historical 
community structures. Unlike the Aruskipasipxañani proposal that called for a return to 
ayllu, marka and suyu geographical borders, this statement encouraged a new juridical 
regionalization according to “traditional territories” and “local ecosystems” (Pacto de 
Unidad 2006). Representatives of CONAMAQ fought for the explicit inclusion of ayllus, 
but were overruled by the rest of the Unity Pact. Furthermore, they advanced a three-
tiered administrative system with local autonomous regions and intermediate 
departmental regions within the centralized unitary plurinational state (Pacto de Unidad 
2006). This, they declared would assure unprecedented levels of self-determination. 
The proposal rejected Bolivia’s uniform judicial system that favored the market 
economy and pressed for a plural juridical system that would recognize community 
justice systems and collective rights as well as direct representation and respect for local 
leaders. They asserted that indigenous, originary, and peasant peoples should be included 
in a plurinational congress that would communicate in Spanish as well as indigenous 
languages. Local justice systems would be responsible for defining and implementing 
legal standards for workplace safety and administering justice in accordance with their 
local legal systems in combination with the functions and powers of the legislative 
branches of the central government. The major conflict in regards to community justice 
was the role that indigenous communities would have and when the plenary power of the 
state would overrule smaller systems. The proposed juridical system, at a national level, 
placed major emphasis on water as a human right that should not be concessioned, 
privatized, nor exported. The Unity Pact contended that the state must guarantee, 
regulate, and protect the sustainable use of hydrological resources, free from 
contamination (Pacto de Unidad 2006).  
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Elaborating on cultural rights, they maintained that indigenous, originary, and 
peasant peoples had the right to free, compulsory, participatory, pluricultural and 
plurilinguistic educational programs that would aim to recuperate indigenous customs 
and traditions. Furthermore, they asserted that the plurinational state should promote 
indigenous universities. The Unity Pact encouraged the right to labor with dignity so that 
private and public companies would treat workers with equality and equity according to 
ethnic and gender identities. All Bolivians, they stated, should be guaranteed fair working 
hours and wages, social benefits, social security, stability, and compensation as well as 
universal insurance without discrimination. Intercultural health services should be 
organized at the autonomous community level according to norms and traditions. In 
addition, the state should promote research and implementation of traditional medicine in 
an effort to diminish the current hierarchy of Western medicine (Pacto de Unidad 2006).  
The proposition also admonished the repression and coercion of indigenous, 
originary, and peasant peoples by the police and military. They demanded greater respect 
for human rights stating that the military colleges should recognize and accept peoples 
from all sectors of society for military careers. The Unity Pact called for the end to the 
systematic genocide and ethnocide of indigenous, originary and peasant peoples (Pacto 
de Unidad 2006).  
The proposal denounced the exclusive and unsustainable socio-economic model 
dependent on natural resource extraction and environmental depredation. Instead, they 
called for development with identity, acknowledging that local knowledges and 
technologies are valuable to the development of the country as a whole. Members of 
CONAMAQ pushed for self-sufficiency through the Andean notion of vivir bien, striving 
for solidarity, reciprocity, food sovereignty, communal economies, and equal access to 
the market economy and basic services. The Unity Pact solicited aid from the state to 
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promote agro-ecological productive associations and cooperatives, and prohibit 
monopolies (Pacto de Unidad 2006). They highlighted the importance of striking 
equilibrium between natural resource extraction and protection of the environment in an 
effort to guarantee sustainability for future generations. The next chapter, however, will 
highlight the varied opinions of what sustainable development means and to whom it 
ultimately benefits. Disagreements on this point would ultimately result in CONAMAQ 
and CIDOB breaking away from the Unity Pact. 
Unlike CONAMAQ’s proposal that demanded the right to autonomous 
administration of resources both above and below the earth’s surface, the Unity Pact 
made a compromise on this topic. They declared that the benefits from the exploitation of 
non-renewable resources from indigenous territories would be subject to equitable 
redistribution and social justice for the whole country (Pacto de Unidad 2006).3 However, 
renewable natural resources would be within the domain and property of the originary 
nations and indigenous peoples who would have the right to use the benefits and 
resources as they saw fit. Furthermore, they distinguished that non-renewable resources 
should never be privatized or concessioned under any given circumstance. This question 
of natural resources has become a tense issue in contemporary Bolivia as we will see in 
chapter three. In an effort to limit the depredation of biodiversity, they asserted that the 
Plurinational state should prohibit genetically modified seeds.  
Finally, the Unity Pact solicited autonomy at the local level according to 
linguistic, historical, cultural, geographic, and organizational criteria. Autonomous 
                                                 
3 This decision, that non-renewable resources would benefit the Bolivian society as a whole, sparked 
ongoing discussion and disagreement within the Unity Pact. CIDOB, an organization that recognized 
lowland indigenous peoples believed that non-renewable resources should be split between the state and 
communities, while other members of the Unity Pact oscillated between declaring them state property, or 
property of the Bolivian peoples as a collective. 
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peoples on autonomous lands would be protected by mandatory, binding procedures of 
free, prior and informed consent with the power to veto any exploration or exploitation of 
non-renewable resources. This aimed to break the state’s vertical, exclusive power 
structure. They also advanced a fourth political body beyond the executive, legislative, 
and judicial bodies called the “plurinational social power”. This organization would be 
composed of non-governmental civil society representatives elected through universal 
vote and would be responsible for watching and controlling the power of the state and 
denouncing irregular acts of the military (Pacto de Unidad 2006). This body would help 
to protect autonomy within the state and theoretically minimize state appropriation. They 
specified that autonomous territories must be culturally differentiated according to 
distinct language, culture and history, an indigenous, native or peasant local government 
and legal administration based in customs and traditions, cultural norms and knowledge, 
community based management of territory, land and natural resources and a budget for 
their own resources.  
Each of these eight proposals drew attention to the exclusive nature of the 
Bolivian Republic and proposed viable alternatives to the constituent body in an effort to 
create a more horizontal, decolonized, plurinational state. The Unity Pact would 
ultimately revise their proposals as necessary, but largely maintained these positions as 
crucial for indigenous, originary, and peasant peoples. The proposal greatly influenced 
the assembly, especially members of the MAS party. Isaac Ávalos, a member of the 
CSUTCB declared that,  
 
The Pact was a fundamental step. We had some problems. We fought a bit 
amongst ourselves. But in the end we had to sit down and reach an 
agreement about the articles that we had conflict with and continue 
advancing. Eighty percent of the proposals we worked on they accepted; 
so we should be proud of our leaders, our organizations, we have achieved 
what we wanted in the constitution (Interview in Garcés 2010, 88).   
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Other representatives such as Florentino Barrientos (also a member of CSUTCB) 
estimated that the Unity Pact had achieved closer to ninety percent of their original 
proposals (Garcés 2010). Most importantly, the civil society organizations that initiated 
the March for the Constituent Assembly in 2002 were able to reflect and recognize that 
after years of struggle, the people of Bolivia had gathered to write a new constitution, 
with representatives from many sectors of society.   
 
FINAL ALTERATIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
On January 25, 2009, the Bolivian masses voted and approved the new 
plurinational constitution with 61.43% of the votes, but not without major discrepancies 
between the media luna and the Unity Pact. On November 24, 2007 members of the 
assembly approved a preliminary draft of the full document, however, the eastern elite 
opposition boycotted the final stages of the assembly vote and incited violent protests 
against the larger group. On December 8, the assembly moved its sessions to Oruro for 
safety reasons, but the majority of the media luna decided to boycott these meetings. 
Only 165 of the 255 delegates attended and participated in the final vote (Carrasco and 
Albó 2008). Throughout the night, the present members approved each article, one at a 
time, and sent the document off to La Paz for final editing. On December 14, 2007 Silvia 
Lazarte, the president of the constituent assembly, submitted the approved version of the 
constitution to Vice President Alvaro García Linera for final revisions pertaining to “style 
and consistency” (Carrasco and Albó 2008). After over a year of revisions, discussions, 
and negotiations, the Bolivian masses finally approved the plurinational constitution. 
While prior constitutions had barely recognized indigenous rights, the new 
constitution did so right from the start. Article two highlights the historical importance of 
 80 
indigenous peoples, establishing legitimacy for contemporary constitutional rights to self-
government according to their traditions:   
 
Given the pre-colonial existence of nations and rural native indigenous 
peoples and their ancestral control of their territories, their free 
determination, consisting of the right to autonomy, self-government, their 
culture, recognition of their institutions, and the consolidation of their 
territorial entities, is guaranteed within the framework of the unity of the 
State, in accordance with this Constitution and the law (Article 2). 
 
The constitution moves beyond guaranteeing indigenous peoples special rights, 
and establishes that the entire nation “adopts and promotes” indigenous moral principles, 
including “do not be lazy, do not be a liar or a thief”, “live well”, “live harmoniously”, 
“good life”, “land without evil”, and “noble path or life” (Article 8). These values aim to 
minimize capitalist forces of accumulation and greed. The constitution promises that rural 
native indigenous institutions may be part of the general structure of the state, a way for 
indigenous systems to gain legitimacy, but at the risk of state appropriation. One of the 
most important rights is that to free, prior, and informed consent. Article 30.15 states that 
rural native indigenous peoples enjoy the right 
 
to be consulted by appropriate procedures, in particular through their 
institutions, each time legislative or administrative measures may be 
foreseen to affect them. In this framework, the right to prior obligatory 
consultation by the State with respect to the exploitation of nonrenewable 
natural resources in the territory they inhabit shall be respected and 
guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement (Article 30.15). 
Chapter three of this thesis will explore the practices of the state in regards to extracting 
resources and promoting infrastructural development on indigenous land.  
While many of these aforementioned rights are monumental in comparison to 
previous constitutions, a series of under the table alterations has stained the democratic 
process of the constituent assembly. Between the moment that Lazarte presented the 
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assembly’s draft to Vice President García Linera, and the final ratification, numerous 
modifications changed the document from one that valued the rights of indigenous, 
originary, and peasant peoples to one that privileged corporate elitism. Manuel Morales 
Alvarez, a Bolivian scholar, analyzed both of these documents, discovering that 
approximately 25% of the articles differed in the final version. He claims that these 
changes largely benefit right wing political parties and the traditional oligarchy, favoring 
wealth over the rights of mother nature. Representatives from the four political parties 
that worked with García Linera to finalize the constitution claimed that the changes were 
only minor structural corrections. However, of the 101 revised articles, Morales 
Alvarez’s report states that they altered 26 themes substantially, emitted 93 articles, 
paragraphs, or concepts, and arbitrarily included 78 additional entries, proving substantial 
adjustments (Morales Alvarez, unpublished). The following section is a brief overview of 
several modifications in regards to indigenous autonomies, participation and social 
control, and land rights that have left many Bolivian people disillusioned by the Morales 
Administration’s Process of Change. Only time will reveal whether some of the 
adjustments are significant in practice, or merely in discourse. 
The final version of the constitution altered the definition and limitation of 
indigenous autonomies, one of the key rights that CONAMAQ and the Unity Pact fought 
for. To begin with, the constitution recognized indigenous peoples as idiomas, or 
languages, instead of the proposed nacionalidades, or nationalities. Furthermore, the 
conclusive edits substituted the term autodeterminación for libre determinación (Article 
289). In English, both of these words translate to “self-governance”, however, in Spanish 
political- juridical terms, the connotations differ. According to Morales Alvarez, libre 
determinación refers to the rights of minorities, while autodeterminación recognizes the 
right of indigenous, originary and peasant peoples as legitimate self-governing bodies at a 
 82 
level that is complementary to the plurinational state (Morales Alvarez unpublished). 
This linguistic difference may in practice demarcate small groups with special rights 
within the nation state (ex. labor unions) from legitimate governing bodies that pre-date 
modern day Bolivia and have complex historical traditions and systems. Only the 
implementation of the constitution will dictate the severity of this modification. 
The constituent assembly agreed that civil society organizations must establish 
their own rules to fulfill the functions of participation in decision-making and social 
control. The Unity Pact had proposed a political body called the “plurinational social 
power” (Pacto de Unidad 2006). Non-governmental civil society representatives would 
be responsible for watching and controlling the power of the state and denouncing 
irregular acts of the military. This would ensure active participatory checks and balances 
to minimize state authoritarianism. However, the final version of the constitution stated 
that, “The law shall establish the general framework for the exercise of public 
monitoring” (Article 241.4, italics are my own). The final version also completely 
eliminated the constituent assembly’s description of the social body’s responsibilities as 
“ensuring proper implementation of general jurisdiction, the agricultural jurisdiction and 
native indigenous peasant jurisdiction” (CELAC summit in La Habana, Cuba in January 
2014). That is, they essentially postponed discussion of what this body would look like 
and what its role would be for a later date. 
President Morales has stated that the new constitution is a tool to recognize the 
new needs of indigenous peoples and subjugated peoples, while simultaneously 
recognizing the rights of companies. However, many indigenous Bolivians have 
proclaimed that the constitution guarantees the desires of companies and powerful 
sectors, while only nominally incorporating the rights of indigenous peoples. For 
example, the final constitution eliminated the statement that limits the amount of private 
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property any given individual can own. Article 315.1 disregards the social benefit clause 
for land ownership as suggested by the Unity Pact and agreed upon by the constituent 
assembly. Instead the approved constitution states that,  
 
The State recognizes the title to land of all legal persons that are legally 
constituted in the national territory, provided that it be used to fulfill the 
objective of the creation of an economic agent, the generation of 
employment, and the production and commercialization of goods and/or 
services (Article 315.1) 
This language emphasizes the importance of economic gain over environmental 
protection. 
The biggest critique of the new constitution is that it prioritizes companies and 
private business interests over the right of indigenous peoples and Mother Nature. In 
contrast to the constituent assembly’s proposal, it grants the state “control of exploration, 
exploitation, industrialization, transport and sale of strategic natural resources through 
public, cooperative or community entities, which may in turn contract private enterprises 
and form mixed enterprises” (Article 351). Furthermore, the editing process eliminated 
‘crimes against the environment’ from the list of offenses that are not extinguishable 
(Article 111). Finally, the constituent assembly agreed that the state should prohibit the 
production, import, and commercialization of genetically modified seeds. However, the 
revised version states that the “production, importation, and commercialization of 
genetically altered products shall be regulated by law” (Article 409, italics are my own). 
Each of these last minute revisions contributed to a bureaucratic process that 
limited the rights of indigenous, originary, and peasant peoples in an effort to appease 
right-wing business interests. It is hard to tell which revisions substantially limit the 
rights of indigenous peoples. At this point only time and implementation will be able to 
reveal those answers. The new plurinational constitution is not as revolutionary as many 
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members of the assembly had hoped for, and ultimately became a derivative of the 
political powers that have controlled Bolivia for centuries (Morales Alvarez, 
unpublished).  
Major alterations to the constitution demonstrate how the Bolivian nation state 
and conservative elite class view indigenous autonomy and political presence as a threat 
to Bolivian civil and political life. CONAMAQ and several other civil society 
organizations unified in a historical pact to confront the elite class and demand that they 
recognize their privilege and discriminatory acts. The March for the Constituent 
Assembly shows how indigenous peoples refused to work through political parties, and 
instead called for an assembly of over three hundred different representatives—men, 
women, indigenous, non-indigenous, urban, rural, lower-class, middle-class, and elite. 
The final modifications to the constitution demonstrate the fear of civil society, and in 
particular indigenous peoples who work both inside and outside of the nation-state’s 
political structure. In creating a third space of sovereignty, they are viewed as dangerous, 
threatening, and elusive. Having analyzed over five hundred years of indigenous 
exclusion and forced assimilation in chapter one, we can understand how the dominant 
system was not built for indigenous peoples. For this reason, members of CONAMAQ 
and the Unity Pact have decided to use the constituent assembly in order to imagine a 
new system that would recognize their needs, and also the value of their contributions.  
Major changes to the constitution also represent the first instances of the 
government betraying the trust of members of the Unity Pact, foreshadowing a rupture 
within the alliance that would occur only a couple years later. When speaking with one 
member of CONAMAQ, she told me how many felt betrayed before the constituent 
assembly was even over, particularly in regards to the amount of land that individuals 
could own privately, the lack of restrictions on genetically modified seeds, and the 
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limitations on the right to prior consultation. She said that she, and many members of 
CONAMAQ, felt let down by President Morales and by the constituent process that held 
the semblance of participant democracy, yet ended in cooptation (interview conducted by 
author, July 4, 2014). Her frustration is indicative of the real threats of indigenous 
peoples working within the system to gain greater levels of autonomy. She told me that 
after years of protesting, marching, writing proposals, monitoring working sessions, and 
making compromises, that the government has still decided to favor private corporations 
at the expense of indigenous peoples. Members of CONAMAQ not only felt used but 
have potentially risked greater entrapment with new jurisdiction on land titling and 
monitoring.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Rewriting the Bolivian constitution is a pivotal moment in the long struggle for 
indigenous rights. After centuries of exclusion, subjugation, and forced assimilation, the 
constituent assembly created a space for disparate sectors of society to piece together a 
vision for the country that would recognize a plurality of desires and lived experiences. 
Despite violent disagreements, the constitution approaches a document that at the very 
least is a greater compromise than past iterations. While the constitution has laid the 
groundwork for future transformation, many members of the constituent assembly 
recognized that real transitions would occur after the ratification. Even when a 
constitution guarantees equal rights, this does not mean that individuals and communities 
will be treated equally in everyday life amongst individuals or between individuals and 
institutions. Laws are only as good on paper as they are in social practice.  
 
 86 
This chapter has traced the creation of a new constitution from the 2002 March 
for the Constituent Assembly to final under the table modifications. By tracking the 
visions of CONAMAQ through their own Aruskipasipxañani proposal, to their strategic 
alliance with other civil society representatives of lowland indigenous peoples and 
peasant organizations, we see under what circumstances they were willing to negotiate 
their autonomy (Refer to Figure Two: Proposals for the Constituent Assembly). 
CONAMAQ challenged the coherency of both spatial (territorial, legal, and political) and 
temporal (Western-centric development, progress, and modernity) boundaries imposed 
upon them by colonial rule and the contemporary nation state.  
After hundreds of years of discrimination and subjugation, CONAMAQ strives 
for a sense of belonging, and the ability to participate in the reconstruction of a more just 
Bolivia. Yet, they simultaneously strive for self-determination, autonomy, and 
differentiated citizenship. Scholars such as Tom Perreault point out that CONAMAQ 
uses the state apparatus to accomplish their goals, yet simultaneously desires freedom 
from the state (2013). These two goals do not have to clash. While Perreault suggests an 
ambivalence in CONAMAQ’s behavior, using Kevin Bruyneel’s analysis of US Native 
Americans points to the structural forces that make this position so (2007). That is, while 
movements such as CONAMAQ desire total autonomy from the state, centuries of 
subjugation have situated them such that breaking away from this dependency is 
complicated. Furthermore, indigenous entanglement with different sectors of society and 
relative levels of privilege suggests drastic measures to regain equilibrium. 
Autonomy is not a gift from the government, but rather a long-standing inherent 
status of indigenous peoples long before Spanish colonization. Many indigenous peoples 
believe that they have the inherent right to self-governance, but must defend and secure it 
within the same Bolivian political system that has displaced them (territorially and 
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culturally) to begin with. However, this does not mean that indigenous peoples concede 
to the national government’s plenary power. It is the formation of “co-constitutive 
interaction among groups, governments, nations, and states” where competing notions of 
political time, space, and identity are negotiated (Bruyneel 2007, xix). 
The next chapter will explore CONAMAQ’s struggles in contemporary Bolivia 
and their decision to break away from their alliance with President Evo Morales and the 
historical Unity Pact. What happens when the government suspends constitutional rights 
in the name of revolutionary change? The current crisis of climate change and the push 
for energy development threatens the very existence of indigenous peoples and is forcing 
them to adapt and resist for survival in unprecedented ways. With increased globalization 
and new technologies for extraction, indigenous nations exist in a battle zone, a balancing 
act of indigenous autonomy and development strategies. While some recognize the need 
for development, others ask, at what cost? And for whom? The following chapter argues 
that autonomous rights to land and natural resources within indigenous territories as well 
as the guarantee of free prior and informed consent is crucial to indigenous peoples and 
their ability to choose what kind of development they want, if at all.
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Figure Two: Proposals for the Constituent Assembly 
 
 
Rights CONAMAQ’s Proposal (2002) Unity Pact’s Proposal (2004) Plurinational Constitution (2009) 
Cultural 
Politics 
Reconstitution and 
strengthening of indigenous 
systems of governance, 
language, and spirituality; 
respect for intellectual property 
Preserve and develop traditional 
music, film, archaeological sites, 
dress, food, crafts, cosmovisions, 
myths, legends, languages, 
traditional medicine, science and 
technology, intellectual property, 
and self esteem; right to free, 
compulsory, participatory, 
pluricultural and plurilinguistic 
education; State support for 
indigenous universities. 
Nations and rural native indigenous 
peoples enjoy the following rights: To 
their cultural identity, religious belief, 
spiritualities, practices and   customs, 
and their own world view (30.2); To 
collective ownership of intellectual 
property in their knowledge, sciences 
and learning, as well as to its 
evaluation, use, promotion and 
development (Art 30.11); To an inter-
cultural, intra-cultural and multi-
language education in all educational 
systems (30.12) 
Participation 
in 
Government 
Direct participation of 
indigenous leaders in the state 
political system, including 
gender duality/ complementarity 
(mama y tata), and rotating 
leadership 
Direct representation and 
participation of local authorities 
elected according to local 
customs and traditions; National 
representatives should be 
ethnically diverse and 50% male 
and 50% female; Representatives 
should speak languages of the 
region they serve 
Nations and rural native indigenous 
peoples enjoy the following rights: 
That its institutions be part of the 
general structure of the State (30.5)  
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Table Two Continued 
 
Rights CONAMAQ’s Proposal (2002) Unity Pact’s Proposal (2004) Plurinational Constitution (2009) 
Natural 
Resources 
Autonomous administration of 
indigenous territories and 
resources, both above and below 
the earth’s surface 
Gains from non-renewable 
resources from indigenous 
territories subject to equitable 
redistribution to the whole 
country; non-renewable 
resources should never be 
privatized or concessioned; 
Renewable natural resources 
stays within the autonomous 
domain 
The state controls exploration, 
exploitation, industrialization, transport 
and sale of strategic natural resources 
(351.I); The State owns the entire 
hydrocarbon production of the country 
and is the only one authorized to sell them 
(359.I); The State shall be responsible for 
the mineralogical riches found in the soil 
and subsoil. The private mining industry 
and cooperative companies shall be 
recognized as productive actors of the 
state mining industry (369.I)  
Territory Debureaucratization of INRA law; 
reconsideration of arbitrary 
political-territorial departmental 
boundaries as designated by the 
Republic to recognize the socio-
cultural borders of traditional 
suyus and markas 
New juridical regionalization 
according to “traditional 
territories” and “local 
ecosystems”; Privilege 
collective land rights as 
inalienable, irreversible, 
indivisible, and exempt from 
taxation; Recognize individual 
private property only if the 
owner personally works the 
land and meets environmental 
and social economic functions 
Nations and rural native indigenous 
peoples enjoy the rights to collective 
ownership of land and territories (30.6); 
Bolivia is organized territorially into 
departments, provinces, municipalities, 
and   rural native indigenous territories 
(269.I); The creation, modification and 
definition of the territorial units shall be 
made by the democratic will of their 
inhabitants, in accordance with the 
conditions established in the Constitution 
and law (269.II) 
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Table Two Continued 
Rights CONAMAQ’s Proposal (2002) Unity Pact’s Proposal (2004) Plurinational Constitution (2009) 
Community 
Justice 
Respect a balance of autonomy 
and participation while 
recognizing cultural, socio-
economic, and territorial rights; 
local and national seminars and 
workshops to educate the 
masses about indigenous rights  
Plural juridical system; 
recognize community justice 
systems and collective rights; 
direct representation and respect 
for local leaders 
Proportional participation of the nations 
and rural native indigenous peoples shall 
be guaranteed in the election of 
members of the Plurinational Legislative 
Assembly (147.II); The State shall 
promote and strengthen rural native 
indigenous justice. The law of 
Jurisdictional Demarcation shall 
determine the mechanisms of 
cooperation between rural native 
indigenous jurisdiction and all the 
constitutional jurisdictions (192.III) 
Development Development of the Ayllu: 
Poverty reduction and 
redistribution of resources 
through better infrastructure and 
communication services, safe 
drinking water and 
electrification, promotion of 
local modes of production, 
support for traditional 
technologies, intellectual 
property, nutrition programs, 
traditional crops, and medicine, 
culturally sensitive state-funded 
health services. 
Development with identity: 
local knowledges and 
technologies are valuable to the 
development of the whole 
country; self sufficiency 
through vivir bien, solidarity, 
reciprocity, food sovereignty, 
communal economies, equal 
access to market economy and 
basic services; state promotes 
agro-ecological cooperatives, 
and prohibit monopolies; 
guarantee fair working hours 
and wages, social benefits, 
social security. 
Native indigenous peoples enjoy right to 
be consulted by appropriate procedures, 
in particular through their institutions, 
each time legislative or administrative 
measures may be foreseen to affect 
them. In this framework, the right to 
prior obligatory consultation by the State 
with respect to the exploitation of 
nonrenewable natural resources in the 
territory they inhabit shall be respected 
and guaranteed, in good faith and upon 
agreement (Article 30.15). 
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Table Two Continued 
Rights CONAMAQ’s Proposal (2002) Unity Pact’s Proposal (2004) Plurinational Constitution (2009) 
Ideology aruskipasipxañani (the Aymara 
word for communication), 
understanding, and a 
reevaluation of institutional and 
local norms; Respect for nature 
and Pachamama should guide 
development policies and protect 
sacred land; reciprocity (ayni) 
prioritizes human and collective 
rights and respect for life and 
dignity as well as transparency and 
social responsibility; values the 
coexistence and interrelation 
amongst a variety of cultures both 
indigenous and mestizo 
The entire nation “adopts and 
promotes” indigenous moral 
principles, including “do not be 
lazy, do not be a liar or a thief”, 
“live well”, “live harmoniously”, 
“good life”, “land without evil”, and 
“noble path or life” (Article 8); 
Nations and rural native indigenous 
peoples enjoy the following rights: 
To the practice of their political, 
juridical and economic systems in 
accord with their world view. (Art 
30.14) 
Autonomy Indigenous autonomy through 
the archipelagic ayllu system; 
local leadership; control over 
natural resources, community 
justice etc. 
Autonomy and direct representation 
through “communal cabildos and 
assemblies” as well as “territorial 
autonomies” distinguished by 
“language, history, culture, 
geography, and organizations”; 
fourth political body called the 
“plurinational social power” 
composed of non-governmental 
civil society representatives elected 
through universal vote and 
responsible for watching and 
controlling the power of the state 
and denounce irregular acts of the 
military 
Recognizes indigenous peoples as 
idiomas, or languages, instead of the 
proposed nacionalidades, or 
nationalities; Substituted the term 
autodeterminación for libre 
determinación (Article 289); “The 
law shall establish the general 
framework for the exercise of public 
monitoring” (Article 241.4). 
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Chapter Three: Alternatives to Development: CONAMAQ’s Struggle 
Against Neo-Extractivism 
A long struggle for indigenous rights and liberation from subjugation has evolved 
in Bolivia ever since the Spanish colonial encounter: from Tupac Katari, to Fausto 
Reinaga’s Revolución india, to the rise of katarismo, to the election of an Aymara 
president, to indigenous representation in re-writing the constitution. These efforts slowly 
chipped away at the deeply embedded cultural norms and political institutions of colonial 
racism. In light of such accomplishments, the following chapter recognizes that the 
struggle is not over. For, even with an indigenous president, legacies of unequal land 
distribution, and an extractivist economy continue to burden progressive policies. Despite 
a discourse of decolonization and plurinationalism, this chapter suggests that the nation-
state’s modes of governance continue to rely on homogenous notions of a plurality of 
subjects. That is, while the constitution recognizes the rights of many different types of 
peoples (ie. indigenous peoples), it assumes a unified subjectivity of all indigenous 
peoples without recognizing profound heterogeneity of needs and desires. This chapter 
demonstrates that there are many ways of being indigenous in Bolivia and that in order to 
work towards a pluriverse, the state, corporations, and civil society must recognize 
epistemological discrepancies, particularly in regards to land use and development. 
Drawing on history that provided fertile ground for the emergence of 
CONAMAQ (in chapter one) and the details of their alliance with the Unity Pact (in 
chapter two), this chapter explores why this indigenous movement broke away from the 
Unity Pact and openly denounces the Morales administration. This contentious 
relationship makes one wonder, did CONAMAQ change? Did the Morales administration 
change? Or was the Unity Pact a perfect storm of people and aspirations, only to blow 
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away with the next sunrise? Engaging with divergent perspectives harvests better 
understanding of the complexities and contradictions embedded within indigenous 
negotiation of autonomy, the implementation of Bolivia’s Proceso de Cambio (Process of 
Change), and the creation of a plurinational state. 
This chapter traces the waning allegiance of CONAMAQ to the Morales 
administration from the ratification of the new plurinational constitution (2009), to 
January 2014 when MAS sponsored dissidents ambushed and seized CONAMAQ’s 
offices in La Paz. Between these two dates, tensions grew, peaking in 2011. While most 
scholars, activists, and news sources have attributed CONAMAQ’s rupture from the 
Unity Pact (2011) to the TIPNIS highway conflict, this chapter engages in a more 
nuanced analysis of fundamental thematic issues over land use and development.. 
CONAMAQ’s clashes with the Morales Administration are rooted in differing 
perspectives on neo-extractivist policies and alternatives to development. This chapter 
moves beyond the TIPNIS to explore other mining oriented social conflicts that have 
marked the past decade. In particular, the Mallku Khota mining conflict demonstrates a 
local level struggle for territory and natural resource rights.  
This analysis intentionally tries to avoid contributing to the dichotomy between 
indigenous rights and development. It proposes that, with the pressure from CONAMAQ 
and other civil society organizations, the Morales administration (and future 
governments) can continue to flourish by rethinking Western style development and 
engaging with a type of development that recognizes the plurality of identities across 
Bolivia. In this moment of profound climate change, both social movements and state 
governments will need to struggle to find a balance between protecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples and the environment while continuing to develop in an effort to lift 
people out of poverty. 
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While chapter two demonstrated indigenous victories in constitutional law, the 
following segment pushes this process to consider the difficulties of turning law into 
practice and societal norm. Tensions between discourse and implementation help explain 
why an indigenous movement such as CONAMAQ has broken away from the Unity Pact 
and publically denounced the Morales administration.  
 
PRESIDENT MORALES’ PROCESO DE CAMBIO 
President Evo Morales has been praised internationally for recognizing 
indigenous rights to territory, natural resources, and self-determination. His 2005 
campaign with the Movimiento a Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism, MAS) 
highlighted his Aymara heritage and transformation from a cocalero labor organizer to 
president. He promised an anti-neoliberal Process of Change prioritizing the rights of the 
indigenous majority through administrative and institutional reforms in an effort to 
decolonize both state and society. He repeatedly declared that global climate change was 
the result of capitalism and proposed reciprocity and communality rooted in indigenous 
cosmovisions as an alternative to protect Pachamama (Mother Earth).  
Billboards and street art throughout the country declared Bolivia cambia, Evo 
cumple (Bolivia changes, Evo comes through). In August 2006, Morales nationalized 
forestry, gold-mining, and petrol concessions in the country’s protected areas. He 
proclaimed sovereignty over Bolivian soil as a nationalist, anti-imperialist, anti-neoliberal 
discourse, and affirmed that traditional lands would be returned to indigenous peoples. 
He interwove indigenous and environmental discourses promising that indigenous 
peoples would protect the land, and in turn be protected by the state (Nación 2006). 
While this speech delivered at Madidi national park may have served to affirm the trope 
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of the native environmental steward, it also recognized the importance of balancing 
development with indigenous and environmental rights.  
Throughout his first two terms (2005-2015), Morales accentuated an international 
pro-environment discourse. He hosted numerous conferences on climate change 
proclaiming, “The climate is not for sale”. He demanded respect for Mother Nature, 
singling out northern nations for treating her as a commodity and killing her with 
unlimited industrial development. Morales invoked indigenous cosmology, stating that; 
“Humankind is capable of saving the earth if we recover the principles of solidarity, 
complementarity and harmony with nature”. He proclaimed that delegitimizing the 
capitalist system is the only way to halt devastating energy, food, and financial crises 
(Morales 2008).  
As described in depth in chapter two, the Morales Administration ratified a new 
progressive constitution recognizing indigenous autonomy, collective land titles and 
rights to free, prior and informed consent. The constitution states that indigenous peoples 
have the right  
 
to be consulted by appropriate procedures, in particular through their 
institutions, each time legislative or administrative measures may be 
foreseen to affect them. In this framework, the right to prior obligatory 
consultation by the State with respect to the exploitation of non-renewable 
natural resources in the territory they inhabit shall be respected and 
guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement (Paragraph 15, Article 30).  
While this declaration mandates fair consultation processes, it does not give indigenous 
peoples the power to veto projects planned on their territories. Nor does it specify when 
consultation must happen—before exploration or before extraction. Ultimately, this 
means that indigenous autonomy is overruled by the plenary power of the nation-state. 
This distinction is key in the unraveling of the Mallku Khota conflict described later in 
this chapter.  
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In his latest inaugural address, Morales reiterated the need to defend Bolivia’s 
indigenous peoples. He proclaimed that,  
 
For more than 500 years we have suffered darkness, hate, racism, 
discrimination and individualism, ever since the strange [Spanish] men 
arrived who told us we had to modernize, we had to civilize ourselves… 
But to modernize us, to civilize us, first they had to make the indigenous 
peoples of the world disappear (Morales 2015). 
Recognizing this long legacy, the Morales Administration embarked on a journey to 
claim a new form of development dictated by, and for indigenous peoples. The 
government founded a Vice-Ministry of Decolonization and an office on 
Depatriarcalization in 2009. In December 2009, voters approved autonomy for twelve 
indigenous municipalities, providing them the right to define development in their own 
ways.  
The Morales Administration uses funding from nationalized resources to 
implement numerous social programs to help alleviate poverty, and fund small-scale rural 
infrastructure projects for underprivileged communities. In doing so, he has gained 
international attention for demonstrating that left wing policies can initiate economic 
growth and reduce inequality. According to a report by the Center for Economic and 
Policy Research (CEPR), social spending has increased by more than 45% so that one in 
three Bolivians directly benefit from government social security payments. Poverty has 
decreased by over 25%, from 60.6% of the population in 2005 to 43.4% in 2012. 
Furthermore, the real minimum wage has increased by 87.7% (O’Hagan 2014). The 
Morales Administration is confronting issues of illiteracy, marginalization, racism, and 
sexism head on so as to create a more just society. With these powerful statistics, we 
must ask how Morales was able to create such profound economic change, and at what 
cost.  
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ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS  
There are profound contradictions between Morales’ original platform and 
international image and the experiences of many indigenous peoples within the country. 
Many rural indigenous peoples would argue that Morales’ politics have changed from the 
protection of Pachamama and respecting indigenous land claims, to favoring extractivist 
industries and unsustainable development. Social cash-transfer programs are reliant on 
natural gas, oil, minerals, and large-scale agro-industry. This model emphasizes the need 
for regional and global capital rather than searching for alternative visions of 
development and local sustainability. It promotes accumulation of wealth and goods, 
while stagnating self-sufficiency by turning otherwise fertile land into monocultures or 
mining pits. In short, development practices foreclose possibilities of subsistence. 
The false premise that there are no legitimate alternatives to the capitalist market 
system represses the ability to imagine anything other than economic development as a 
viable pathway to sovereignty. Incapable or unwilling to participate in a deep rethinking 
of Western norms, Vice President Alvaro García Linera has defended a neo-extractivist 
economic model based on the premise that the only way Bolivia can develop is through 
extracting and selling raw materials. Argentine sociologist Maristella Svampa critiques 
this notion stating that Latin American “progressivism’s practice and policies ultimately 
correspond to a conventional and hegemonic idea of development based on the idea of 
infinite progress and supposedly inexhaustible natural resources” (Lang 2013, 135).  
Unlike colonial extraction of gold, silver, and tin that explicitly benefited 
European empires, or post-colonial capitalist corporate accumulation, neo-extractivism is 
characterized by an increased presence and role of the state. While still based in large-
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scale removal and industrial scale agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, these 
resources, are not exported to other countries. Garcia Linera argues that neo-extractivism 
is a point of departure for overcoming capitalism. He argues that the new economic 
model is based on generating wealth and distributing it with justice (2012, 107). This 
political strategy emphasizes the short-term, urgent needs of the Bolivian population. As 
a politician, this is particularly important. He states, “if you don’t bring well-being, the 
people will begin to become disenchanted with your work, they will start to listen to 
conservative fantasies that promise paradise through an act of magic” (2011, 149). 
However, the structures and fundamental features of production remain unaltered so that 
money overrides concerns of environmental and human justice, and local economies 
maintain their subordinate position in the global market.  
Beyond questioning whether neo-extractivism is truly different from colonial 
extractivism, the underlying fact is that extractivism has expanded under the Morales 
administration. Between 2005 and 2014, Bolivia’s daily average production volume of 
natural gas doubled (Energy Press 2014). Land area conceded to gas and oil companies 
has increased from 7.2 million acres in 2007 to 59.3 million acres in 2012 (Achtenberg 
2013b). This includes expansion of hydrocarbon concessions into 11 of Bolivia’s 22 
national parks. Furthermore, Bolivia exported more silver in this decade than in 300 years 
of Spanish rule (Williams and Oliveira 2015). While Morales has freed Bolivia from the 
talons of US imperialism, he has turned to China and Brazil, forces that many Bolivians 
claim to pose the same old threats of historical foreign dependence, simply with a new 
face. Bolivia’s state oil and gas company, (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Boliviano-
YPFB) announced in 2013 that it would begin studies to identify shale gas deposits in the 
Chaco region. The Vice Ministry for Hydrocarbons Exploration and Exploitation has 
stated that a new hydrocarbons law is underway and will support the potential for shale 
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gas operations. Bolivia has plans to build 19 industrial gas plants and has committed to 
supply Argentina and Brazil with gas in the future. 
The Morales administration has seemingly compounded class and ethnicity, 
believing that relieving poverty would simultaneously liberate indigenous peoples. 
However, being indigenous is not only about being economically disadvantaged. If this 
were the case, then Marxist peasant movements in the mid twentieth century would not 
have clashed so much with the rising ethnic movements. Fighting for indigenous rights is 
also about eliminating the subjugation of indigenous knowledges and technologies, 
customs and traditions, and communal land holdings. These traits are not purely 
economic (although frequently interwoven after centuries of economic subjugation), but 
rather linked to cultural pride and dignity.  
On the contrary, Morales’ short-term initiatives to lift Bolivians (both indigenous 
and non-indigenous) are important. A vast majority of the population have benefited from 
his social programs that rely on neo-extractivism. Furthermore, there are many ways of 
being indigenous in Bolivia, not all of which identify with traditional epistemological 
values and alternatives to development. Due to forces of urbanization and globalization, 
indigenous peoples are living in urban and rural areas. They are miners, peasants, 
musicians, fishers, union organizers, scholars, government functionaries, and even elite 
property owners in the city of El Alto.    
CONAMAQ has expressed frustration with the Morales administration’s 
development model that discursively holds Pachamama on a platform only to use and 
abuse her for human needs. During the April 2009 World People’s Conference on 
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (held in Tiquipaya, Cochabamba, Bolivia 
and organized by the Morales government), seventeen working groups comprised of 
activists, labor organizers, and indigenous peoples from over 150 different countries met 
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to discuss issues of climate change. Members of CONAMAQ shed light on the 
contradictions between the expansion of an extractive model of development and 
proposals for climate justice. They proposed an eighteenth panel that would focus on 
social conflicts in Bolivia related to climate change. This open opposition to the 
government’s climate policies resulted in CONAMAQ’s expulsion from the conference. 
Rafael Quispe, the national leader at the time denounced Morales for his hypocrisy, 
stating, “this government is neoliberal and capitalist. It’s all a political show” (Weinberg 
2010, 21). 
They proceeded to hold ‘table eighteen’ in a local restaurant nearby. This event 
was well attended with people who recognized that when putting theory into practice 
problems arise, and the people must recognize these conflicts in an effort to move 
forward. They critiqued the government for refusing to recognize these bumps in the 
road, and limiting the possibility of social emancipation outside of state governance. 
Government officials criticized the participants of table 18 for trying to divide the summit 
in support of capitalists.  In this moment, CONAMAQ, led by Rafael Quispe, demanded 
“the expulsion of all extractive industries” from Bolivia (Weinberg 2010, 24). They also 
encouraged the government to adopt a new development model based upon the ayllu 
system and local self-sufficiency, a platform they had proposed as a basis for the 
Constituent Assembly years ago. This system would include collective land holding, 
equitable distribution of resources, rotational leadership, and accountability. This 
proposal would be an alternative to destructive and expansive capitalism. 
In an interview with Bill Weinberg, Rafael Quispe stated that “We support the 
process of change, and CONAMAQ is a protagonist, but we do not participate in the 
government. We don’t make deals, we don’t support candidates—absolutely nothing. 
And this systematic violation of the rights of the peoples and of the Pachamama shows 
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that there is something wrong with the process.” He echoed the words of Raquel 
Gutierrez as quoted in the introduction of this thesis, stating that it is possible to change 
the world without taking power. Quispe continued by saying that, “In these last elections, 
I had to say, ‘Evo, you are wrong. What you are saying is pure talk. You are not 
complying with your own discourse.’ And therefore, I didn’t vote” (Weinberg 2010, 21). 
This stance demonstrates an indigenous man and leader of CONAMAQ who refused to 
work within the parameters of the Western-centric state apparatus.  
Critics of the Morales Administration argue that the MAS’ Unity Pact with 
peasant, indigenous, and originary peoples, has transformed into a new pact with eastern 
agribusiness and transnational oil businesses. The constitution (as described in chapter 
two) protects private landownership and business practices over the autonomy of local 
populations. However, Morales has successfully eliminated the threat of media luna 
secession, gaining support from the majority of Cruceño voters in the 2014 elections. 
While Morales is still working within the Western liberal matrix, and appeasing the 
media luna elite, he has also openly rejected US imperialism (expelling the US 
ambassador, the DEA, and USAID between 2008 and 2013), setting the stage for further 
innovation and gradual distancing from Western notions of modernity and progress.  
Many Bolivian activists have reprimanded Morales, stating that he must not be 
indigenous, because his policies no longer prioritize traditional indigenous systems of 
governance. I do not share this stance, but rather prefer to recognize that there are many 
ways of being indigenous in contemporary Bolivian society. Even siblings that grew up 
in the same community may fall on different sides of a debate surrounding what it means 
to be indigenous and what rights accompany claims to indigeneity. While the Morales 
administration has promoted an indigenous image, it has not transformed the governing 
structure to include indigenous epistemologies, or even to protect fundamental rights as 
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he had promised. They have not yet transitioned from capitalism and Western modernity 
to a uniquely Bolivian alternative rooted in the Andean cosmovision of vivir bien. The 
government has chosen mining and neo-extractivism as their priority, but certain 
indigenous communities as represented by CONAMAQ understand that these policies 
will only bring them closer to death. This council of local ayllus prefers instead to mix 
tradition with contemporary advancements to construct feasible alternatives. Suggesting 
that tensions between CONAMAQ and the contemporary Bolivian government are rooted 
in epistemological discrepancies over land use and development, the following section 
teases out the ways in which CONAMAQ, scholars, and activists contribute to a new 
understanding of sustainable alternatives to development. 
 
CONSTRUCTING ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT  
In The Darker Side of Western Modernity, Walter Mignolo proposes the following 
question to his readers: “Why would you like to save capitalism and not to save human 
beings? Why would an abstract entity be saved, and not the ecological and human lives 
that capital is constantly destroying?” (2011, 144). Mignolo pushes his readers to imagine 
a world in which humans do not live to produce and consume, but rather produce and 
consume enough to live. This is the basic premise of the indigenous Andean ideology 
vivir bien, or live well, which can be contrasted with the Western capitalist ideology of 
live better. 
In contrast to Morales’ neo-extractivist model, many scholars and indigenous 
activists, particularly members of CONAMAQ, believe that the indigenous ayllu 
community system and ideology of vivir bien is emblematic of a feasible Andean 
alternative to capitalism. As described in chapter one, Ayllus are tight-knit highland 
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indigenous communities that have been spaces of contentious politics since the pre-
Columbian era, rejecting exploitative systems and striving to live more harmoniously 
with other humans and with nature. I do not present the ayllu as a universal or utopian 
solution to end capitalism. On the contrary, I recognize this indigenous space as a locus 
of one of many ontologies that should be valued on an equal plane with Western 
modernity. Sovereignty and the pluriverse rely on respecting systems on a horizontal 
platform without unwanted imposition. For this reason, CONAMAQ must be careful of 
exporting the ayllu system to an unreceptive nation, while simultaneously demanding that 
their autonomous rights be respected. On the contrary, they, and the nation-state as  a 
whole must recognize the profound diversity of indigenous peoples within the country. 
Rafael Quispe, a former leader of CONAMAQ, recognizes that both capitalism 
and socialism are destructive models based in extraction, consumerism, and development. 
Reminiscent of Fausto Reinaga’s writings in the mid-twentieth century, Quispe notes that 
CONAMAQ’s ayllu system of communitarian development provides a basis of 
equilibrium. He supports wind energy and other clean technologies to create electricity 
and power transportation as an alternative to petroleum exploitation (Weinberg 2010, 21). 
This is what some scholars would call development with identity in which states 
recognize distinct cultural needs (Hale 2011, 195). 
The subsequent analysis focuses on two land-based conflicts in which members 
and leaders of CONAMAQ clash with government sponsored development projects. 
Before engaging with the details of each encounter, it is worth highlighting local 
epistemological and ontological connections to the land. While tied up with economic 
needs and internal community fissions, the following conflicts are also rooted in long-
term connections to place so that the death of land is the death of indigenous knowledges 
and life systems.  
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Vivir Bien is a concept that emerges predominantly in rural, agricultural areas that 
are able to self-sustain. Factors such as over population and therefore lack of housing and 
employment curtail the ability to ‘live well’. Allison Spedding has critiqued the notion of 
Vivir Bien, stating that it is invented by indigenous intellectuals, and that it does not even 
represent the reality of rural communities, and much less urban centers. However, like 
most ideologies, vivir bien is an ethos to live by, not necessarily a reflection of everyday 
life. Nonetheless, recognizing the heterogeneity of indigenous peoples and Bolivians as a 
whole is crucial to recognize that the concept of vivir bien may not be implemented in the 
same way in the city of El Alto, as in a llama herding community in Potosí, an 
agriculturalist center in Santa Cruz, or an indigenous fishing village in Beni. 
Eduardo Gudynas and Arturo Escobar have emphasized the need to search for 
“alternatives to development” as opposed to “development alternatives”. The former 
practice involves completely rethinking capitalist development, while the latter settles for 
minor reforms to a system that has been built on human and environmental exploitation 
(Gudynas 2013). This movement requires individuals and policy makers to reject the 
assumption that capitalism and Western modernity are natural, and instead imagines 
alternative systems other than resource extraction. While it would be irrational and 
unattainable to propose closing down all extractive industries in the immediate future, 
scholars such as Gudynas recognize the desperate need to focus conversations on how to 
best overcome extractivism. 
People like Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, a major ally of CONAMAQ, propose self-
management, and self-sufficiency through small-scale production and sale of crafts, food, 
and everyday goods. Rivera Cusicanqui critiques the state’s new form of colonialism that 
dominates the political spectrum and all expressions of collectivity. “The only space left 
for us is the micro, and from there we establish affinity communities that allow us to 
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connect and link networks into a fabric capable of overcoming colonial practices” 
(Zibechi 2014). This comment is inspired by the Tambo Collective in La Paz, a cultural, 
educational, and political meeting place recovered by a group of young students. There, 
they organize fairs and exhibitions and run a garden to promote urban agriculture with the 
objective of promoting food self-sufficiency. They have also began to hold small 
informal classes on themes such as migration, and decolonization in art led by local 
intellectuals. I have personally spent many days attending classes with this collective, 
working to construct the main building, and to landscape the outdoor area. 
Recognizing the colonial legacy of extractivism is crucial to breaking the 
historical dependency on exporting raw materials and the importance of self-sufficiency. 
Members of CONAMAQ have expressed that Pachamama is tired. The harmony and 
equilibrium that indigenous peoples maintained with her has been lost. Refusal to 
promote alternatives will not allow the region to move in a new direction. Claiming that 
the legacy is so deeply rooted that we cannot make a change is both lazy and paralyzing. 
The struggle for an alternative, post-capitalist development model is intertwined with the 
need to overcome extractivism.  
In short, a complete overturning of the norm is necessary. Not a reform, or a 
Western-style revolution, but a pachacuti—a shift in perceptions of time, space, being 
and dwelling. The Andean pachacuti seeks the reconstitution of a political collectivity 
that understands reality in their own ways rather than those dictated by Western 
modernity. This decolonial option places human and non-human lives first, promoting 
thoughtful production and consumption as a means of survival not as a way of life. Vice 
President Garcia Linera has declared that, “We respect Mother Earth, but we are not 
going to live like 300 years ago” (Ross 2014). However, CONAMAQ’s mission is not 
about returning to the past, it is about reviving ancient practices and intentionally 
 106 
molding a more sustainable lifestyle that respects both the old and the new. We will see 
in the following section that these ideological battles sometimes clash with the immediate 
needs of poor communities that prefer development as a short-term way to confront 
poverty, over long term systemic changes. 
 
TIPNIS LAND CONFLICT 
The tensions between development and indigenous rights are pronounced in the 
TIPNIS land conflict. In June 2011, President Morales inaugurated construction on a 
highway connecting the agricultural region of Beni to the commercial hub of 
Cochabamba. This project formed part of the Brazilian led Initiative for Integration of 
Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), an effort to build interoceanic roads, 
ports, bridges, dams, hydroelectric plants, and pipelines to integrate and open up the 
continent. Brazil offered a loan to cover substantial costs for the US$420 million, 190-
mile highway project as well as a construction company to begin work (Israel 2013). The 
new highway would be crucial to transport Brazilian soybeans to Pacific ports for 
shipment to China.  
However, 32 miles of the highway route was planned to pass directly through the 
Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), an area that President 
Morales had designated as an autonomous indigenous reserve in 2009. This territory is 
home to 69 communities and approximately 12,000 residents from three different 
indigenous groups (Tsimanes, Yuracarés, and Mojeño-Trinitarios). While leaders of 
community organizations expressed resistance to the highway in early planning stages, 
Morales declared that the highway would go ahead "whether they [indigenous groups] 
like it or not"  (Los Tiempos 2011). Leaders conveyed concern that a highway would 
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alter the entire ecosystem, contaminate the park’s three main rivers, allow land grabs by 
loggers and cocaleros (coca growers), and aid the influx of sizeable migrant populations. 
A study published by the Strategic Research Program in Bolivia in 2011 estimated that 
64% of the national park would be deforested by 2030 if the highway were built (PIEB 
2011). Indigenous leaders expressed concerns that the highway would not bring 
development of schools and hospitals for local communities but rather benefit the 
interests of big business passing through the region.  
 
 
Figure Three: Map of the TIPNIS Region 
 
 108 
In response to the Morales Administration’s disregard for the lack of resident 
consent, CIDOB, the lowland indigenous organization that formed part of the Unity Pact 
as described in chapter two, and CONAMAQ joined forces to stop the highway. CIDOB 
initiated a 350-mile march leaving Trinidad on August 15, 2011. Over 1,000 supporters 
(including several hundred residents of the park) arrived in La Paz after two months of 
walking through rain and blistering heat. This march rejected highway construction and 
the governments’ incompliance with the constitution they had worked so hard to pass 
only years earlier. Environmentalists and indigenous peoples from throughout the country 
joined the protest proclaiming that Morales was contradicting his pro-Pachamama 
discourse in favor of unapologetic development (CIDOB 2012b).  
At the time of this conflict, the decision to support the people of TIPNIS in 
denouncing the government-planned highway was not unanimous amongst members of 
CONAMAQ. In September of 2011 a subsection of CONAMAQ led by local leader 
Carmelo Titirico denounced Rafael Quispe and his hard line pro-TIPNIS platform. 
Opposing factions supported the highway that they claimed would promote further 
development (particularly schools and heath centers) in rural communities throughout the 
country. Furthermore, this faction of CONAMAQ supported the Process of Change, 
recognizing that development was not only necessary for much of the country, but a right 
that had been withheld from indigenous peoples for centuries (Fundación Tierra 2011b). 
Later sections of this chapter will further interrogate the heterogeneous perspectives on 
development within CONAMAQ that have ultimately led to a split within the council.  
The government’s disregard for consulting local communities evolved into blatant 
disrespect for human rights mid-way through the march. On September 25, 2011 a fully 
armed anti-riot group of over 500 Bolivian police officers raided the peaceful march, 
brutally repressing indigenous men, women, and children with tear gas, rubber bullets, 
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and truncheons. In this encounter, four people were killed (including a young child) and 
74 protesters were wounded. As hundreds of marchers were detained in Chaparina, 
protests erupted in the capital city resulting in the rapid resignation of four high-level 
government officials, including the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior 
Relations. Thousands of people stormed the government buildings in La Paz yelling, “No 
se matan niños, Carajo” (Don’t kill children, ******), and “No a la carretera de la 
muerte!” (No to the highway of death!). 
The official investigation of the Chaparina massacre has been marred by 
confusion, a lack of transparency, and delays. The investigation has mainly tried to 
uncover who is responsible for ordering the intervention. Morales has consistently denied 
responsibility, claiming he learned about the event after it occurred, and blaming a 
number of different police officers. Critics claim that the executive branch was involved 
in purchasing supplies used during the attack and for arranging the buses, trucks, and 
military planes used to transport the detainees (Saavedra 2014). Still, no one has been 
charged with the responsibility for ordering the violent police intervention.  
The Chaparina massacre is pinpointed as a key moment in which lowland and 
highland indigenous movements as well as the Bolivian population on a national scale 
lost confidence in Morales’ administration and his dedication to indigenous rights. One 
Bolivian woman, a good friend of mine, told me that this incident changed everything. 
The elite cruceños critiqued Morales for violating indigenous people, claiming that 
Morales was an indio bruto (ignorant indian), that could never succeed as president. 
Racism throughout the country was at an all time high. While this outrageous use of force 
and denial of basic human rights is unforgivable, I believe that it is crucial to look beyond 
the Chaparina Massacre, at the broader picture; to understand deeply rooted 
epistemological opposition to Morales’ development strategies. 
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Despite physical and emotional hurdles, the marchers arrived in La Paz on 
October 19, 2011 with 15 key demands, and promptly engaged in negotiations with the 
Morales administration. That same month, the Plurinational Legislative Assembly passed 
law 180 authored by indigenous deputies declaring TIPNIS as an “intangible zone”, 
prohibiting further construction of the highway according to the original route (SomosSur 
2011). This victory, while a monumental testimony to the public pressure that indigenous 
and non-indigenous peoples placed on the government, was short lived as the MAS party 
rallied pro-highway supporters in an effort to reverse the law. From December 2011 to 
January 2012, a pro-highway march led by CONISUR, an organization of communities 
living in the southern region of the TIPNIS, brought attention to the heterogeneous 
opinions surrounding development. In response to this second march, the government 
passed law 222 issuing a formal consultation process of indigenous communities living in 
the TIPNIS (Los Tiempos 2012b).  
To show discontent with law 222, members of the original pro-TIPNIS march 
(including members of CONAMAQ) initiated yet another march that ran from April to 
June 2012, claiming that the government initiated consultation process was not free, 
prior, or informed (CIDOB 2012a). According to one member of CONAMAQ who 
participated in the march in solidarity with lowland indigenous peoples, not enough 
people knew about the second march, “no se discutió bien en las comunidades, la gente 
no sabia” (They didn’t discuss it [the consultation] much in the communities, the people 
didn’t know [it was happening]) (Interview conducted by author, June 18, 2014). Beyond 
lack of communication, many members of CONAMAQ were simultaneously fighting 
their own anti-development battle in the northern region of Potosí. In the midst of the 
TIPNIS conflict, over forty communities fought for their right to free, prior and informed 
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consent in the face of a Canadian transnational mining company. The next section of this 
chapter will elaborate on this conflict in Mallku Khota.  
The MAS government refused to listen to the opinions of marchers from the 
second pro-TIPNIS march. From July to December of 2012, the Plurinational Electoral 
Organ carried out a consultation process concluding that 57 of the 69 communities 
rejected “intangibility” while 55 actively supported the highway. From November-
December of the same year, a human rights fact-finding mission led by the Permanent 
Assembly for Human Rights of Bolivia (APDHB), the Inter-American Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH), and the Catholic Church reported conclusions drastically different 
from the government sponsored consultation process. Of the 36 communities they visited, 
the government had contacted only 19, and 30 avidly opposed the construction of the 
highway. Three communities approved the road on the conditions that an impact 
assessment be carried out, the road path be changed, and that a cleanup project for the 
neighboring river be put in place to improve river transport. The human rights 
commission reported “numerous irregularities in the consultation process” in regards to 
international protocol and that “the communities consulted reported having received gifts, 
having been pressured or being imposed restrictions in exchange for acceptance of the 
consultation; some were coerced through the suspension of development projects in case 
of refusal” (International Federation for Human Rights 2013). These differing opinions 
demonstrate the heterogeneity of opinions in regards to the TIPNIS highway, but also the 
incongruence between different consultation processes. 
After ongoing conflict, the Morales administration decided that the government 
would put the highway project on hold through the end of 2015 and concentrate instead 
on eliminating extreme poverty in the TIPNIS region. This decision curiously occurred 
just in time for Morales’ 2014 elections. Nonetheless, this emphasis on confronting rural 
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poverty is a direct response to desires as articulated during the consultation process 
(Achtenberg 2013a). Only time will tell the future of the TIPNIS. However, in early 
August 2014 Senator Julio Salazar (MAS) confirmed that the government intends to build 
the controversial highway between 2015-2020 (Pagina Siete 2014a).  
The TIPNIS land conflict highlights the complex heterogeneity of indigenous 
peoples on the topic of development, rupturing the idea of a singular homogenous 
indigenous subject. The TIPNIS conflict was a watershed moment in which groups of all 
sizes fractured along the lines of in favor or against the highway. One member of 
CONAMAQ described the many fights in the streets of La Paz, particularly in the San 
Francisco Plaza in regards to the building of the highway (Interview conducted by author, 
June 18, 2014). Perhaps neither an untouchable TIPNIS, nor a multi million-dollar 
highway is sustainable, but instead an alternative way to improve access to health and 
education while recognizing indigenous knowledges and technologies, and without 
immense deforestation and mass migration.  
CONAMAQ’s decision to break away from the pro-MAS Unity Pact has been 
attributed to this violation of indigenous and human rights (Achtenberg 2014; Farthing 
and Kohl 2014, 154; Interview conducted by author, June 18, 2014). Perhaps the TIPNIS 
land conflict did convince CONAMAQ to break away from the Unity Pact, but we must 
recognize the numerous other factors, ones that most authors have brushed aside. The 
remainder of this chapter argues that there are numerous conflicts in relation to Morales’ 
neo-extractivist policies that have slipped under the radar, yet contribute greatly to 
CONAMAQ’s resentment of the MAS government. The following analysis suggests that, 
while TIPNIS was a massive event with ample media coverage that allowed CONAMAQ 
to denounce the Morales administration in an open manner, epistemological grievances 
with Western-centric development policies run much deeper than the TIPNIS.  
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MALLKU KHOTA MINING CONFLICT 
While the TIPNIS land conflict is one example of lowland struggles for 
autonomy, mining in the Andes region fuels another crucial source of tension between 
indigenous peoples and the MAS government. While immediate closure of all mines 
would result in a national economic collapse, ongoing large-scale extraction fuels 
excessive capitalist consumerism while delegitimizing and decelerating potential 
alternatives. This section emphasizes the Mallku Khota mining conflict as experienced by 
members of one of CONAMAQ’s 16 suyus, Charka Qhara Qhara. Shedding light on this 
conflict that occurred simultaneously with the later TIPNIS marches provides a deeper 
understanding of why CONAMAQ broke away from the Unity Pact. While 
demonstrating many of the same fundamental tensions as displayed in the eastern 
lowlands (government violation of indigenous, collective, and basic human territorial and 
political autonomy), this distinctly highland issue adds another layer to the tensions 
between indigenous rights and the type of development revered by Western modernity.  
Mallku Khota is an ayllu in the Sacaca Marka of the Charkas Qhara Qhara Suyu, 
in the northern region of the department of Potosí. It is also rich with one of the largest 
undeveloped silver deposit and the largest indium deposit in the world. Indium is used in 
touchscreens and liquid crystal displays (LCD), making it a highly desirable resource in 
the current age of technology. Mallku Khota also has traces of gold, copper, led, and zinc. 
When President Morales came to power, he inherited a contract (signed in 2003) that 
entrusted the legal rights of all mining concessions in Mallku Khota to the Canadian 
South American Silver Corporation (SASC) (CEDIB 2008). However, 46 different 
communities also held official collective titles (TCOs) to this land. For years, while 
SASC explored the region in their pre-exploitation phase they encountered resistance 
from members of the six affected ayllus in the region. 
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Figure Four: Location of Mallku Khota  
(http://www.cedib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/Dossier-MallkuKhota.pdf)
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Figure Five: Affected ayllus in the Mallku Khota region 
 116 
Indigenous peoples, many affiliated with CONAMAQ, proclaimed that they had 
not been consulted, feared environmental degradation, and reprimanded the private, 
transnational nature of the project. CONAMAQ criticized the government for 
disrespecting the constitution and violating indigenous rights to prior consultation, 
allowing transnational companies to exploit resources like prior colonial and republican 
governments (CEDIB 2008). Practices of free, prior and informed consent in this case are 
particularly complex because SASC obtained the rights to the Mallku Khota concession 
before the implementation of the new constitution (2009). Furthermore, the constitution 
does not specify when consultation efforts must occur: before exploration or extraction 
(Los Tiempos 2012a). Since SASC was still in their exploratory stage, the Bolivian 
government declared that the company was not violating their contract. The company 
hired two doctoral sociology students and a local NGO (Cumbre del Sajama) to work 
with community members to “help them understand the benefits that the project could 
bring them”, but never reached terms of free consent (Garces 2012). 
A primary reason that communities did not consent to SASC exploration is due to 
environmental concerns. Indigenous peoples unequally experience the impacts of 
mining’s environmental degradation while foregoing most of the social benefits. Rural 
resources power urban spaces, so that those who are poisoned from the effects of 
extraction are both physically and mentally distant from those who benefit from 
development. Local community members feared deforestation, desertification, drought, 
water, air, and soil pollution, displacement and destruction of sacred sites. Due to the 
nature of the minerals, extraction would be through sky exploitation, an open pit 
technique that results in much higher environmental impact than small-scale subsistence 
mining practices. Members of CONAMAQ fought against SASC in order to protect the 
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three lakes in the area where they raise trout and water their sheep and cattle (Garces 
2012). 
Discontent with the Mallku Khota mining concession also stemmed from the 
neoliberal nature of a private transnational company pumping riches out of a developing 
nation and into a select few corporate hands. While the mining concession would produce 
some wealth for the country, it would also infringe on the grazing and farming land, in 
turn stripping the possibility of local self-sufficiency. Community members saw that 
SASC had placed a flag in sacred soil to fuel the world market’s insatiable greed. Despite 
all of these breaches of indigenous autonomy, environmental degradation, and private 
accumulation of wealth, the Morales administration continued to support SASC’s 
exploration process.  
Opposition to SASC’s mineral extraction was fragmented according to a diverse 
array of ideological and material needs. While many indigenous peoples rejected the 
concession for the aforementioned reasons, other residents supported the nationalization 
of the mine. They believed that if the land was laden with valuable natural resources, that 
this nationalized wealth would help lift the country out of poverty and reject dependence 
on foreign aid. Other indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in the community 
advocated for the creation of a local mining cooperative.7 While a smaller cooperative 
would not be able to extract certain minerals that relied on large machinery as provided 
by the Canadian company, it would provide income for local communities. 
As vocal leaders of CONAMAQ fought to protect their land, other indigenous 
community members supported the potential social and economic benefits the company 
would bring to the region. SASC did not thwart their exploratory efforts because 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, space does not allow for an in-depth discussion on the nuances of nationalized mining and 
small-scale private entrepreneurial cooperative mining, but it is worth pointing out that there are profound 
differences amongst the two groups. 
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according to their own surveys, 43 of the 46 affected communities strongly supported the 
company. The transnational corporation invested in local infrastructure to aid exploratory 
processes and promised “significant employment on project related jobs” (South 
American Silver Corp 2012b). Celia Garces contests that these opportunities would be 
limited to approximately 275 positions (2012). Nonetheless, SASC promised to “facilitate 
job training, education, agricultural enhancement and water management for long-term 
sustainable development” (South American Silver Corp 2012a).  
Negotiations between the government and South American Silver at the 
institutional level resulted in violent conflict at the local level. In May 2012, SASC 
ordered fifty police officers to suppress dissent to the company’s mining activities. They 
entered the homes of community members in the early morning using gas and physical 
abuse. In response, local leaders took two police officers hostage, releasing them two 
days later when the governor of Potosí promised that the community would finally be 
consulted (CEDIB 2012). Two weeks later, CONAMAQ’s leader of the Sacaca Marka, 
Cancio Rojas, was arrested on claims of taking the officers hostage, harassing them, 
threatening to bury them alive, and attempting to murder them.  
The detention of Cancio Rojas was laden with rumors, false accusations, and 
biased trials. Rojas claims to have been in the city of La Paz presenting petitions to the 
Ministry of Mining when the police intervention and abduction occurred in Mallku 
Khota. However, this assertion, supported by many witnesses, was not publically 
reported. The only testimonies taken into account were those of the police officers. 
Community members claim that seeking the truth was never the intention of officers, 
only the representation of an indigenous leader as violent, cruel, savage and radical, a 
tactic that has been used throughout the 19th and 20th century to justify indigenous 
genocide and exclusion. Rojas and his supporters asserted that his arrest was based on 
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complete fabrication and that rapid diffusion of unverified, false testimonies was a 
strategy to demobilize the community. After ten months of imprisonment, the public 
prosecutor’s ministry in Potosí declared the dismissal of the proceedings against Cancio 
Rojas for lack of evidence. However, he is still under accusation for other more minor 
claims. 
On May 28, 2012, thousands of people left Mallku Khota to march 190 miles to 
La Paz, demanding the eviction of SASC.CONAMAQ organized this march in defense of 
the sacred lake Wara Wara of Mallku Khota, water, land, territory, indigenous collective 
rights, national parks, and mother earth. According to local leader, Damián Colque, “We 
cannot let our Plurinational State in a Process of Change illegally detain our leader. We 
have to mobilize in massive numbers” (Damián Colque, Erbol, 24 de mayo 2012).  As 
mentioned earlier, this march coincided with the second pro-TIPNIS march, emphasizing 
the government’s lack of respect for both highland and lowland indigenous rights to 
consultation. Several days into the march, the Mining Minister, Mario Virreira, declared 
that they would consult indigenous communities before SASC could transition from 
exploration to extraction. Upon arriving in La Paz on June 7, 2012, representatives 
demanded respect for human and collective rights, the renunciation of SASC’s contract, 
the initiation of a free, prior and informed consultation process, and the liberation of 
Cancio Rojas (CONAMAQ 2012). When Virreira made clear that these points would not 
be heard, 25 leaders began a hunger strike in defense of their territorial and political 
autonomy. 
Throughout the following month, numerous conflicts broke out between 
community members and employees of the mining company. Protesters blocked a local 
mining camp, two SASC engineers were caught spying on community members during 
their meetings, and a mining site in Sacani was raided and burned. As a result, the 
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government militarized the area, dispatching nearly 500 officers in hopes of minimizing 
further conflict (CEDIB 2012). On the contrary, increased police presence escalated 
tensions. 
During a clash with police officers on July 5, four community members sustained 
gunshot wounds, and one man, José Mamani Mamani was brutally killed. The ministry of 
the government claimed that the police didn’t have mortal firearms and that the man had 
mishandled dynamite while he was drunk. However, community members claim that a 
police officer put a gun in the man’s mouth and shot him. According to the community, 
Mamani Mamani was an evangelical man who never drank, and that he had left his home 
with a bible to try to reason with the police. Instead, the police killed him. Medical 
examiners and the Permanent Human Rights Assembly confirmed that he died from a 
bullet entering the nape of his neck. A joint inspection by local authorities found 24 used 
tear gas cans, thirty bullet casings, four loaded bullet shells, thirteen rounds of used nine-
millimeter casings, and other police paraphernalia at the site of Mamani Mamani’s death. 
It wasn’t until the murder of Mamani Mamani that South American Silver Company 
decided to “temporarily cease all field activities while government-led talks proceed to 
seek a peaceful resolution” (South American Silver Company 2012c). 
Finally, on July 7, the state entered into dialogue with community members. After 
two months of tense and violent conflict, Morales finally agreed to the demands 
presented by the Federation of Originary Indigenous Ayllus of Potosí (FAOI-NP), 
CONAMAQ’s local branch of the Charka Qhara Qhara suyu. This included 
nationalization of the mining concession, compensation for the family of José Mamani 
Mamani and investigation into the police officers. Furthermore, they demanded that the 
engineers caught spying on local meetings must comply with their local community 
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justice system, mandating that the engineers must build 1,000 adobe houses for the 
community. 
The Mallku Khota conflict sheds light on two fundamental issues. First, in the 
case of Cancio Rojas, the criminalization and discrediting of community resistance 
movements and their leaders, and second, in the case of José Mamani Mamani, the 
unwillingness to hold perpetrators of state violence accountable for their actions. While 
the land concession dispute has been settled, the murderers of Juan Mamani Mamani 
have not been convicted, nor have extensive investigations been realized. This 
unwillingness and inefficiency to develop the case of Mamani Mamani stands in stark 
contrast to the quick conviction of Cancio Rojas’. The government’s treatment of Mallku 
Khota demonstrates a model that silences community resistance instead of representing 
the defense of human rights, mother earth, and democratic values. Nonetheless, it also 
proves that very little will not stop indigenous communities who organize to defend their 
rights. It also demonstrates the often-clashing visions of development between different 
indigenous peoples, cooperative miners, and the state.  
Very little has been written about Mallku Khota, and even less from the 
perspective of local community members. The analysis I have compiled is largely 
dependent on national news articles, SASC’s official updates, and alternative digital news 
sources. Accusations of illegal mining, spying, and murder complicate the story 
depending on the article you read or the account you hear. However, one thing is clear: 
the growing distance between members of CONAMAQ and the Morales Administration 
is deeply rooted in disputes over extractivism and development.  
The sentiments surrounding Mallku Khota are bolstered by a long list of mining 
conflicts throughout the altiplano. While this chapter cannot engage with each conflict, it 
is worth noting community outrage over copper mining at Corocoro in CONAMAQ’s 
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Jach’a Suyu Pakajaqui community (Department of La Paz) as well as the Vitichi mining 
conflict with the Kumurana Company, the Challapata conflict, and the Colquiri conflict. 
All of these battles are emblematic of state power that has favored mining interests over 
the autonomy of local communities. Anti-mining activists receive criticism that they are 
anti-development and hindrances to the Process of Change. However, development is 
often a justification for the violation of human rights and indigenous autonomy. Many 
hope that the government could cooperate with communities (and vice-a-versa) so that 
rich mineral deposits can be utilized in sustainable ways without excessive environmental 
degradation and with full consensus and participation of local peoples. By emphasizing 
the details and complexities of one mining conflict, I hope to shed light on the numerous 
voices that must be listened to in order to realize this goal. 
CONAMAQ has abandoned restrictive nation state boundaries in search for 
international alliances. They are forming solidarity networks with indigenous peoples and 
environmentalists throughout the region and the world in the struggle against 
unapologetic extractivism to fuel development. The victims of mining are plentiful from 
the many Native American tribes fighting against the Keystone XL Pipeline, to Mapuche 
people fighting against Shale Oil in southwest Argentina and logging companies in Chile. 
From Apache peoples denouncing foreign concessions of a uranium mine on sacred 
ancestral lands to Sarayaku people fighting off oil company in Ecuador’s Amazon and 
Miskitu and Garifuna peoples speaking out to defend their coral reefs from oil and gas 
activity.  
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CONAMAQ BREAKS AWAY FROM THE UNITY PACT 
While the economy has boomed and poverty rates have plummeted in Morales’ 
two terms, the TIPNIS and Mallku Khota conflicts demonstrate two major clashes in 
regards to impacts on the environment and violating the autonomy of indigenous 
movements. The MAS party has prided itself as being the “government of the social 
movements.” However, in recent years, it has increasingly coopted these bodies, often 
causing internal conflicts, and stripping away their ability to critique the government. 
Vice President Garcia Linera’s book Geopolítica de la Amazonía (2012) demonstrates his 
belief that all indigenous demands must be subordinate to the state’s capitalist 
development model. He claims that indigenous critics of the government are against the 
Process of Change, and therefore support the right wing. His book specifically refers to 
CIDOB’s critiques of the government during the TIPNIS conflict. However, given new 
developments, Garcia Linera has also included CONAMAQ in this critique, claiming that 
they are pro-imperialist, and are funded by USAID (Garcia Linera 2012). This discourse 
elucidates the shift in discourse from championing indigenous autonomy, decolonization, 
and self-determination to unapologetic development. It assumes that all rural indigenous 
peoples prefer to be integrated into the national economy on the terms of Western-style 
development. 
When speaking with a member of CONAMAQ, he curtly told me that he is not 
part of a social movement, that his organization is an indigenous movement whose role is 
to pressure the government from the outside. He explained that the MAS party has 
coopted social movements like the CSUTCB, Bartolina Sisas, and Interculturales as 
censored government subjects. Raquel Gutierrez has critiqued the proximity of relations 
between civil society and the Bolivian state at earlier points in history, highlighting the 
need for more social movement autonomy. While this particular member of CONAMAQ 
 124 
would certainly agree, the following section will demonstrate the heterogeneity of 
opinions in regards to this claim. With the election of Morales and the presumed 
overthrow of neoliberalism, social movement representatives assumed positions inside of 
the MAS party hoping to contribute to the systemic change that Morales preached. It has 
become increasingly difficult for many of these people who identify as both politicians 
and activists as they simultaneously strive to remain loyal to their support base as well as 
the political party they represent. In recent years many have left their posts in government 
due to pressures of censure and conforming.  
The conglomerate effects of state intervention in TIPNIS and Mallku Khota, 
blatant disregard for indigenous autonomy, constitutional rights, and basic human rights 
have led both CIDOB and CONAMAQ to break away from the Unity Pact. While 
CONAMAQ slowly and increasingly denounced the Morales administration’s policies, 
they made a formal decision to break away in December 2011 claiming that MAS did not 
lead the “real process of change” (Alarcón 2011). One ally of CONAMAQ who attended 
this historical meeting told me that the decision came from intense discussion, even more 
so because the government sent representatives to the meeting, resulting in physical 
fights (interview conducted by author, June 18, 2014). She highlighted the long process 
of this decision as leaders relied heavily on the opinions of CONAMAQ’s local masses, 
trying to gage government criticism from the communities. She told me that in this 
meeting she realized that there was a real critique that came from the bases, from the 
communities, not just national leaders (Interview conducted by author, June 18, 2014). It 
was a major transition for the counsel to break the historical alliance between peasant and 
indigenous movements that had flourished since 2005. 
One representative of CONAMAQ told me that the government has appropriated 
all of their struggles since the constituent assembly. She said that every proposal that they 
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made, the government coopted and tweaked to benefit the nation state, straying from 
efforts to protect and respect indigenous peoples. Members protested that representatives 
from MAS were dividing the community by allowing miners, oil companies, and private 
water and land projects onto community land. By denouncing the government’s 
disrespect for indigenous rights, CONAMAQ takes a stance to defend Pachamama and 
their right to self-determination as rooted in pre-Columbian sovereignty. 
While breaking away from the Unity Pact as a whole, CONAMAQ decided to 
reaffirm their “natural alliance” with the lowland indigenous movement, CIDOB 
(Alarcón 2011). In a 2013 resolution, CONAMAQ and CIDOB drew on ILO 169 and 
international norms, declaring that, “executive power has been biased against the 
participation of indigenous organizations, valuing organizations related to MAS above all 
others, the intent of which directly affects our territories, cultures and natural resources” 
(Resolución 01).  The final nail in the Unity Pact’s coffin occurred when both 
CONAMAQ and CIDOB decided as organizations to remain independent of any 
established political party during the October 2014 elections.  
 
DIVIDE AND CONQUER 
Since breaking away from the Unity Pact, both CONAMAQ and CIDOB (the two 
major representative bodies of indigenous peoples in Bolivia) have experienced coups of 
their organizations by government-sponsored dissidents (Vacaflor, 2014). Government 
cooptation of social movements often takes the form of funding responsive factions in an 
effort to gain their further loyalty, while making other groups appear radical and 
irrational. In the case of CONAMAQ, the government provided numerous vehicles and 
computers to national and local leaders to show support and assure loyalty. Cancio Rojas 
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states that the government “gives them pills so that they don’t fight for their real rights”, 
implying a sense of trickery, steering them away from their natural desires, and from their 
roots (Somos Sur 2015). On the contrary, many of these indigenous peoples would say 
that the government is finally fulfilling their needs. They recognize that indigenous 
peoples have been marked as backwards in time for centuries, and now is their 
opportunity to benefit from national development. 
For nearly a decade, scholars have applied Hale’s notion of the ‘indio permitido’ 
to different case studies, in which rights are granted to ‘permitted’ peoples when they 
pertain to cultural elements like language and dress, but not when they threaten state 
power (Hale 2006). President Morales’ recent speech at a meeting of supportive members 
of CONAMAQ highlighted their rich cultural contribution to Bolivian society 
encouraging recuperation of an annual traditional festival. He simultaneously 
delegitimizes non-conformative members of CONAMAQ for straying from the Process 
of Change (Morales 2015). 
On December 10, 2013, nearly 200 MAS-affiliated members of CONAMAQ 
raided the La Paz headquarters, beating and expelling other affiliates of the organization. 
Violent arguments lasted over five hours leaving five people injured and extensive 
damage to the office’s infrastructure. The government had tried to take over 
CONAMAQ’s office six times since 2012, however the organization was able to hold off 
threats (CONAMAQ 2014a). One member of CONAMAQ reported that there were about 
twenty people in the office, many of whom had been living there off and on for an 
extended period of time. When the MAS representatives arrived they yelled that they 
wanted to enter the house that rightfully belonged to them. Many female leaders left 
through the back of the building disguised so as to escape the violent attack, but MAS 
representatives were outside, in the back waiting to attack them. Some people were able 
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to hide in a little store, next to the office (Interview conducted by author, June 18, 2015). 
Days later the police declared that the office belonged to the government.  
On December 12 and 13, 2013 MAS-sponsored members of CONAMAQ held a 
Jacha Tantachawi congress in order to vote for the upcoming leadership. The organic 
commission demanded that the office be returned to CONAMAQ and that the police 
retire from custody so that CONAMAQ could return to their normal functions. When the 
offices were not returned, members of the organic CONAMAQ initiated a vigil outside of 
the office. The vigil lasted 30 days in which time men women and children survived off 
of the kind support of human rights defenders and sympathizing citizens. During this time 
the original authorities looked to speak with government authorities to peacefully regain 
their office (CONAMAQ 2014a). 
On January 14, 2014 a pro-government protest defending the Morales 
Administration’s Process of Change attacked CONAMAQ’s vigil using knives, bottles, 
sticks and whips to destroy tents, chairs, and food. They insulted, beat, and wounded 
authorities, women, children, and the elderly without distinction, even threatening to kill 
bystanders. The police officers stationed at the office refused to offer assistance 
(CONAMAQ 2014a, Saavedra 2014). Several authorities fled the violence and death 
threats hiding to protect their lives. Ex-Authority Felix Becerra and newly elected 
authorities Nilda and Cancio Rojas took refuge in the basement of a nearby house for 
more than 24 hours, deprived of food, communication, and warm clothing (CONAMAQ 
2014a). 
Upon expulsion and persecution of CONAMAQ’s elected organic authorities, the 
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights-La Paz (APDHLP) offered a safe space and 
welcomed the leaders. Thanks to this institutional support the authorities were able to 
reinstate the council of councils where they expressed rejection of the events, reaffirming 
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the defense of self-determination and autonomy of indigenous peoples. Members of the 
organic CONAMAQ claim that their office has since been converted into a campaigning 
center for Morales, instead of the headquarters of a civil society organization.  
Hilarión Mamani, a supporter of the Morales Administration, took control of the 
CONAMAQ office after the takeover. Mamani has been accused of being a dirigente 
eterno (eternal leader) for not abiding by the rotating leadership of CONAMAQ in which 
all leaders serve for two-year terms. The government argues that Hilarión Mamani is the 
rightful leader and that he represents the masses. He is part of a mining cooperative and 
supports mineral extraction (CONAMAQ 2014a). The government pays Mamani, and 
funds development projects in pro-MAS communities. Members of the organic 
CONAMAQ argue that if the government funded hospitals utilized traditional medicine, 
that would be one thing, but instead it is funding soccer fields with synthetic turf. This 
leaves one young woman wondering, “What are we going to eat, the synthetic grass that 
Evo Morales gives us? No. So we prefer to take care of our territory” (Interview 
conducted by author, June 18, 2014). Other members of CONAMAQ, those that were 
expelled from their office, have been cut off from all resources and development projects 
sponsored by the indigenous fund.  
Many members of the organic CONAMAQ feel like pawns that are being played 
against each other by government intervention. Local conflicts are microcosms of greater 
systemic issues of unequal wealth distribution and deeply embedded racism. “It’s a battle 
between poor people. We are indigenous peoples that are fighting amongst ourselves” 
(Interview conducted by author, June 18, 2015). Due to this increasing intervention, 
members of CONAMAQ have been instilled with a sense of fear. One young woman told 
me that many of her friends had been threatened for their involvement with CONAMAQ 
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and that many had been bribed to stay silent (Interview conducted by author, June 18, 
2015).  
The final portion of this chapter will elaborate on some of the key distinctions 
between indigenous members of CONAMAQ who have continued to support the MAS 
government, and those who have abandoned Morales’ Process of Change. This section 
stresses multiple ways of being indigenous in contemporary Bolivia urging scholars, 
activists, and politicians to recognize heterogeneity of experiences and desires. It also 
demonstrates how neighbors within the same ayllu or marka can support mining or risk 
their lives to protect their land. By looking at structural issues of poverty and ethnic 
discrimination such drastic contradictions begin to feel normal.  
 
CONAMAQ ORGÁNICO 
“Ya no queremos ser folklore, ni afiche del gobierno. Queremos participación política y 
económica en este país. Queremos un estado plurinacional en práctica.” 
-Cancio Rojas, May 13, 2014 
While CONAMAQ historically supported President Morales’ rise to power, a 
major faction of the organization has since denounced the Morales administration’s 
tendency towards neo-extractivism and capitalist policies, seeing him as yet another pawn 
controlled by Western modernity. Members of the organic CONAMAQ view the 
government’s ongoing repression as an attempt to block the ‘real’ revolutionaries from 
fulfilling the process of change in a way that respects the 2009 constitution. The organic 
CONAMAQ continues to propose alternatives to development working at local, national, 
and international levels to fight for collective rights to land and territory and greater 
indigenous autonomy (CONAMAQ 2015). 
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Cancio Rojas and his daughter, Nilda Rojas, are the current national leaders of the 
organic CONAMAQ. Despite being kicked out of their office, they have been able to rent 
out a small space in the center of La Paz. When speaking with Nilda, we sat in two chairs 
in an empty room. When the sun set, we sat in darkness, for with all their funding sources 
cut off, the organization was not able to pay electricity bills. Nilda told me that she, and 
other members of CONAMAQ felt betrayed by the government, just as Tupac Katari was 
betrayed by his own people. Despite substantial setbacks, Cancio and Nilda continue 
fighting to represent the ayllus, suyus and markas of Bolivia with a deepening sense of 
urgency. Pachamama cannot be bought, nor can the leaders and members of 
CONAMAQ. They have turned down bribes from the government, choosing instead to 
fight for the rights of their communities. 
Historically, CONAMAQ received the majority of their funding from the Fondo 
Indígena de los Pueblos Indígenas de América Latina y El Caribe as well as NGOs. 
However, upon breaking away from the Unity Pact, the organic CONAMAQ lost all 
funding from the indigenous fund. Now Hilarion Mamani and CONAMAQ-MAS 
receives this money. Furthermore, the Morales administration recently expelled a Danish 
NGO, IBIS, from the country due to their financial support of the organic CONAMAQ. 
In a monumental and symbolic push for autonomy, the group led by Nilda and Cancio 
has been directing their efforts in the last year to focus on creating a financially self-
sufficient CONAMAQ. Some critics have stated that the money from the indigenous fund 
should be given to organizations that do not receive the same level of funding as those 
that are still part of the Unity Pact. Others believe that this money is soiled with the 
exploitation of Pachamama and communities who live off of the land. They instead opt 
for the ultimate struggle for autonomy in front of a government that has chosen not to 
recognize them as legitimate subjects.  
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This may be an example of what Charles Hale calls the “impossible subject” 
(Hale 2011). Seeking fundamental structural change, they are, “analytically acute; willing 
to talk but only according to their own rules; preferring continued protest over incomplete 
concessions; always a force to contend with, in large part because they are so difficult to 
pin down” (201). Hale highlights the downside of this strategy, that radical organizations 
“elude the entanglements, but forgo the quite significant benefits as well” (Hale 2011, 
201). Radical refusal often results in inability to meet immediate material needs. In 
seeking autonomy, CONAMAQ will need to find a balance between fulfilling short-term 
needs and long term goals.  
The organic CONAMAQ has been fighting against the Mining and Metallurgy 
law 535 passed in May 2014, critiquing its stance on free prior and informed consent, 
environmental damage, and the right to protest. The law favors the rights of transnational 
corporations and cooperatives over the interests of indigenous and non-indigenous 
Bolivians who rely on the land. In order to be considered for prior consultation, a 
community must have formal certification proving status as a pre-colonial originary 
indigenous community with territorial claims, that is conserving their nation’s patron 
culture. Without this formal title, indigenous peoples will have no right to prior 
consultation (CONAMAQ 2014). Furthermore, it fails to recognize indigenous 
communities’ right to veto any decision after consultation processes, meaning that 
consultation is essentially a hollow formality. Finally, the law clarifies a previously 
unsolved conflict, stating that companies do not need to consult communities before 
exploration stages of extractive projects. This legalizes the actions of South American 
Silver and ensures further disturbances and contamination on indigenous territories. The 
law also fails to recognize sacred spaces as off limits to mining. 
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Law 535 gives the mining industry the right to use public water for its water-
intensive and toxic operation, while disregarding the rights of rural and farming 
communities to that same water. A leader of CONAMAQ declared, “mining produces 
contamination, not food, and when the land no longer produces, we have nothing left” 
(Interview conducted by Author July 7, 2014). The ruling elite has extracted minerals 
from Bolivian land for over 500 years, and peasants and indigenous peoples have been 
left destitute. She told me that if the government had also passed the water and forestry 
laws that CONAMAQ proposed to protect Pachamama, then they would feel more 
comfortable preserving the rights of miners on an equal level with the rights of the earth. 
However, without any protection, these laws will allow extreme levels of exploitation.  
Perhaps most devastating to members of the organic CONAMAQ, the Mining law 
criminalizes protest against mining operations (Article 99-101). This leaves communities 
that would bear the brunt of the industry’s pollution and displacement without any right 
to defend their land. The law penalizes ‘encroachments on miners rights’ with prison 
sentences between 6 and 8 years for those who block mining activity. The government 
has made protecting mother earth a crime. In an interview with Ben Dangl, the current 
leader of CONAMAQ proclaimed the irony in which, “We’re well aware that it was the 
same Evo Morales who would participate in marches and road blockades [years ago]. 
And so how is it that he is taking away this right to protest?” (Dangl 2014). 
Many members of CONAMAQ have endured hunger strikes and violent 
government attacks, yet they choose to continue fighting even to the death. For without 
water, without land, there is no life. Nonetheless, fear is beginning to control members of 
members of the organic CONAMAQ. In many of my interviews I experienced the fear of 
constant surveillance. When meeting with members of the organic CONAMAQ, they 
often whisked me away to their new office or a friend’s nearby home so as not to be 
 133 
heard by people on the street. When speaking with an ally of CONAMAQ in a café, she 
abruptly stopped the interview and changed the subject. Minutes later she told me that a 
government official had been watching us. Many people I spoke with told me about the 
death threats they or their friends had received. Many of my interlocutors expressed the 
increasing fear that the government had instilled in them as well as their excitement to 
share stories with me, as thought letting the words slip off of their tongue and into my 
mind lifted some kind of burden. As an outsider, I could take these stories away with me 
without the immediate threat of danger.  
 
CONAMAQ-MAS 
Another faction of CONAMAQ applauds Morales and his administration for 
nationalizing natural resources, using the money gained from neo-extractivism to 
promote social services, and promoting a new constitution that recognizes the cultural 
rights of indigenous communities. They argue that they have been excluded from 
development for centuries and now they finally have access to a status of living that has 
been restricted to mestizo and Creole elites. Furthermore, they are not advocating 
extravagant living, but rather fundamental facilities such as schools, hospitals, roads, and 
soccer fields. Hilarión Mamani and his followers believe that they must stand with the 
CSUTCB, Interculturales, and Bartolinas Sisas (the remaining organizations that 
compose the Unity Pact) in order to realize the Process of Change. By working with the 
government, they hope to influence systemic change. President Morales congratulated 
Hilarión Mamani and CONAMAQ-MAS at the most recent regional Marka Tantachawi. 
He clarified that, “We all have the right to be leaders, but we don’t have the right to 
betray our political movement, especially when we are being watched not only by 
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Bolivia, but by the entire world” (Morales 2015).  Morales sheds light on the fact that 
Bolivia is a progressive country with many rights imbued in the constitution that states 
would never guarantee their citizens. His administration’s fear of the organic 
CONAMAQ’s radical behavior is legitimate, as it pushes Morales’ Process of Change to 
levels that the global elite has not come to terms with.  
Morales has congratulated CONAMAQ-MAS’ efforts to reconstitute the modern 
ayllu, denouncing European colonizers and the capitalist system. The MAS 
administration hopes to use the organization as a beacon of cultural light on an 
international scale to legitimize indigenous culture. Many anthropologists have been keen 
to demonstrate the fracturing image of strategic essentialism by demonstrating how 
indigenous peoples are involved in extractive industries. They point out that native 
communities also take part in market-based mechanisms (McNeish 2013). While this is 
generally used as a critique, it is also indicative of a 21st century reality. A ‘return to our 
roots’ ideology (as displayed by the organic CONAMAQ) will not always function in 
light of migration and globalization in which individuals may not identify with those 
same ‘roots’, or have created their own new systems out of necessity or desire. Many 
people who have migrated from rural to urban areas do not necessarily want to return to 
their previous lifestyle. Often they were forced to relocate from their homes because they 
could not survive as small-scale subsistence farmers, miners, or merchants. Nicole 
Fabricant recognizes that the ideas of vivir bien and the ayllu system focus on rural 
realities. Emphasis on how to live in harmony with the environment and how to protect 
the natural surroundings largely ignore urban realities of over population, poverty, and 
inequality (Fabricant 2013). Living well in a place like El Alto would be dependent on an 
entirely new infrastructure. 
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When speaking with one member of CONAMAQ-MAS he told me how the 
‘right-wing CONAMAQ’ (the way that CONAMAQ-MAS refers to the organic branch) 
is a small portion of the movement that is not acting rationally. He told me that they were 
jealous of the development that other indigenous peoples were benefitting from, the 
access to diverse food, the highways, and the soccer fields. He told me a story of an 
ongoing conflict between his ayllu and seven others that ended nearly 20 years ago. It 
was a disagreement that had been passed down through generations over territorial 
borders and bred much resentment between the groups. The ayllus had been separated 
under the nation state’s political-geographic borders with four positioned in Potosí and 
four in Oruro. Just a couple years ago, the Morales administration built 3,000 homes for 
orphans of this conflict. Last year they helped build 2,000 more and several synthetic 
soccer fields. This man told me that instead of fighting brutally amongst neighboring 
ayllus, they have begun organizing soccer tournaments. These factors force us to ask 
whether the government has appropriated CONAMAQ-MAS, or if they are acting as 
rational citizens in the twenty-first century. Are they following the guise of western 
modernity in an effort to confront immediate needs? Are they losing their indigeneity? Or 
are they widening the global perspective of what it means to be indigenous? 
Hale concludes that we must find a balance between the impossible subject and 
the appropriated subject in search for, “creative articulation between these utopian 
sensibilities and the always compromised, always urgent, struggles for relief from 
oppression and for modest material wellbeing in the here and now” (Hale 2011). In a 
concrete sense, Bolivia will need to find a balance between lifting people out of poverty 
through neo-extractivism, and protecting Mother Nature and the rights of indigenous 
peoples. By looking at the split between two factions of CONAMAQ, we see the very 
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real and distinct needs of peoples who have emerged from similar situations. The next 
step will be for the Morales Administration to legally recognize both of these stances. 
 
CONCLUSION 
An indigenous movement can break ties with an indigenous president because 
there are many ways of being indigenous. The organic CONAMAQ is pushing for 
societal changes that the president is not in a position to push forth. Morales must 
appease the needs of many different sectors of society: The Cruceño elite, the mestizo 
middle class, afro-descendants, lowland indigenous peoples, rural peasants, urban 
workers, highland indigenous peoples, and everyone in between. It is the role of social 
movements, outside of state governance, to push the boundaries in an effort to create 
change and social emancipation. 
The dissolution of the Unity Pact marks a crucial moment in Bolivian history. It 
does not mean that the movement for indigenous rights in Bolivia is losing traction or is 
incompetent. Instead, it is a clear sign that activists, politicians, and scholars must 
reconsider how we understand indigeneity. We must recognize that there is not one way 
of being indigenous, for Morales is an indigenous man, as are members of CONAMAQ, 
and members of the other organizations that once made up the Unity Pact. Indigenous 
peoples are not necessarily rural guardians of Mother Nature. They live in urban areas, 
they rap in Aymara, and design houses in El Alto. They starve themselves in an effort to 
win the rights of their land that they have been promised. They are enthusiastic and 
hopeful. They are depressed and defeated. They are determined to create a better world 
for their children and grandchildren. These realities push us to recognize the plurality of 
indigenous experiences in order to create a harmonious Plurinational state.  
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Conclusion 
How are indigenous peoples negotiating their cultural, political, and economic 
autonomy in twenty-first century Bolivia? This thesis has explored one iteration of that 
struggle, through a case study of the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ). I provide an overarching view of how indigenous peoples have resisted 
histories of exclusion and forced assimilation through state and non-state avenues in 
order to create spaces for their autonomy to flourish. The Plurinational State of Bolivia 
under president Evo Morales has accomplished profound institutional shifts in an effort to 
respect indigenous rights, but I argue that the (neo)liberal understanding of one 
homogenous indigenous subject continues to drive this project. In order to realize the 
goals of a plurinational state (in practice, not just in title), the Bolivian government, and 
non-state actors will need to acknowledge, respect, and listen to the distinct identities and 
goals of different subjectivities (indigenous/non-indigenous, urban/rural etc.) throughout 
the country. More specifically, I propose that many conflicts have arisen due to 
epistemological discrepancies over land use and development and can only be mediated 
by attention to the diverse identities of many indigenous peoples.  
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter one, Indigenous Determination in the Wake of Colonial and Liberal 
Exclusion, explores the legacies of colonialism in Bolivia in order to contextualize the 
rise of CONAMAQ in a historical framework. Said’s understanding of the other, 
Quijano’s coloniality of power, Blaut’s emphasis on European diffusionism, and 
Mignolo’s decolonial response to Euro-centrism, theorize the pervasive effects of 
colonialism that continue to tint the hue of everyday life. Racialized and gendered 
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subjectivities are evident in the fibers of institutions, interpersonal interactions, and 
modes of thought. Drawing on Uday Mehta, Partha Chaterjee, Charles Taylor, and Fausto 
Reinaga, chapter one interrogates the inherent exclusion embedded in liberal citizenship. 
Emphasis on individual equality through private property delegitimizes indigenous 
modes of thought and interactions with the natural world rooted in collective, reciprocal 
relations with humans and non-humans.  
Despite this ontological and epistemological subjugation, a retelling of Bolivian 
history demonstrates how indigenous peoples have forged a space for their own modes of 
governance to persevere. Chapter one concludes by situating the rise of indigenous rights 
in Bolivia within a global process that emerged out of the cracks of neoliberal 
multiculturalism. Policies of decentralization and recognition of cultural rights permitted 
certain indigenous subjects access to tradition and territory by working through (and 
risking entanglement with) dominant institutions. Out of this framework, CONAMAQ 
emerged as a contemporary indigenous autonomous movement in the highlands of 
Bolivia that is striving to reconstitute and revalorize indigenous systems of government, 
justice, and land tenure based in the traditional ayllu. 
Chapter two, Envisioning a Plurinational State: CONAMAQ’s demands during 
the Bolivian Constituent Assembly, employs Kevin Bruyneel’s notion of the third space 
of sovereignty to explore the ways that CONAMAQ utilizes state apparatuses to 
negotiate further autonomy in regards to cultural politics, territory and natural resources, 
legal rights, and development of the ayllu. By investigating CONAMAQ’s collaboration 
with other indigenous and peasant organizations, and opposition to the eastern media 
luna elite in the process of re-writing the Bolivian constitution, this chapter gives insight 
into the diverse groups that are fighting for space in Bolivian politics. Chapter two 
concludes with an overview of significant changes that were made behind closed doors 
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after the constituent assembly voted on a final version of the constitution, emphasizing 
the power hierarchies that continue to dominate Bolivian politics despite discursive 
change.  
Chapter three, Alternatives to Development: CONAMAQ’s Struggle Against Neo-
Extractivism, commends the Morales Administration’s institutional process of 
decolonization, but recognizes that their reliance on neo-extractivism reproduces the very 
hierarchies that their discourse aims to overcome. In an effort to understand why 
CONAMAQ broke away from the historical Unity Pact that supported President Morales 
in his rise to power, this chapter points to deeply rooted discrepancies over what it means 
to vivir bien (live well). I argue that CONAMAQ did not break away from the Unity Pact 
only due to the infamous TIPNIS land conflict, but rather a series of localized clashes 
over neo-extractivist projects and policies. I emphasize one such contentious encounter 
that occurred in the Mallku Khota region of Potosí in an effort to demonstrate the 
complex relationships between the state, transnational companies, cooperative miners, 
and members of CONAMAQ. Through this case study, we see that rural indigenous 
peoples who have been subjugated for centuries continue to be deprived of basic rights in 
the name of progress and development for the greater good.  
 
DEEPENING THE BOLIVIAN PROCESS OF CHANGE 
This thesis draws on long histories of oppression to suggest that contemporary 
expansion and extraction continue to breed dependency and limit sustainability. I have 
touched on many of the problems that the Morales Administration will have to confront 
in the next four years. These include diminishing support from certain indigenous 
peoples, whether they will go forward in building the TIPNIS highway, determining how 
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consultation processes will be enacted, and balancing extraction with environmental 
protection. Further issues that this thesis has not touched on include violence against 
women, overcrowding of the prison system, and impunity for human rights violators. 
These issues (particularly the latter) are not unique to Bolivia. Rather, they are symptoms 
of a larger struggle to explore how we can meet basic economic needs while transitioning 
to more sustainable forms of development.  
Studying revolutionary grassroots projects and major shifts in political thought 
reveal the length of time necessary to sync institutional changes with social imaginary. 
Decolonization and plurinationalism remain in the early stages of turning theory into 
praxis and require time and energy from both the state and grassroots movements to 
become sedentary. While alternative lifestyles are flourishing at the community level, 
they are not yet respected on a larger scale. While CONAMAQ and CIDOB, the two 
major indigenous movements in Bolivia, have broken away from the Movimiento a 
Socialism (Movement towards Socialism-MAS), this does not mean that the effort to 
decolonize society is dwindling. On the contrary, it is a sign that social organizations are 
confronting complexities and contradictions in an effort to push the Process of Change to 
new levels. 
The country of Bolivia has recognized that striving to create a unified nation state 
through homogenous liberal citizenship will inevitably favor the dominant group at the 
expense of disenfranchised populations. Bolivia has not yet realized a post-liberal state, 
however it may very well be at the forefront of creative alternatives. There is profound 
multiplicity within Bolivia so that one sibling may make a living off extracting resources, 
while another risks their life to protest mining companies. While one woman harvests 
potatoes, her sons and daughters may be in the city of El Alto attending university or 
buying and selling electronics sent from China. This thesis is an exercise in recognizing 
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that there are many ways of being in this world, in Bolivia, in the Andes, and within 
indigenous communities. Furthermore, it promotes the right for those who choose to live 
according to their own systems of governance to do so without the threat of displacement 
and environmental degradation.  
I do not believe that the ayllu is the decolonial solution, but rather one decolonial 
option. This does not mean that the Bolivian State should adopt the ayllu system on a 
national scale, for we know that indigenous peoples make up only about half of the 
population, and that amongst them only a fraction desire to live according to ayllu 
community structures. Nonetheless, the ethics of the ayllu provide insight into how 
national and global markets could rethink capitalist assumptions in an effort to create less 
exploitative systems. 
 
GLOBAL IMPACTS 
There are substantial obstacles to the widespread adoption of socio-political 
alternatives. Perhaps the greatest obstacles are presented by political-corporate power and 
vested interests, yet at times the psychological barrier to believing that alternatives can 
work seems almost as difficult to overcome. Political and economic barriers make change 
feel impossible. This feeling of helplessness that is perpetuated by environmental 
statistics that say even our greatest efforts won’t be enough to save the planet are 
paralyzing. I hope that by acknowledging an existing alternative to capitalism and 
Western modernity (even on a small scale), we will recognize that imagining the 
impossible is possible, taking us one step closer to realizing the (im)possible.  
In his essay Future City, Frederic Jameson laments, “Nowadays it seems easier to 
imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism”. The realist in me 
 142 
acknowledges that human beings are voluntarily sleepwalking towards natural 
catastrophe and human annihilation through warfare, exploitation, and the destruction of 
our planet. As I reflect on Mignolo’s frustration that humans would like to save 
capitalism instead of humans and nature, I am reminded of the ways that people are more 
concerned about the health of their bank account than their own health or the health of the 
planet. By describing the Andean indigenous ayllu system, the optimist in me hopes to 
challenge myself (and others) to abandon the belief that ‘there is no other way’ and push 
us to reimagine what labor and human and non-human relationships could look like 
through intentional living. 
In light of global economic decline and environmental disaster, exploring 
grassroots movements such as CONAMAQ provides local communities, national 
governments, and non-governmental organizations around the world a sense of what one 
alternative for one community might look like. I reiterate that the ayllu is not a universal 
solution, but that there are larger lessons to be learned when imagining more horizontal 
and reciprocal ways of cohabitating with humans and nature. I continue to consider how 
these lessons of equilibrium, solidarity, and collective well-being can be applied to both 
rural and urban areas without appropriating indigenous struggle.  
By recognizing the ayllu as a legitimate center of indigenous knowledge 
production, and the local center of a decolonial option, I hope to contribute to the 
ongoing movement to recognize and value the numerous ontologies and epistemologies 
that make up the pluriverse. Furthermore, I hope that some of the ethics of vivir bien as 
described throughout this thesis are ones that indigenous and non-indigenous peoples 
alike might value in their own ways so that we can all strive to create a more harmonious 
relationship with those around us and with nature. 
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TAKING RESPONSIBILITY 
In order for the decolonial option to thrive as a legitimate player in a pluriversal 
world, Western powers must acknowledge the existence of multiple ways of knowing and 
being. By promoting universal truths, the West continues to silence indigenous ways of 
life that do not fit neatly within their scientific matrix of reason. The colonization of 
knowledge and existence reduces humans and non-humans to disposable and exploitable 
objects, commodities and resources. CONAMAQ and other Andean indigenous 
movements are subjected to these subordinating, homogenizing, racist threats and 
violences. In the words of Lilla Watson, an indigenous Australian Murri activist, “If you 
come here to help me, you’re wasting your time. If you come because your liberation is 
bound up with mine, then let us work together.” I believe that non-Indigenous peoples 
have a role in the indigenous struggle, for we are all part of a greater ecosystem. 
Decolonization relies on the white man’s consciousness that their privilege and power is 
in turn oppressing other people whether or not they are aware of it.  
Therefore, we must engage in ongoing discussions, guided by a praxis of listening 
to negotiate a balance between promoting alternatives to development while 
simultaneously recognizing immediate economic needs. In a world where businesses, 
corporations, and government tend to heavily favor economic needs, I believe that 
organizations such as CONAMAQ hold a crucial role in the creation of alternatives to 
development. It is worth noting once again that the ayllu is not a utopian space, nor a 
universal solution, but is proof that alternatives to Western modernity can and do exist.
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